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EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM IN AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

The Analysis of Military Policy

FOR fifteen years American military policy has been in a state of turmoil and change. As a result, perhaps, stability has ranked high as a goal of military policy. In some respects the evolution of military policy between 1945 and 1960 can be described as a search for stability: stability in expenditure, stability in forces, stability in concepts. These goals contrast with the reality of military policy, which has been constant change and conflict. This gap has led many to argue that the current phase of military policy is unprecedented in American history. Certainly the intensity and significance of the problems are unprecedented. Conflict and change, however, are not new to military policy. In the past, they have alternated with periods of stability and harmony.

A common view holds that a government's military policy is shaped by its reactions to the last war and its anticipations of the next. American military policy, in particular, is often said to evolve through a war to peace to war cycle. After a war the nation lets down its guard; its armies vanish into the landscape. Security and peace eliminate the need for military forces. Later, as threats develop from abroad, military men and others warn of the need to rearm, but the nation does not listen. Eventually the danger suddenly becomes apparent to all, the country mobilizes and marches off to fight a successful war. After the war, it loses many fruits of victory and once again disbands its armed strength.

There are certain elements of truth in this picture.[1] It is not,

[1] For a more extensive discussion of the concepts of "equilibrium," "disequilibrium," "strategy," and "structure," see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York, 1961), chap. 1.

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however, the most useful framework for analyzing the evolution of military policy. Wars are often merely interludes in the development of military policy. The goal of policy is to prevent or to win future wars, but policy is largely shaped by the continuing peacetime needs and goals of the government. The military policy of a government is the product of the influences of the domestic and external environments of the government and of the goals it pursues in those environments.

Military policy is both domestic policy and foreign policy. Major changes in military policy reflect changes in the relation of the government to its domestic or foreign environment. If the external balance of power changes and the government sees opportunities to expand its territory and power abroad, these changes in its external environment will be reflected in its military policy. The changes in military policy, in turn, may require changes in aspects of domestic policy. Similarly, changes in the domestic environment—such as the rapid industrialization of the country, or a change in its form of government—may lead to alterations in its military policy and its foreign policy; these, in turn, may transform the external environment sufficiently to stimulate changes in the foreign and military policies of other countries.

At any given time, military policy thus reflects the interactions between the external environment and goals of the government and its domestic environment and goals. Military policy is in equilibrium when no sharp conflicts exist among the principal goals of foreign policy, military policy, and domestic policy, and when no major changes in policy are taking place. Equilibrium means harmony and stability in policy. Disequilibrium is the product of basic changes in the domestic and external environments of policy. When the policy environment is upset, disequilibrium ensues until a new balance emerges between external and domestic goals. If these goals remain fundamentally contradictory, military policy may remain in disequilibrium for a long period of time. The achievement of the government's goals in foreign policy, for instance, could require certain types of military forces which its domestic institutions and policies may not permit it to maintain. If the government's domestic and external goals are compatible, it will have a coherent military policy. If they are incompatible, its military policy will be inconsistent, vacillating, and incomplete.

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The scope of military policy reflects its foreign and domestic character. Broadly speaking, military policy can be divided into strategy and structure. Strategy is concerned with the units and uses of force. It involves decisions on the size and character of the armed services, the number and nature of their weapons, their deployments and commitments, their use in war and in support of diplomacy. Structure, on the other hand, concerns the acquisition, allocation, and organization of the resources which go into the units and uses of forces. It involves decisions on finances, personnel, procurement, and organization. Any action in military policy usually involves decision on both strategy and structure. A decision to double the size of the battlefleet is a strategic one. It implies, however, certain decisions on the naval budget, on procurement, and, possibly, on organization. Conceivably, the failure to make the proper structural decisions may modify or reverse the decision on strategy. Prolonged conflicts and inconsistencies could develop among the elements of military policy. Any fundamental change in the environment of military policy thus normally leads to extensive changes in both strategy and structure.

The most important changes in American military policy have not been directly related to the character and size of the wars which the United States has fought. The wars were significant only insofar as they led to fundamental changes in either the external or domestic environment of policy. The Civil War was the biggest war in the world between 1815 and 1914; yet it did not fundamentally change the external or internal environment of military policy. It was an interlude, not a turning point, in the history of policy. The Spanish-American War, on the other hand, was part of a fundamental change in the external environment and thus was associated with important changes in military policy. An analysis of American military policy as a response to changes in its external and domestic environments indicates that before World War II American military policy evolved through three phases of equilibrium and two of disequilibrium.

Neutrality and the Eighteenth-Century Equilibrium

Eighteenth-century America was a part of the European political system. England and Spain possessed major American colonies and, until 1763, France was present also. The struggles

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of the European powers in America were simply extensions of the struggles for power and territory which went on in Europe. Each European war had its American counterpart. Canada was to Britain and France what Silesia was to Austria and Prussia. The winning of independence by the colonies did not fundamentally alter their position in European politics. At birth they faced disputes over territory and other issues with Great Britain and Spain. Nor could the new republic be disinterested in the disposition which these two powers and France made of their American possessions. The Nootka Sound controversy, the retrocession of Louisiana, and British interests in Florida and the Caribbean, all drew the United States into European diplomacy. In addition, the maritime warfare beginning in 1793 between France and England involved the United States in almost continuous controversy over the protection of its neutral rights on the high seas. Geographically, America was isolated from Europe; politically, she was not.

The Founding Fathers did not like this involvement in European politics but they accepted it as a fact. "Were I to indulge my own theory," Jefferson declared in 1785, "I should wish them [the United States] . . . to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the footing of China." He recognized, however, that such isolation was an ideal, not a reality. As Richard Henry Lee put it: "A word more upon the point of our just wishes to be detached from European politics and European vices; of course I wish it most sincerely. But unfortunately Great Britain is upon our Northern quarter and Spain upon the Southern. We are therefore compelled to mix with their Councils in order to be guarded against their ill designs."[2] Given the fact of involvement, the Founding Fathers agreed upon a policy of neutrality. Their aim was not to separate America from Europe—which was beyond their power—but rather to separate America from European wars and intrigues. As early as 1775 John Adams had proclaimed neutrality as "a first principle and a maxim never to be forgotten,"[3] and in 1796 Washington carefully spelled out its implications in his Farewell Address. The address was an ex-

[2] Quoted in J. Fred Rippy and Angie Debo, *The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation*, Smith College Studies in History, IX (Northampton, 1924), pp. 125, 131.

[3] Charles Francis Adams, ed., *The Life and Works of John Adams*, 10 vols. (Boston, 1851-1866), II, p. 505.

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hortation to avoid European balance-of-power politics and European wars. It did not presuppose that America could escape European dangers. Instead it urged a course of action to meet those dangers. America was to be in Europe but not of Europe. China might be the ideal, but Switzerland was the relevant model. The military policy of neutrality was shaped largely by the need to protect American independence and integrity from the threats inherent in Europe's American possessions and Europe's maritime wars. America was to be a hedgehog rather than a mole: it could not hide from European perils but it could ward them off. The purpose was, in the words of Steuben, to make America "respectable with the powers of Europe."[4] This goal shaped the formulation of policy for the militia, the army, and the navy.

The Founding Fathers wanted a military force which could protect the nation against invasion by a European power, but which could not be a weight in European politics, a menace to domestic liberty, or an instrument of aggression. Almost unanimously they relied on a "well-regulated militia" as the most efficient and least dangerous way of insuring the independence and neutrality of the country. Switzerland was consciously chosen as the example to be followed because, as Washington pointed out in his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," it had existed "for Centuries, in the midst of powerful and jealous neighbors, by means of a hardy and well organized Militia."[5] Washington and his associates were well aware of the military limitations of the militia revealed in the Revolution. Their goal was a peacetime policy which would correct these deficiencies and make the militia into an effective and reliable wartime force. The only alternative to such a force was a large peacetime standing army which would be prohibitively expensive and which was contrary to the country's political and military traditions. The militia, moreover, was inherently and traditionally a purely defensive force, and, under the Constitution, its use was limited to domestic and defensive purposes. A well-organized militia meant military force endemic throughout society, every able-

[4] Letter to Washington, April 21, 1783, quoted in John McA. Palmer, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen* (Garden City, N. Y., 1930), p. 18.

[5] U. S. George Washington Bicentennial Commission, *Writings of Washington*, 39 vols. (Washington, 1931-1944), XXVI, p. 388.

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bodied citizen a soldier. It meant a bristling hedgehog which the wolves and foxes of Europe would find in their interest to leave alone. Washington, Adams, Jefferson, all made the establishment of a strong militia system a prime objective of their legislative programs.

Primary reliance upon the militia meant a small rôle for a standing army. All the Founding Fathers agreed that a standing army was undesirable in a free state if it could possibly be avoided. The political tradition of antipathy for a large standing army was thus reinforced by the absence of a military requirement for one. The issue really was whether an army was required at all. Jefferson and others thought that in peacetime it was superfluous. Washington and Hamilton wanted a modest army to guard the frontiers against the English, Spanish, and Indians.

The immediate cause of the creation of an army was the protection of the frontier from the Indians, and the immediate rationalization for the creation of a navy was the protection of commerce from Algerian pirates. Apart from these initial stimuli, the broad lines of development of the Army and the Navy were, until after the War of 1812, shaped primarily by American needs in relation to Europe. The need for a permanent military force to deal with the Indian danger was seldom stressed, despite the fact that the Indians were for a century to be the principal reason for its existence. In 1794 Congress authorized the first naval vessels for the express purpose of dealing with the Algerian corsairs. Although an agreement was shortly reached with Algiers, the Administration secured the consent of Congress to continue building three frigates. These were designed not only for action against the Algerians but also to be superior "to any frigates belonging to any of the European Powers." These ships first saw action in the naval war with France, which also led to the creation of a Navy Department and the construction or purchase of a number of frigates, sloops, and other vessels. The differences between the Jeffersonians and Federalists over naval policy did not reflect differences over the basic policy of neutrality so much as differences over the relative importance of foreign commerce to the nation. The Federalists wished to construct a moderate-sized fleet which would prevent European nations from interfering with the neutral rights of our commerce. The Navy was to be to the merchant marine what the militia was to the territory. The Jeffersonians, on the other hand, held

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that the proper limit of concern was not the merchant fleet abroad but the seacoast at home. Hence Jeffersonian naval policy was directed toward the potential danger of European invasion rather than European interference with our commerce. Jefferson's administration shifted from the construction of a sea-going fleet to the construction of gunboats for coastal defense.

Changes in the International Environment, 1803-1823

During the first twenty years after the Constitutional Convention, the involvement of the United States in European politics thus led to an emphasis upon the Regular Army to guard the northern and southern frontiers against surprises, a militia to repel invasion, coastal fortifications and gunboats to ward off maritime attacks, and, among the Federalists, the creation of a fleet to prevent European interference with overseas commerce. Subordinate military concerns were the protection of commerce against non-European threats and the protection of the frontier against the Indians. Changes in the international situation in the second decade of the nineteenth century greatly altered the relative importance of these functions. Beginning with the American purchase of Louisiana in 1802, the European powers gradually withdrew from America. The revolutions in Latin America against Spain, the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1818, Spain's cession of Florida to the United States in 1819, and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 successively reinforced this isolation. European possessions in America and European maritime wars—the two factors which earlier had involved the United States in European politics—declined in importance. Except for Canada, which was neutralized, and a few scattered colonial remnants, Europe was out of America. Similarly, the weakening of France, the end of the overlong century of Franco-British naval wars, the maritime supremacy of the British fleet, and the conscious efforts of Britain to maintain the balance of power in Europe, combined to end the struggles which had led the United States to espouse a policy of neutrality. The isolation of America from Europe was not the least significant political result of the Congress of Vienna. Isolation, which had been a dream in 1790, became a reality in 1820, largely as the result of the action of the European powers themselves.

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Isolation and the Continental Equilibrium

The change in international position implied drastic changes in military policy. Neutrality required a particular type of armament. Isolation now made those armaments unnecessary. Or, if it did not make them unnecessary, it sharply reduced the probability of the contingency which they were designed to meet. American policy had been geared to America's presence, if not participation, in the European political system. Now, however, John Quincy Adams' "two spheres" had become a reality. The concern of the Founding Fathers "to make America respectable with Europe" was no longer of crucial importance. Many of the older strategic ideas appropriate to a foreign policy of neutrality still continued to be popular. But in practice, as the danger of involvement with Europe receded, policy was more and more shaped by the needs of continental and commercial expansion. The Army became an Indian-fighting and civilization-building frontier force. The Navy became the widely dispersed guardian of commerce in the non-European waters of the globe. Except during the Civil War, the pattern of strategy and structure which emerged in the 1820's remained reasonably constant for over fifty years.

The Grand Designs. So long as America remained part of Europe the creation of a well-organized militia, a battle fleet, and strong coastal fortifications remained within the realm of political possibility. After the withdrawal of Europe from America, "grand designs" to accomplish these goals were still proposed by military and political leaders. Following the War of 1812 the War and Navy Departments drew up comprehensive plans for the forces required to fight the war over again somewhat more successfully. These included Calhoun's plan for an "expansible standing army," the shipbuilding program embodied in the Naval Act of 1816, and the plans for coastal defense proposed by the Board of Fortifications in 1821. None of these programs was realized. Congress rejected the army plan in principle; it approved the shipbuilding program without considering its strategic implications and then did not support it with appropriations; and it furnished only very limited funds for the construction of coastal fortifications.

This pattern was repeated again and again throughout the century. "Grand designs" for military reserves, a battle fleet,

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and coastal fortifications were regularly recommended but never realized. The military needs for which they were relevant were too remote and the practical political support for them too weak. Calhoun's expansible army and its more popular alternative, a well-organized militia, would be necessary to repel European attacks which seldom seemed likely. Presidents and senators talked of the importance of the militia and Secretaries of War regularly urged Congress to strengthen it. Simultaneously the militia disintegrated as a military force. So long as there was no need for it to defend anything, everyone could agree that the militia was "our first line of defense." The American people went through the nineteenth century with a happy and harmless faith in an ineffective force which was protecting them from a nonexistent threat.

A similar fate befell the other strategic carry-overs from the earlier era. The vulnerability of the coast to attack was continually deplored, and major plans for its fortification were advanced in 1821, 1826, 1840, and 1845. The great schemes, however, were never realized. In 1885 the Endicott Board found the coast still defenseless and urged the installation of new artillery, which thirteen years later was still absent as the United States went to war with Spain. Similarly, the grand plans for the construction of a battle fleet came to nought. The 1816 naval act laid down a comprehensive and systematic building program extending over six years and including nine seventy-fours, twelve frigates, and sundry other vessels. This fleet never materialized, however, and the expansion of the country westward steadily reduced the political power of those sections most sympathetic to the needs of the Navy. In 1841, for instance, Secretary of the Navy Upshur submitted a master plan to Congress for a fleet whose size and composition were carefully based upon estimates of the naval forces which European powers might send against us in the event of war. Congress quietly ignored it. For most of the century a gap existed between the strategic plans carried over from the earlier age when America was still part of Europe and the military policy in practice which was shaped by more immediate and current needs.

Army Strategy and Structure. Secretary Calhoun in the 1820's, Lt. Halleck in the 1840's, and General Schofield in the 1870's all argued that the Indian-fighting and frontier functions of the Army were transitory and that they should not distract it from its

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more important duties of conserving military knowledge and preparing for a major conflict. Nonetheless, the requirements of the frontier shaped the strategy and structure of the Army. The Regular Army had come into existence to deal with the Indian threat and for a hundred years thereafter this was its primary *raison d'être*. Without the frontier the Regular Army would have gone the way of the militia. In setting the numerical size of the Army, Congress looked westward not eastward. The frontier shaped the force composition, military organization, tactics, and weapons of the Army. The expansion and development of the country also provided the Army with a wide range of nonmilitary functions. The War Department regulated trade with the Indians; Army generals negotiated treaties with them; Army explorers surveyed and mapped land and chose the sites for forts and the settlements which were to follow; Army engineers built roads and developed waterways.

The structure of the Army was shaped by these functions. The continental pattern of organization emerged in the 1820's with the creation of the post of Commanding General of the Army. He was responsible for the discipline and command of the Army, in short, for its military aspects, while the Secretary of War was in charge of the administration of the War Department and the various staff bureaus. The system produced continuing friction between the Secretary and General, but it reflected the functions which the Army had to perform. The Army had a clear-cut military function in the west, the performance of which required a military commander. Since the function was a current and immediate one, the Army did not need a general staff or comparable agency to draw up war plans for future contingencies. Throughout the nineteenth century the American Army, somewhat like the British Army, differed from the armies of continental Europe in that it did not have a general staff, a system of higher military education, or a reserve system. Also, unlike the European armies, it was engaged in almost continuous military action.

The personnel structure of the Army also reflected its frontier and coastal defense missions. The rank and file were enlisted for long terms, at times of five years, and were generally a rough and unsavory lot. They were what the Army needed for Indian fighting and road building in the West. Increasingly, the officers

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were products of West Point. Until 1817 the mission of West Point itself had not been entirely clear. Some thought that it should train officers for the militia. Others wished to disestablish it altogether. After 1817, however, under the leadership of Sylvanus Thayer, the Academy became a first-rate military and engineering school. The decline of the militia eliminated the need for a school to train militia officers. The need was instead for engineers for both civilian and military purposes, and it was to this need that West Point responded. Until 1836 it was the only major engineering school in the country, and its graduates were employed in a wide variety of civil and military activities.

Navy Strategy and Structure. The primary mission of the nineteenth-century Navy was the protection of American commerce abroad. Following the War of 1812, the Navy became more and more dispersed about the globe and performed a wider and wider variety of supporting functions. The activities of the Navy were no longer focused primarily upon the European maritime powers. The building of a battle fleet was abandoned in practice if not in theory, and emphasis shifted to building a larger number of small ships. Between 1821 and 1823, for instance, Congress reduced the program which had been approved in the Naval Act of 1816, but then turned around and authorized the construction of ten sloops for the suppression of piracy.[6] In 1815 the Navy returned to the Mediterranean to finish its struggle with the Algerians. Between 1821 and 1826 it engaged in extensive operations against the West Indian pirates; in the 1830's and 1840's the suppression of the slave trade became a major function. The dispersion of the Navy was reflected in its squadron structure. The Pacific and West Indian squadrons were established in 1821, the Brazilian squadron in 1826, the East Indian in 1835, the Home squadron in 1841, and the African in 1843. Like the Army, the Navy was frequently involved in diplomacy. Naval officers on distant stations had to take the initiative in dealing with foreign governments and local princes for the protection of American trade and citizens. During the first part of the nineteenth century naval officers negotiated treaties with Turkey, the Barbary powers, China, Japan, Korea,

[6] Howard White, *Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United States* (Urbana, Ill., 1924), p. 188.

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Hawaii, Samoa, Denmark, and France.[7] Significantly, all but the last two were with non-European governments. Also related to its dispersion was the important rôle of the Navy in explorations and scientific expeditions. Naval officers explored the Amazon, surveyed Latin American and North American coasts, aided in cable laying, collected scientific specimens and data from faraway places, and generally engaged in a variety of miscellaneous duties which reflected the widespread dispersion of naval vessels rather than the dominance of any single purpose. After the Civil War, when the American merchant marine declined in importance and less need existed to protect it against avaricious oriental potentates, the functions of the Navy took on a more domestic hue. It was frequently argued that the numerous naval officers should be employed in the lighthouse service, the Coast Guard, the coastal survey, the life-saving service, and steamboat inspection. Without a clear-cut overriding military mission, the Navy was available to fill in wherever it might be needed. Throughout the century the emphasis in naval construction was on cruisers, frigates, and sloops for commerce protection abroad, and gunboats, monitors, and floating batteries for coastal defense at home.

The subordinate and diversified rôle of the Navy was reflected in the general lack of public interest and support during the nineteenth century. New England was the traditional pro-Navy region, but after the Federalists were swept out of office in 1800 New England was never able to dominate the government again. The farmers of the interior saw little need for a navy. The Navy enjoyed a brief renaissance in the middle of the century when the interests of the South in expansion in the Caribbean led its statesmen to take a more sympathetic attitude toward naval needs. Otherwise, the dominant elements in the government were generally indifferent or actually hostile to the needs of the Navy.

The lack of any real naval threat and, consequently, of any significant military mission for the Navy made it unnecessary for the Navy to have an organization emphasizing the distinction between military and civilian functions. The most important naval activities were those associated with the technical problems

[7] For the activities of the mid-century Navy, see the writings of Charles O. Paullin, especially *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883* (Baltimore, 1912); "Naval Administration under the Navy Commissioners, 1815-1842," 33 *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (June 1907), pp. 597-641; "Naval Administration, 1842-1861," *Ibid.* (Dec. 1907), pp. 1435-77.

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of the design, construction, outfitting, and supply of naval vessels. In 1814 Secretary William Jones urged that Congress establish a five-man naval board to be in general charge of these activities, with each of its members specifically responsible for one of them. Congress responded by creating the Board of Naval Commissioners and giving it a collective responsibility in this area. In 1842 the abolition of the Board and the establishment of the bureau system marked a return to Jones's basic concept. Neither under the Board nor under the bureaus was there any clear differentiation between the military and the civilian functions which the department performed under the Secretary. The organization was adapted to the peacetime functions of the Navy. During war or periods when war threatened it had to be supplemented by the establishment of a separate office or mechanism to direct the fighting activities of the Navy. In the Civil War a retired naval officer was appointed Assistant Secretary to perform this function. During other crises naval war boards were appointed to provide a military head for the Navy which could direct its operations in combat.

The Stability of the Equilibrium. Once the continental pattern of military policy emerged in the 1820's it remained remarkably stable until disrupted by fundamental changes in the domestic and external environments of policy in the 1880's. In 1820 the principal functions of the American Army were protection of the frontier and coastal defense. Sixty years later there had been no fundamental change. In 1820 the principal military functions of the American Navy were the protection of American commerce in peace, the destruction of enemy commerce in war, and the defense of the coasts. Sixty years later these were also unchanged. The services increased somewhat in size (although not in proportion to the growth of the country), but they did not change basically in force composition, weapons, deployment, organization, or personnel structure. The deficiencies of policy were as stable as its achievements. In the 1820's governmental officials and boards lamented the absence of a well-organized militia, a battle fleet, and effective coastal fortifications. In the 1880's the same deficiencies were described in almost the same terms and the same proposals were advanced to remedy them.

During the first thirty years of the Republic, Congress had devoted almost constant attention to military affairs. The crea-

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tion of the War Department (1789), the Militia Act (1792), the creation of a Navy (1794) and the Navy Department (1798), the establishment of West Point (1802), the organization of the War Department staff (1812), the creation of the Board of Naval Commissioners (1815), the act to increase the Navy (1816), the establishment of the Office of Commanding General (1821), all reflected the disequilibrium in military policy. The sixty years after 1820, however, produced little significant legislation on military structure. Symbolic of the stability of policy was the fate of the Burnside Committee recommendations of 1878. A Joint Committee of Congress appointed to propose measures for the reorganization and reform of the Army, its membership included three senators and five representatives, all with distinguished careers as general officers in the Civil War. After detailed and exhaustive study, the committee proposed a comprehensive bill covering almost every aspect of military policy. There, however, the matter ended. Congress took no action on the bill, "and for almost twenty years no other legislation of importance affecting the size or organization of the military establishment was adopted."[8]

Changes in the Domestic and External Environments, 1880-1916

In the 1880's and the 1890's fundamental changes began to occur in the domestic and external environments of American military policy. At home, the disappearance of the frontier deprived the Army of its traditional function. At sea, the requirements for the peacetime protection of commerce had disappeared even earlier. The balance of power in Europe and Asia changed. The United States moved onto the world scene, developing new interests in the Pacific, acquiring Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, and at the end of the century, the Philippines. American interest in the Far East increased and the "open door" in China became the keystone of American policy in that area. The rise of Germany and of German naval power altered the European balance of power, dislodged Great Britain from her position as the balancer, and led eventually to the division of Europe between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. In Asia, Japan defeated China and Russia and emerged as the dominant local power. Meanwhile the rapid industrialization of the United States in-

[8] White, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

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creased its war potential in general and its ability to support a modern navy in particular.

These developments made obsolete the Continental pattern of military forces. The United States now needed a navy which could command the neighboring oceans, an army with reserves which could be mobilized and sent overseas, and a staff organization which could draw up plans for the mobilization and overseas movement of troops. Within the services, groups of younger and more forward-looking officers recognized the need for change. The years from the mid-1880's to 1916 were years of change, debate, controversy, and legislation in military policy. With the help of Mahan and the Spanish-American War, fundamental changes were made in military strategy and structure. The Indian-fighting Army passed into history. A General Staff was created. The National Guard was organized with federal support. The Navy was tremendously expanded from the twelfth largest in the world in 1886 to one of the three largest in 1907. In 1915 the post of Chief of Naval Operations was created. The Joint Board was established to integrate Army and Navy strategic planning. Rudimentary provision was made for economic mobilization. In 1916 the Act to Increase the Navy and the National Defense Act ended the period of most rapid change. In 1920 the National Defense Act and the investigation of the Navy Department produced few significant alterations in the pattern of military policy developed before American entrance into World War I. Between 1920 and 1940 the changes in military policy were minor compared to the fundamental ones of the disequilibrium at the turn of the century. The basic pattern of policy had been fixed. A new equilibrium had emerged.

Mobilization Strategy and the Interwar Equilibrium

American military policy in 1920 differed far more from that of 1895 than that of 1895 differed from that of 1870 or that of 1945 differed from that of 1920. In contrast to the dispersed naval vessels on "police duty" and the Indian-fighting Army of the continental period, the principal elements of the interwar military equilibrium were: 1) a strong Navy and battle fleet, second to none, as a first line of defense capable of dominating the western Atlantic and the eastern Pacific; 2) a small Regular Army devoted primarily to the preservation and increase of military knowledge, the training of civilian components, and the

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preparation of plans for future wars; 3) a large manpower potential of organized reserves and, to a much larger extent, of untrained civilians, who, it was assumed, could be mobilized and trained in an emergency; and 4) a strong civilian industrial economy capable of conversion to war production in an emergency. The key to strategy was the concept of mobilization. The armed forces had few duties in peacetime except to prepare for a future conflict with a major power. Potential enemies were all across the ocean. Only the Navy had to be maintained in a high state of readiness. In an emergency the nation could mobilize for war behind the seas and the fleet. Apart from the fleet, the peacetime military system was designed to furnish the framework for wartime mobilization.

Navy Strategy and Structure. The dramatic change in the international position of the United States between the 1890's and the close of World War I produced a revolution in the rôle and the composition of the Navy.[9] The new naval strategy received, of course, its most authoritative exposition in the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783,* was published in 1890. Attacking the old idea that the functions of the Navy were coastal defense and commerce raiding, Mahan argued that the true mission of a navy was acquiring command of the sea through the destruction of the enemy fleet. He vented his scorn upon the "police" functions to which the Navy had been relegated during this earlier period of national strategy. To achieve command of the sea it was necessary to have a stronger battle fleet than the enemy. This could only be secured by building more ships than other nations, building larger ships with more fire power than those of other nations, and keeping those ships grouped together in a single fleet instead of deploying them over the world in separate squadrons. The net results were naval races, big-gun battleships, and the theory of concentration as the chief aim of naval strategy.

In its generalized form, the Mahan doctrine was accepted by almost all the world's naval powers. Each country, however, also had to apply the doctrine to the threats peculiar to it. Even before World War I the American and Japanese navies had begun to think of each other as natural enemies. After the de-

[9] For a more detailed analysis of naval strategy, see Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," 80 *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (May 1954), p. 487-493.

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struction of German surface power in World War I the bulk of the fleet was shifted to the Pacific. For the next two decades American naval thought was oriented almost exclusively towards the possibility of a war with Japan. The framework for the naval balance of power between the two countries was defined in the Washington Treaty of 1922. The naval strategy of each country, however, had to be based on the premise that the balance was not necessarily a lasting one. The requirements of a war with Japan shaped the Navy's thought, its forces, and its weapons. The Navy developed long-range submarines, the fleet train, and long-range patrol bombers as substitutes for the western Pacific bases denied it by the treaty. The emergence of the Marine Corps as the world's leading amphibious force was encouraged by the need to prepare for an island-hopping campaign in the Pacific. The Navy's strategic concept gave a distinctive unity and coherence to its activities, and in the 1941-1945 naval war with Japan the Navy in effect realized the strategic concept which had dominated its planning for twenty years.

The increased importance of the Navy to national security was paralleled by the heightened prestige of the Navy throughout the country. Public opinion came to view the Navy as the symbol of America's new rôle in world affairs. Business groups played a more important rôle in government and were more favorably inclined toward the Navy than the agrarian groups which had been dominant earlier. The Navy League was organized. Presidents—especially the two Roosevelts— and congressional leaders were more sympathetic to the Navy's requests for funds. The expansion of the Navy was further aided by the fact that between 1885 in the House (1899 in the Senate) and 1921 responsibility for naval appropriations lay with the Naval Affairs Committees rather than with the Appropriations Committee.[10] The changes in the economic and political character of the country thus sustained and shaped the strategy required by its new international position.

The emergence of a well-defined military function for the Navy meant that the old organization of the Navy Department had to be altered also. The formation of the fleet and the de-

[10] See R. G. Albion, "The Naval Affairs Committees, 1816-1947," 78 *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (Nov. 1952), p. 1228, and, on the Navy's political support, George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None* (New York, 1940), pp. 394 *et seq.*

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velopment of its purely military rôle permitted the business of the Department to be roughly divided into military functions and civilian functions. The reformers within the Navy campaigned for an organizational structure which reflected this duality of function. Their campaign resulted in the creation of the General Board in 1900, the institution of the naval aides in 1909, and the creation of the Office of Naval Operations in 1915. In time, the Chief of Naval Operations assumed responsibility for the military aspects of the Navy while the bureau chiefs continued to report directly to the Secretary on the performance of their logistical and supporting functions. Similarly, the new needs and rôle of the Navy led Congress to reform its personnel system in 1899 and again in 1916 and to double the number of appointments to Annapolis. Only once between 1870 and 1895 was the strength of the Navy more than 12,000 officers and men. In 1896, however, it began a regular expansion, reaching 60,000 officers and men in 1916. After World War I, it leveled off between 90,000 and 100,000 during most of the 1920's and 1930's. The new emphasis upon the military purposes of the Navy was also reflected in the creation of the Naval War College in 1884 and the subsequent expansion of advanced educational facilities for Navy officers.

The twenty years before World War I were a period of revolution in the Navy; the twenty years after the war were a period of stability. If, as the Sprouts put it, a Rip Van Winkle had fallen asleep in the Navy Department in 1898 and awakened twenty years later, "he would have been amazed at the startling developments that had taken place." He would have been struck by the momentous changes in naval architecture, the novel idea of maintaining "a permanent American fighting fleet" in peace as well as war, and the "greatly enhanced importance of the Navy in the international relations of the American people." If, however, the "navy-minded Rip Van Winkle had fallen asleep following the return of the American battleships from Europe in the winter of 1918-1919, and awakened twenty years later, he would have beheld changes, it is true, but no revolutionary alteration of the principles of naval technology, strategy, and organization; of the processes of naval administration and policy determination; of the general atmosphere of public opinion; of the relation of naval development to internal politics; or of the impact of American naval power and policy on international

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politics in Europe, Eastern Asia, and the Western Hemisphere." The interwar years were years of "remarkable continuity" in the naval establishment.[11]

Army Strategy and Structure. The Army of 1895 numbered only 27,495 men organized into 25 regiments of infantry, 10 of cavalry, and 5 of artillery. It reflected its traditional Indian-fighting mission. It was an Army where an officer "learned all there was to know about commanding forty dragoons, and forgot everything else."[12] By 1920, however, the Army had been fundamentally reshaped. Throughout the 1920's and the 1930's its strength averaged about 140,000 men. It was organized into divisions and corps areas on a geographical basis. Most importantly, it was oriented toward preparation for a future major war with a large power rather than continuing frontier struggles with Indian tribes.

The nineteenth-century Army had no reserve system and had needed none. The twentieth-century Army, however, was viewed as the cadre of the vast military force which would be required in any future general conflict. During the nineteenth century the militia had lost its function and disintegrated as a military force. At the end of the nineteenth century it went through a renaissance. The Regular Army needed a reserve and the National Guard had a new rôle to play as the principal element of that reserve force. The great debates over Army military policy between 1901 and 1920 all centered about proposals concerning the Army reserve system: the militia act of 1903, the second Dick Act of 1908, the General Staff proposals of 1912, Garrison's Continental Army plan, the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920. The basic issues concerned the size, nature, and control of the Army's reserve forces. Symbolic of the change in concern from the nineteenth century was Secretary Root's exhumation and publication of Emory Upton's *The Military Policy of the United States.* Written in 1881, this volume was a long argument for Calhoun's expansible standing army scheme and against reliance upon state-controlled militia as the principal

[11] Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton, 1946), pp. 2-3.

[12] General Ewell, quoted in United States Military Academy, Department of Economics, Government, and History, *Military Policy of the United States, 1775-1944* (West Point, N. Y., 1944), p. 14.

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reserve force. It was irrelevant to military policy in the 1880's; twenty-five years later, however, the issue it dealt with was the dominant issue in military policy. The twenty years of debate and conflict eventually produced a reserve system which took its definitive form in the National Defense Act of 1916 and was confirmed and extended by the National Defense Act of 1920. The National Guard, the organized reserves, and the ROTC assumed their modern shape at this time. The system established by these acts remained relatively unchanged during the 1920's and 1930's.[13]

At the same time that the Army reserve structure was emerging, fundamental changes were also taking place in Army organization. In 1903 the office of Commanding General of the Army was abolished and the General Staff and the office of Chief of Staff were created. These organizational developments reflected the new functions of the Army. The General Staff was designed as a planning agency, "the organ of thought" in the War Department, to prepare plans for the mobilization of the Army in a general war. The Army War College was also established to assist in planning and to educate higher-ranking officers for their complex responsibilities. Since the Army was no longer engaged in continuous fighting, the distinction between the combat forces of the Army and the technical bureaus declined in significance. Instead of the earlier divided system of authority, the Chief of Staff supervised all elements of the Army on behalf of the Secretary of War. Between 1903 and the end of World War I the General Staff and its Chief struggled against the Adjutant General, the bureaus, and, during World War I, General Pershing. After the end of the war the primacy of the General Staff was established, and the pattern of War Department organization did not again change significantly until 1942. Planning for future war required coöperation among the services, and the Joint Board was established in 1901. Like the General Staff, this agency had a checkered and uncertain existence until after World War I, when it became the vehicle through which the various "color"

[13] For the "disequilibrium," 1903-1916, and "equilibrium," 1916-1940, of the National Guard, see Martha Derthick, "Militia Lobby in the Missile Age: The Political Evolution of the National Guard," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, to be published in 1962.

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plans and eventually the Rainbow plans were developed.[14] The experience of World War I also demonstrated the need for planning for economic mobilization, and the National Defense Act specifically made this a responsibility of the War Department. The Army Industrial College was established and a series of industrial mobilization plans prepared.

Between 1920 and 1939 Army policy remained reasonably stable and harmonious. A balance had been reached among external and domestic goals affecting military policy. The major issues had been settled. No serious controversies took place. No significant changes were made in the established pattern of strategy and structure. Equilibrium prevailed.

The Current Disequilibrium

Among the more significant changes in the international position of the United States after World War II were the continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union, the expansion of Soviet economic and military power, the involvement of the United States in the politics of Europe and Asia, the rise of Communist China, the decline of colonialism, and the pressures toward modernization and industrialization in the former colonial territories. In 1961, world politics was still evolving rapidly. Military policy was necessarily in a state of disequilibrium. During the fifteen years after World War II, it evolved through two phases. From 1945 through 1949, policy adjusted to the lessons of World War II. Interpretations of the World War II experience shaped the National Security Act of 1947, the strategic concepts of the services, the general belief in the efficacy of strategic airpower. The principal goals of the services—Universal Military Training for the Army, 70 groups for the Air Force, "super-carriers" for the Navy—all were formulated before the war ended.

The needs of the Cold War, however, were not identical with the needs derived from World War II. In 1949 and 1950 the first important steps were taken to adjust military policy to the new goal of American foreign policy: the containment of the Soviet Union. This process of adjustment was slow and com-

[14] See Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," *World Politics*, vol. XI, no. 2 (Jan. 1959), pp. 221-250, and "Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration, 1900-1938," to appear in Harry L. Coles, ed., *Total War and Cold War*.

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plex. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1950's, a new strategy of deterrence was emerging to replace the pre-World War II strategy of mobilization. A strategic retaliatory force armed with nuclear weapons had been brought into existence. American forces were permanently deployed in Europe under an international command headed by an American general. A continental defense system had been created. A network of military alliances—NATO, SEATO, bilateral pacts—and military assistance programs bound the United States to its principal allies. By 1961, except for limited war forces, military programs had been substantially adjusted to the needs of deterrence.[15] The transformation of structural policy, however, particularly in the areas of organization and personnel, lagged behind the changes in strategy. More significantly, the continued rapid evolution of world politics suggested that the requirements of deterrence would themselves continue to change. Sustained deterrence in the 1960's, for instance, might demand either a large-scale civil defense program or some form of arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union. Conceivably, the strategy of deterrence was itself only a way station to an even more radically different military policy. American military policy was an important influence on world politics. Stability in world politics, however, would have to precede stability in military policy. Each of the earlier periods of disequilibrium in American military policy lasted about thirty years. Little reason exists to believe that the current phase will be any shorter.

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[15] For the evolution of strategic programs in the current phase of disequilibrium, see Huntington, *The Common Defense, passim.*

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ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY POWER

THE JAPANESE HIGH COMMAND IN WORLD WAR II

IN WAR, it has been observed, organization is the key to national success.[1] Military power, economic wealth, technological skills, and political know-how are all essential for victory, but only through efficient organization can these resources be focused and translated into an effective unity. Successful organization for war, then, is the arranging and combining of military, political, industrial, and economic strength into a coöperative and disciplined pattern to achieve the desired end. It involves a close interrelationship between individuals, institutions, and, frequently, governments. It necessitates a clear understanding of national objectives, a precise definition of authority, and a responsible and undivided leadership. It is an essential of military power, the sine qua non of victory.

Nations differ in their organization for war, even as they are unlike in their political structure. In World War II, the divergent philosophies and institutions of the participants led to wide differences in their national military organizations. Nowhere, however, was there a more curious and paradoxical arrangement than in Japan, where the high command was a strange amalgam of apparent strength and actual weakness, of modern constitutional leadership and feudal overlordship, of unity and division. As the first Asian state to adopt and tailor for itself the tools and methods of the West, Japan had become the only nation of the Orient to play a dominant rôle in international politics. Yet the Japanese clung to many of their old habits and institutions, and the result of this was a curious admixture of East and West in the nation, its government, and its top-level organization for World War II. This organization bore a superficial resemblance to Western military establishments, but it retained within itself an Oriental divisiveness that hastened Japan's inevitable defeat.[2]

1 Harold and Margaret Sprout (eds.), *Foundations of National Power* (Princeton, 1945), pp. 28 *et seq.*

2 The Japanese high command is discussed and analyzed in Yale Candee Maxon, *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945* (Berkeley, 1957). For this essay, I have drawn heavily on the foregoing as well as on Takushiro Hattori, *Dai Toa Senso Zenshi*

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I

The Japanese high command was, on the surface, similar to that of the United States. The commander-in-chief of the Japanese armed forces, as with the American military establishment, was the head of state, in Japan, the Emperor. Under him was Imperial General Headquarters, comparable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with its Army and Navy Sections—there was no separate Air Force—which planned and had over-all direction of armies in the field and fleets at sea. There was a War and a Navy Minister in the Cabinet, and there were also civilian agencies for the direction of the war effort on the home front. This organization, seemingly not unlike the American, was, in practice, extremely different.

The roots of the difference lay in the Japanese constitution, which established a paradoxical monarchy that was at the same time both absolute and limited. The Emperor, the political, military, and theocratic head of the nation, had unrestricted power to direct the affairs of state. He was advised by civilian and military counsellors who not only gave him the benefit of their opinion but who also, constitutionally, bore the full responsibility for imperial actions. These actions were theoretically subject to legislative control, but the constitution had created so feeble a Diet that in practice the legislators exercised almost no power. While thus free to act as an absolute ruler, the Emperor nevertheless chose to wear the mantle of a constitutional monarch and normally followed the advice of his counsellors. He had, in effect, authority without responsibility, power without initiative.[3]

(The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War), 4 vols. (Tokyo, 1953), translation on file in the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (OCMH); "Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record," a monograph prepared by former Japanese Army officers as part of the unpublished series, "Japanese Studies in World War II," on file in OCMH; Saburo Hayashi with Alvin D. Coox, *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico, Va., 1959). Useful material is also contained in Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York, 1949); Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (New York, 1942); Toshikazu Kase, *Journey to the "Missouri"* (New Haven, 1950); Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954).

[3] See also Yasumasa Matsudaira, "The Japanese Emperor and the War," appendix to GHQ, SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan), "Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area," unpublished manuscript on file in OCMH.

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With the Diet nearly impotent and the Emperor usually content to be led by his advisers, control of the Japanese government normally lay in the hands of these advisers—the Cabinet and the Supreme Command (the Army and Navy General Staffs) and, to a lesser extent, the Emperor's household and other counsellors. The result was a dual government, a civil-military oligarchy emerging during the 1930's in which the *gumbatsu*, the military clique, gained ever-increasing power at the expense of civilian rule. By the time of Pearl Harbor, this power was all but unchallengeable and, as the war progressed, centered in the Army, whose dominance over all civil and military governmental functions became more and more pronounced. Only the failure of Japanese military ambitions and the collapse of General Hideki Tojo's *shogunate* brought about the exercise of imperial authority that ended the war and resulted in the re-emergence of civil control. During the war years, however, Japan was a military dictatorship and the Japanese high command was, in effect, the government of Japan.

Under the Japanese constitution, the Army and Navy were responsible solely to the Emperor, and, as imperial advisers, the Chiefs of Staff of the two services had direct access to the throne. The Emperor also received military counsel from two advisory bodies, neither of which had much actual power. The first was the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, created in 1898 as the highest body of military counsellors to the throne. But there were few officers of this rank to serve on the Board and it met rarely, so that its influence was minimal. The second advisory group, the Supreme Military Council, included the members of the first group as well as the War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff, and other general and flag officers appointed by the Emperor. The Council was limited to advising on not too highly classified matters and had no say in operations.[4] None of the Emperor's other advisers—the Cabinet, the Privy Council, the *Genro* (Elder Statesmen), the *Jushin* (Senior Statesmen, all former Prime Ministers), or his other personal counsellors—had any authority to comment on military matters. Thus, when the Army or Navy Chief of Staff submitted plans to the

[4] The Supreme Military Council *(Gunji Sangiin)*, or Supreme War Council, as its title is frequently translated, should not be confused with the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War *(Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi)*, a much more important body created in mid-1944 and discussed below.

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Emperor, his only advice on the merits of these plans came from the very men who had drafted them. Normally he followed this advice and accepted whatever the Army or Navy General Staff proposed.

Nor did the civil government—the Prime Minister and his Cabinet—have a voice in the planning or conduct of military operations. Indeed, the first the Prime Minister might learn of an Army or Navy plan was when the appropriate service minister passed him an information copy. The other members of the Cabinet were even more helpless. They were responsible for governmental policy only within their individual areas, without even indirect responsibility for military matters. The latter were the province solely of the two service ministers, who had immediate access to the throne and were the only Cabinet members who could advise the Emperor in this area.

To the observer looking for parallels in Western parliamentary governments, the rôles and positions of the War and Navy Ministers were, at the very least, anomalous. Each minister was appointed by his respective service, rather than by the Prime Minister, and he was required by law to be a top military officer on active duty: a general or lieutenant general or an admiral or vice admiral. Thus the two most important positions next to the Prime Minister, in what was ostensibly a civilian government, were held by military officers chosen by the Army and Navy.

This curious arrangement gave the armed forces a life-and-death hold over any civilian cabinet. Constitutionally, no cabinet could exist without its service ministers, so by threatening to resign and thus topple the Cabinet either of these men could bring to bear a most persuasive argument for any course of action the *gumbatsu* might wish to follow. "A Minister of War," declared General Sadao Araki, who once held that post, "is able to force the adoption of any measure desired . . . or to block any measure that meets his disapproval."[5] What happened when the will of the *gumbatsu* was opposed is plainly indicated by at least half a dozen occasions when the Cabinet was either toppled or prevented from forming in the first place. Even though the Prime Minister was theoretically appointed by imperial command, if the Army or Navy disapproved, it could withhold its minister and thus prevent the Prime Minister from forming his cabinet

[5] Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, 1957), p. 132.

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and taking office. More than anything else, this veto was responsible for the domination of Japan's government by its armed forces.

Theoretically, fiscal control of the Army and Navy, the traditional rein of civilian governments on military ambition, was vested in the two service ministers, who submitted the annual military and naval budgets for legislative approval, and the Diet, which could accept or deny these budgets. But there was small chance that the War or Navy Minister would fail to request funds desired by his service, especially if the activities these funds were to support had already been approved by the Emperor. And if the Diet balked at approving a military budget, that of the previous year was automatically carried over.

The rôle of the War and Navy Ministers as spokesmen for the armed forces was not due solely to service loyalty, for each in effect owed his appointment to his respective Chief of Staff. The War Minister was chosen by agreement between the outgoing minister, the Chief of Staff, and the Inspector General of Military Training. But since the Chief of Staff appointed the Inspector General, he controlled two votes, and his own relationship with the outgoing minister made it even easier for him to dominate the choice of the new appointee. The rôle of the Chief of the Navy General Staff in appointing his minister was not as great, since he shared this rôle only with the outgoing Navy Minister. But the latter was still a naval officer, and the Chief of Staff apparently had the major say in the appointment of the new minister.

Curiously enough, the Chiefs of Staff were, in turn, theoretically appointed by the War and Navy Ministers, since the latter had the prerogative of recommending officers for these positions. In practice, however, this was little more than a formality. The War Minister's recommendation was based on consultation and agreement with the outgoing Chief of Staff and his Inspector General of Military Training, that of the Navy Minister on a similar understanding with the Navy Chief of Staff and other officers.

The functional division of responsibility between the Chief of Staff and his minister was usually between operations and administration, with the Chief of Staff controlling plans, operations, organization, and, in the Army, training, and the minister responsible for management, but without any command function.

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In their areas of responsibility, the Chiefs of Staff had complete initiative and control. Originally subordinate to the War and Navy Ministers, in 1878 they had been placed directly under the throne. Since that time, they had been entirely free from control by any political organ and, in General Tojo's words, were "responsible solely to the Emperor in matters of strategy and evaluation of the probable advantages and disadvantages of warfare."[6] The powers of the two Chiefs of Staff—especially of the Army head, whose authority was more extensive than that of his counterpart—were thus extremely broad in both their civil and military functions. Indeed, their unimpeachable and unquestionable prerogatives were referred to, in the popular phrase, as the "independence of the Supreme Command."

II

Under the two Chiefs of Staff, and in practice powerful enough to dominate these officers, were the Army and Navy General Staffs. Their organization was similar, although the Army staff was larger. The most important Army staff agencies were the General Affairs Bureau, the 1st Bureau (Operations), 2nd Bureau (Intelligence), and 3rd Bureau (Transportation and Communications). In the Navy, the 1st Bureau (Operations), 2nd Bureau (Preparations), and 3rd Bureau (Intelligence) carried the most weight. These bureaus were usually headed by general and flag officers, who exercised a strong influence on the conduct of military and naval affairs. In the absence of any other direct influences on the Chiefs of Staff, the bureau chiefs were probably the most important factors in their thinking.

In both staffs, the Operations Bureau exercised the greatest power, especially in the Army where in 1941 it completely dominated the Chief of Staff. Indeed, in high Japanese military circles it was commonly held that the Army Operations Bureau had been mainly responsible for Japan's entry into World War II.

The primary difference in the organization of the two General Staffs was that the Chief of the Naval Staff, unlike his Army counterpart, had no control over training, which was directly under the Training Bureau of the Navy Ministry. The Army

[6] Quoted in Maxon, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

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Chief, however, had direct control of the Army War College and indirect control of the Military Academy and technical schools. He exercised this indirect control through the Inspector General of Military Training who, while technically independent of the Chief of Staff, was appointed by him and operated by means of military ordinances.

One other significant difference was the existence of an Inspectorate General of Army Aviation, outside of, yet indirectly controlled by, the Army General Staff, but the absence of such an agency in the Navy organization. There were, however, Aeronautical Departments in both the Navy and War Ministries.

In addition to the Army and Navy General Staffs, there were extensive staff organizations in both the service ministries. These organizations also consisted of a number of bureaus, staffed and often headed by field grade officers who, by virtue of their position, exercised an influence far beyond their military rank. The main War Ministry bureaus were: Military Affairs, Personnel, Military Administration, Economic Mobilization, Ordnance, Intendance, Medical, and Judicial. In the Navy Ministry, they were: Military Affairs, Military Preparations, Personnel, Training, Supply, Medical, Intendance, and Judicial.

Just as the Chiefs of Staff were dominated by their staff organizations, so the real power in the War and Navy Ministries lay within the bureaus. The most powerful of these were the Military Affairs Bureaus, headed by a lieutenant general and vice admiral respectively, the heart, soul, and driving force of the two ministries. In them was centered responsibility for policy on national defense, mobilization, and international relations, as well as for the general administration, organization, and equipment of the two services, and for liaison with the civil government. The chiefs of these bureaus thus had broad powers in the political field and could affect national policy and foreign affairs to an extent unheard of for staff officers in other countries with parliamentary forms of government.

The picture that emerges is of two Chiefs of Staff who normally controlled their respective cabinet ministers and of all four officials being dominated by their own staffs, particularly by the members of the Operations and Military Affairs Bureaus. During much of World War II, however, there was a significant reversal in some of these relationships. General Tojo, War Minister for four years beginning in July, 1940, was one of the most

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powerful Japanese ever to hold that post. When he became Prime Minister in October, 1941, his influence became even stronger and continued to increase with the passage of time. In late 1942 a violent dispute arose over the proposed evacuation of Guadalcanal, which Tojo and the War Ministry favored and which the Army General Staff opposed. Tojo's victory was overwhelming. Not only were Japanese forces pulled out of Guadalcanal, but the head of the Operations Bureau and his chief deputy, who had been the main opponents of evacuation, were transferred to other posts. And in early 1944 Tojo himself took over the position of Army Chief of Staff. His dominance over the Army staff was matched by Navy Minister Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, who now also became Navy Chief of Staff. But Tojo's position was supreme. In addition to being Prime Minister, War Minister, and Chief of Staff, he was also Munitions Minister, Education Minister, and Minister of Commerce and Industry, and, for a time, had been Home Minister. Only the fall of Saipan in July, 1944, climaxed a growing opposition among the *Genro, Jushin,* and other imperial advisers and the senior Navy officers to bring about an end to Tojo's dictatorship. Even then, so powerful was Tojo that he clung to his position to the bitter end, even disputing his removal with the Emperor. It took the full weight of opposition of the most influential Japanese to force his resignation.[7]

III

The conduct of the war was nominally in the hands of *Daihonei,* literally "the great main camp" but usually translated as Imperial General Headquarters, an organization that bore a surface resemblance to the American or British Joint Chiefs of Staff but that in practice was greatly dissimilar. In 1893 an imperial ordinance had established Imperial GHQ to be set up in time of war. Imperial GHQ was then headed by the Army Chief of Staff, an attempt at unifying the two services under the Army that reflected the Prussian origins of Japan's military establishment. Close coördination with the civil government was achieved by the presence of the Prime Minister at Imperial GHQ meetings and the attendance of the Chiefs of Staff at important

[7] For Tojo's downfall, see especially Kase, *op. cit.,* pp. 73-85.

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cabinet meetings. During the war with China in 1894-1895, and the conflict with Russia a decade later, Imperial GHQ met twice weekly in the presence of the Emperor. In 1903 the ordinance covering Imperial GHQ was revised to give the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff equal responsibility, eliminating the dominant position of the Army. However, no position of chairman, such as exists in the American JCS, was established.

Imperial GHQ does not appear to have met during World War I, but on November 17, 1937, after the start of hostilities in China, the Army succeeded, over Navy opposition, in obtaining its re-establishment. However, the new organization differed from the old in at least two important respects. First of all, a previous requirement that Imperial GHO ordinances had to be imperial rescripts, countersigned by the Prime Minister, was dropped and Imperial GHQ was authorized to issue all military orders without reference to the Cabinet. To be sure, these orders were subject to imperial approval, but this was a mere formality and raised no difficulty. A second important change permitted the establishment of Imperial GHQ in time of "incident" as well as time of war. These changes served to remove it entirely from civil control, leaving it responsible solely to the Emperor.

During World War II, Imperial GHQ included the Army and Navy General Staffs, the War and Navy Ministers—who, with the exception of Tojo and Shimada, served almost in an associate capacity with no real voice—and strong representation from the important bureaus of both ministries. While this organization increased the power of the Chiefs of Staff, it also strengthened the lateral influence of the ministry bureau chiefs on the members of the General Staffs. Civilian influences were completely excluded.

The main weakness of Imperial General Headquarters was that it was not a single joint command—as was the case with the American Joint Chiefs—but was, rather, two separate service commands. Traditionally there had been a strong rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy, either as a continuation of earlier, long-standing inter-clan antagonisms or as an outgrowth of the different foreign influences that shaped Japan's armed forces. In the latter instance, especially, the Prussian influence led to strong absolutist leanings in the Army and a tendency to involve itself in politics; in the Navy, British influences

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brought about a feeling that civil affairs should be left to the civilians. Thus, while inter-service rivalry is not unusual in other countries, in Japan it achieved unprecedented heights. Its effect was to prevent any really close coördination between the two services.

Imperial GHQ was therefore divided into an Army Section, with offices in the Army General Staff, and a Navy Section, which met in the naval staff offices. At joint meetings, held about twice a week in a building on the imperial palace grounds, *both* chiefs of staff presided. These meetings were occasionally attended by the Emperor, who was not normally present at individual service conferences.

Army and Navy plans were developed separately in the Operations Bureaus of the General Staffs, and plans and operations orders were not issued from Imperial GHQ as such but rather from Army or Navy Section. Joint operations were conducted by means of agreements between the services and separate orders were issued to Army and Navy commanders. Often Army-Navy disagreement over a proposed joint operation might result in delay or even the abandonment of the operation. Even when agreement was reached, the operation would not normally be carried out under a joint commander but under the two local service commanders, who would "coöperate" with each other under the terms of an Army-Navy "agreement." On the rare occasion that saw the establishment of a joint operational command, supplies were still delivered through separate service channels, with consequent duplication, oversights, and mutual recrimination.

In the absence of any leadership on the part of the Emperor, the Army and Navy went their separate ways. Admiral Shimada, Navy Minister during most of the war, followed a course of trying to coöperate with the Army, and Tojo's strong position gave the Army increased prestige and influence. But despite one or two late and abortive attempts to unify the Supreme Command, there was never any coördinated inter-service policy. In the words of the Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, who served on different occasions as Prime Minister and Navy Minister, ". . . as far as . . . Army operations are concerned, if the Chief of the Army General Staff says we will do this, that is the end of it; and as far as the Navy operations are concerned, if the Chief

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of the Navy General Staff says we will do this, that fixes it; and should there develop differences of opinion between the two chiefs, then nothing can be accomplished."[8]

IV

If there was dissension within Imperial GHQ, the Army and Navy had little difficulty of this sort with the civil government. Machinery existed for close civil-military collaboration, and this machinery was employed, but in actuality the military will was dominant over the civilian. The link between Imperial GHQ and the Cabinet was the Liaison Conference. This Conference, initiated briefly in 1937 after the re-establishment of Imperial GHQ, was resumed in 1940 and continued throughout the war. It had no formal status or authority, but was merely a framework for discussion between the civil government and the military authorities. The participants were the War and Navy Ministers and Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister, and such others as might be necessary. Also present were the Cabinet Secretary and the chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the two service ministries. These three functioned as a secretariat, determining the agenda of the meetings and deciding which other ministers should attend, usually the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. Moreover, while the three secretaries had no direct power in the making of decisions, by their choice of agenda and their rôle in preparing briefings for the participants, they exercised a very strong influence on the outcome of the Liaison Conference. Their presence, also, meant that the Conference proceedings would soon become known to other members of the *gumbatsu,* and the civilian participants were fully aware of the danger of assassination for any one strongly opposing the plans of the military.

The Liaison Conference usually convened twice a week in a small conference room in one of the imperial palace buildings. There was no presiding officer, but the Prime Minister normally

[8] U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Interrogations of Japanese Officials,* 2 vols. (Washington, 1946), II, 328. See also Tsuruzo Akisada, "History of Conflicts Between Army and Navy, and Clique Struggles," in GHQ, Far East Command, Historical Division, "Translation of Japanese Documents," III, on file in OCMH.

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occupied an armchair towards the far end of the room and the others sat grouped around him. Near the door, in position to monitor everything that transpired, sat the three secretaries. Discussion was informal, sometimes with more than one conversation going on at the same time, and officers were constantly on the phone or entering and leaving the room with documents or to explain plans and operations.

The participants discussed a wide variety of subjects: war plans, diplomatic steps, the administration and disposition of occupied areas, the assignment of national resources—in short, anything and everything that went to make up national policy. Despite the magnitude of the questions considered, the Liaison Conference had no legal status as a policy-making body, and its conclusions had to be implemented by actions of the Cabinet or Imperial GHQ. But the location of the Conference in the palace—where it had been moved from the Prime Minister's residence at Army instigation in 1941—gave its proceedings an implication and air of imperial blessing. In practice, anything decided at the Liaison Conference was forthwith adopted and implemented once the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff had gone through the formal motions of reporting to the throne.

If the Liaison Conference had been a meeting of equals, there might have been true civil-military collaboration in the formulation of Japanese national policy. In actuality, however, the *gumbatsu* dictated and the civilians obeyed. "Imperial General Headquarters was in the Liaison Conference," explained Tojo, "and after they got through deciding things, the Cabinet, generally speaking, made no objection. Theoretically, the Cabinet members could have disagreed . . ., but, as a practical matter, they agreed and did not say anything." Imperial GHQ was thus the source of national policy. "The Cabinet, and hence the civil government," wrote former Prime Minister Konoye, "were manipulated like puppets by the Supreme Command: . . ."[9]

On extremely important occasions, the Liaison Conference became an Imperial Conference, or a Conference in the Imperial Presence, at which the Emperor and the President of the Privy Council were also present. These meetings were much more formalized, and, indeed, were planned in advance at the Liaison Conference, which body usually requested the Imperial Con-

[9] Both quoted in Maxon, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 182.

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ference. The participants made set speeches, previously written and rehearsed, and any differences of opinion were carefully and thoroughly resolved beforehand. The Emperor listened in silence, seated on a raised dais before a long, rectangular table where the major participants sat facing each other. The three secretaries were grouped around a small table in the corner of the room. The Prime Minister presided over the meeting, and each participant rose in turn, bowed to the Emperor, and stood stiffly in front of his chair while speaking. No one entered or left the room during the conference. At the conclusion of the presentations, the President of the Privy Council would ask questions designed to elicit further information for the Emperor. These questions and answers were unrehearsed, but none of the participants deviated from the pre-arranged conclusions of the group. The Emperor, whose rôle was normally a passive one, did not speak. Only on very rare occasions—such as the Imperial Conference in September, 1941, that foreshadowed Japan's entry into the war and the meetings in August, 1945, that led to the Japanese surrender—did he venture to exercise his authority.

Like the Liaison Conference, the Imperial Conference was extraconstitutional, but if the effect of the Liaison Conference was decisive, that of the Imperial Conference was even more so. No one questioned a decision made in the presence of the Emperor and with his tacit approval.

The Liaison Conference-Imperial Conference apparatus underwent a slight change in the last year of the war. In August, 1944, in an attempt to simplify and improve Japan's war effort, the Liaison Conference was replaced by a body called the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War. Membership was unchanged and, aside from a few nominal procedural differences, the new organization functioned substantially in the same manner as had the old. In March, 1945, in another move aimed at achieving civil-military collaboration, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso (who had replaced Tojo the previous July) was permitted to attend meetings of Imperial GHQ. The only effect of this, however, was to place on his shoulders some of the blame for Japan's military reverses, without giving him any say in the direction of strategy.

A final change in the high command came in May, 1945, when membership in the Supreme War Council was limited to six: the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War and Navy Ministers,

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and the two Chiefs of Staff. Other cabinet members and, more important, the two Military Affairs Bureau chiefs were eliminated from the proceedings. This decreased the power of those still urging all-out continuance of the war and it may have had some slight importance in the Japanese decision to surrender. But it came too late to improve Japan's lagging military fortunes.

One last item remains to indicate the complete control of the Supreme Command over the direction of the war. This was the military domination of the Cabinet Planning Board, an organization established within the Cabinet in late 1937 to supervise the mobilization of manpower and resources, and the one civilian agency that might, if independent, have had something to say about the conduct of the war. Ostensibly serving the Prime Minister, the Planning Board was actually controlled by the Army. It had been established mainly as the result of Army initiative, was headed by a reserve lieutenant general, and consistently carried out the Army's bidding. It was abolished in late 1943 and most of its functions were absorbed by the newly created Munitions Ministry, which also took over important bureaus of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Tojo's position as Munitions Minister guaranteed continued military control of manpower and materiel.[10]

V

Beneath the military high command structure in Tokyo, the Japanese had an extensive field organization. Field commanders were directly responsible to the Emperor, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but there was no direct communication between the throne and the field. Basic orders were issued to commanders as Imperial GHQ Army or Navy Section Orders and were signed by the appropriate Chief of Staff "by Imperial Command." The detailed instructions necessary for implementation of these orders were called Imperial GHQ Army or Navy Section Directives and were signed by the Chief of Staff without any reference to the throne. By the same token, any recommendation that a field commander might wish to make to the Emperor would be submitted through the Chief of Staff.

[10] The position of the Planning Board is also discussed in Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis, 1949), *passim*.

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Japanese field commands were not organized into theaters—although areas were sometimes given arbitrary geographical designations—but retained their designations as separate army or fleet organizations. In the Army, the largest command was the general army, operating directly under Imperial GHQ Army Section. It was the equivalent of a United States Army overseas command or perhaps to an army group, but its size might vary widely. It sometimes consisted of area armies, equivalent to United States field armies; sometimes of district armies, which were smaller units, about the size of United States corps, with the mission of defending specific areas in Japan, Korea, and Formosa; and sometimes of armies, also equivalent to United States corps, which served in overseas areas and which might also be assigned to area armies. The Japanese did not utilize the corps organization, and divisions, brigades, and other special units were assigned directly to armies; air units normally served under general or area armies.

The Japanese Navy had one over-all command for most of its forces, the Combined Fleet, which operated directly under Imperial GHQ Navy Section. Navy Section also controlled the various naval stations in Japan as well as the China Area Fleet and such other tactical units as it might wish to withhold from the Combined Fleet. Under the Combined Fleet were numbered fleets, air fleets, and special naval forces organized for specific operations. The Japanese Navy had no organization corresponding to the United States Marine Corps. However, separate battalion-size units known as Special Naval Landing Forces, consisting of specially trained naval personnel and assigned directly to fleets, were sometimes used for landing operations and beach defense.[11]

VI

Japan's high-level organization in World War II was one in which the Supreme Command not only directed strategy and the mobilization of economic, industrial, and manpower resources, but also had complete control of the civil government. Such an arrangement might have resulted in great efficiency, but the

[11] For naval organization, see also "The Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II," prepared by former Japanese naval officers and included in the series, "Japanese Studies in World War II," on file in OCMH.

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Supreme Command itself, despite the dominant position of the Army under General Tojo, was split by bitter inter-service antagonisms. It functioned not as a single entity, but as two separate agencies working at cross purposes. The only individual capable of exercising command and restoring unity, the Emperor, was unwilling to do so until his country had fallen in ruins about him.

With civil government practically non-existent, an irresponsible and divided military leadership, and a commander-in-chief in name only, the Japanese top-level organization for war was uncoördinated, ill-defined, and inefficient. Yet it operated with surprising effectiveness. The Japanese developed plans, carried out coördinated operations, and revised and adjusted strategy in a fairly realistic manner. How much more skillfully then, might Japan have fought the war had the over-all direction of her military effort been more efficiently organized? Assuredly she could not have won the war and perhaps she might not even have started it. But it seems clear that, once she entered the conflict, better organization would have produced better results, and the absence of efficient organization could only have contributed to the inevitability of her defeat.

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ASPECTS OF ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL THOUGHT[1]

In a review of Sir Isaiah Berlin's *Two Concepts of Liberty,* which appeared in *The Times* (London) *Literary Supplement,* the anonymous writer complained of the "slanders" that have been lavished on the political philosophy of Rousseau.[2] The slanders—and slanders they are—which the writer had in mind have come from those who claim to see in Rousseau's thought a powerful and also influential defense of totalitarianism. The fashion which makes of Rousseau a *totalitarian democrat* must, of course, be as modern as the word "totalitarian" itself; and it is J. L. Talmon who has been primarily responsible for this kind of attribution to Rousseau.[3] But there are slanders against Rousseau that go back to an earlier time: the view of Rousseau as a friend of *despotism* begins with Constant.[4] Later in the century, Taine thought he saw in Rousseau's writings a repellent theory of collectivism.[5]

[1] The author is greatly indebted to John Rawls' paper, "Justice as Fairness," *The Philosophical Review, LXVII* (April 1958), pp. 164-194; and to Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, 1958), esp. chaps. 8 and 10, for aid in understanding some of the concepts which figure in this paper. Of all the writing on Rousseau consulted, I found Robert Derathé's *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le science politique de son temps* (Paris, 1950) to be the most valuable. Derathé's book is a work of profound scholarship.

[2] Anon., "A Hundred Years After," *The Times Literary Supplement,* Feb. 20, 1959, pp. 89-90, at p. 90.

[3] See J. L. Talmon, *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy* (Boston, 1952), pp. 38-49. The idea of "democratic despotism" is to be found in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* trans. by Henry Reeve, rev. by Francis Bowen (2 vols., New York, 1945), vol. II, book IV, chaps. 6-7, and *The Old Regime and the French Revolution,* trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York, 1955), pt. 3, chap. 3. In the latter work, Tocqueville associates specific thinkers with this idea, but Rousseau is not among them. For other accusations against Rousseau in the totalitarian vein, see John W. Chapman, *Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal?* (New York, 1956), p. 74.

[4] For a discussion of Constant's criticism, and of the way in which Constant qualified his criticism, see Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London, 1934), pp. 36-37.

[5] See Peter Gay's Introduction to his translation of Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (New York, 1954), pp. 7-8. The most careful and sustained exposition of the view that Rousseau is a collectivist is to be found in C. E. Vaughan's Introduction to his edition of *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1915).

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Against these charges, as we know, Rousseau has had his defenders, whose strategy has been to try to show that Rousseau is not a collectivist, at all, nor some kind of perverted democrat, but an individualist.[6] And it would seem hopeless to expect that the exchange of arguments for and against Rousseau could ever be resolved: truces resulting from fatigue would seem in fact to be the only resolution. However, if the issue could somehow be given a different complexion; if, somehow, it could be shown that both sides are wrong and their battle folly, then perhaps intolerable debate would be quieted, and Rousseau's thought be allowed a different perspective. Such an enterprise is itself pretentious, but the pretentiousness may be forgiven by the results. In this paper, I will try to show what this enterprise, in its outlines, would be.

I.

There is common agreement that the central idea in Rousseau's political thought is the idea of the general will. And though every one acknowledges that he is somewhat confused by Rousseau's analysis of this idea, almost everyone feels that he understands it well enough to make it the primary reason for saying that Rousseau is either a collectivist or despot or totalitarian, or an individualist. I have no wish to deny that the idea of the general will *is* the central idea in Rousseau's political thought; nor that some of the blame for the confusion belongs to Rousseau. But I would also say that whatever the occasional obscurities of the idea, it is possible to come to an understanding of it that is quite certain; and thereby come to an understanding of Rousseau's political thought.

The essential fact is that the aim of the general will is justice. Once this has been seen, the problems of interpreting Rousseau become much less fierce. Once it has been seen that justice is at the center of Rousseau's concerns, no warrant is left for thinking that Rousseau is a collectivist, totalitarian, despot, or individualist. The concept of justice simply displaces these categories.[7] Accompanying justice are two other concepts which figure in

[6] For a historical discussion of the individualist interpretation of Rousseau's political thought, consult Peter Gay, *op. cit.* (See note 5). See also the temperate pages of John W. Chapman, *op. cit.*, especially chapters 7 and 9.

[7] Some attention is given to the concept of justice in Rousseau's thought by John W. Chapman, *op. cit.*, chapter 5.

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Rousseau's political thought, the concept of moral autonomy and the concept of fair play. When these three concepts are located and related, I would say that Rousseau's political thought has been seen in its proper light.

To begin with, we must understand that the idea of justice to be found in Rousseau's writings is the idea of distributive justice, the idea of justice as "giving every man his due."[8] The political application of justice (so understood) is a condition in which the rights of every citizen are protected. That society is just in which the life, liberty, and property of every citizen are protected. Next, we must understand that by "autonomy" is meant something very much like what Kant said it meant. Rousseau does not use the word, but his meaning is clear: a man is autonomous when the laws by which he lives are given by that man to himself. Last, we must understand that by "fair play" is meant the willingness of every man to obey the laws of his society, even when such obedience imposes on him some sacrifice, and therefore seems to take back from him what society, in the first place, gave him. The connections between justice, autonomy, and fair play are of the following sort. In the good society, every man takes part directly in the framing of laws; those laws are to be framed which embody (distributive)

[8] See Rousseau, *Contrat Social,* First Draft, bk. II, chap. IV in Vaughan, vol. I, pp. 493-495. Rousseau cites the axiom *cuique suum,* "to each his own." According to Rousseau this axiom "to each his own," and the related axiom, "to do to others what one wishes done to oneself"—which together are the true principles of justice—are applications of the overriding principle, to seek the greatest good of all. This latter principle is the first principle of civil society. The rule of distributive justice is thus an indispensable *means* to the attainment of the greatest good of all. In the early state of nature, the natural feeling of *compassion* is operative; but this feeling leads men not to try to do good to others, but to "do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others." (*A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* in *The Social Contract and Discourses,* trans. by G. D. H. Cole (New York, 1950), p. 227.) Only when civil society is established does it become possible actively to seek the good of others without jeopardizing oneself, to be benevolent without ruin. And in civil society everything must be done to cultivate the feeling of benevolence, which manifests itself not only in voting according to the rule of justice, but also in one's general deportment. Though respect for the idea of distributive justice is to the interest of each man, benevolence supplies another motive for that respect. The good man will be glad that the rule of distributive justice serves others besides himself, he will be glad that his own protection is indissolubly connected to the protection of his fellows.

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justice, or which (in extraordinary circumstances) call into being the operation of fair play. The good citizen (who is the good man) will not absent himself from the deliberations which conclude in the framing of laws; will always seek to have laws framed which are just, or which accord with fair play, as the case may be; and will obey these laws willingly, conscious both of their importance to him and his society, and of their moral character. Rousseau's primary intent is precisely to see these concepts guide political reality wherever possible.[9]

Thus, in a society which remains faithful to the correct political principles (as embodied in the social contract), no man can preserve his life, liberty, and property without fulfilling his obligations; and merely by fulfilling his obligations, each man will be able to preserve his life, liberty, and property. There can be no benefits without obligations, and there will be no obligations without benefits.

Lest our description be taken as an impertinent simplification of Rousseau's complex thought, it would be well to examine some of the major points that Rousseau makes in *The Social Contract* and elsewhere. Such an examination would establish, I think, the validity of what I have so far said. In addition, we shall see how it has come about that Rousseau has been accused of collectivism, despotism, and totalitarianism, and defended by the counterclaim that he was an individualist.

[9] In the state of nature, each is entitled to do as he pleases: he is born free of chains; he has no obligations. The consequence, however, of each doing as he pleases is that each stands the chance of losing his life, or becoming enslaved, or losing his possessions. Men place restrictions on their will, men impose obligations on themselves, men take upon themselves the burden of morality, in order to preserve themselves from death, slavery, or loss. Civil society is the only condition in which morality is inextricably joined with the enjoyment of life, liberty, and possessions. In nature, the good man will surely lose his life or liberty or possessions, and bad men will constantly war with each other; but in civil society, under normal conditions, only the immoral man will lose his life or liberty or possessions. A man cannot afford to be moral in nature; a man cannot afford to be immoral in civil society. Civil society makes moral behavior both possible and necessary. Rousseau's fullest discussion of the state of nature, and of the hypothetically historical changes in it, is to be found in his *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. See the commentary of Arthur O. Lovejoy in "The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality" in *Essays in the History of Ideas* (New York, 1955), pp. 14-37.

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2.

Distributive justice is at the center of Rousseau's concerns, and the purpose for which men agree to live with each other in a society—the purpose for which they enter with each other into the agreement known as the social contract—is to set up the rule of distributive justice. With the formation of a society, a system of rights is for the first time established. In a condition of nature, men do what they must to live, and that means that they take what they can, often from each other, and keep it as long as they can. Each man has a natural right to preserve himself as he sees fit, and without the onus of blame. In the civil condition, however, precarious tenure is replaced by legal ownership, and the entire force of the society is employed to protect that ownership. Natural liberty gives way to a system of civil rights. There is, in Rousseau's political theory, no other purpose for which the social contract is made.[10] Marvelous benefits of every kind do in fact follow on the making of the social contract; most importantly, benefits moral, intellectual, and spiritual. But we must not think that in the past men were driven to enter civil society for the sake of these benefits; we must not think that today we live in civil society for the sake of these benefits. These benefits come as they can. So that it could be said that *prudence* dictates the departure of men from their natural condition; and before we can call a society a good society, we must make sure that it accommodates that prudence. Rousseau begins where Hobbes begins.

Another comment by Rousseau strengthens the view that the protection of property (and, of course, of life and liberty) is the foundation stone of Rousseau's political thought. In a note to the last sentence of the first chapter of *The Social Contract,* Rousseau says:

> Under bad governments, this equality (of convention and legal right) is only apparent and illusory; it serves only to keep the pauper in his poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped. In fact, laws are always of use to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing: from which it follows that the

[10] Let us note that the first moral idea Rousseau teaches his pupil is respect for the property of others. See Rousseau, *Émile,* trans. by Barbara Foxley (London, 1911), pp. 62-63.

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> social state is advantageous to men only when all have something and none too much.[11]

When applied to a man without property, the principle of distributive justice is a mockery. He has no stake in society; he has nothing to be protected; he can only contribute to the protection of the property of others. He makes sacrifices, but receives no benefits, apart from mere existence. There is, as the saying goes, "nothing in it for him." But for those with property, there can be no higher blessing than to live in a society in which there is distributive justice.

What or who, then, deliberately offends against the principle of distributive justice in society? In *The Social Contract,* Rousseau finds in particular interests the source of offense; and in *A Discourse on Political Economy,* he finds that government (the executive power) can also offend.[12] In a phrase, to take, or to try to take, what is not one's own, constitutes the basic violation against the requirements of distributive justice. (Obviously, that is a matter of definition.) In a state of nature, one takes what one can, knowing that it may be taken by someone else. In society, however, one is enabled to keep what one has. In return, one must not try to take what belongs to another. Abstention from aggrandizement answers to the protection afforded against the aggrandizement of others. How does a man aggrandize? Clearly, whenever he commits a crime against the life, liberty, or property of another; that is, when he breaks a (putatively just) law. But it is also possible to aggrandize in accordance with the law, when the law is itself unjust. Laws are unjust, by definition, when they legitimize encroachments by particular interests (or by the government) on the property of others. Rousseau's great fear of particular interests, acting in solidarity, comes from his belief in the natural propensity of groups to expand at the expense of others. He prefers a society without organized interest groups just because of this propensity,

[11] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* trans. by G. D. H. Cole (see note 8, above), bk. I, chap. IX, p. 22. *The Social Contract* in this edition is hereafter cited simply as "Rousseau." *Cf. A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* pp. 251-252.

[12] Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy* in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (see note 8 above), p. 297. This discourse is hereafter cited as "Political Economy." The abuses of government which Rousseau discusses in bk. III, chap. X of *The Social Contract* are violations of the principle of autonomy and illegal changes in the structure of government.

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not because he wished a levelled society at the mercy of the political power, or an equalitarian society of identical men. Of course, Rousseau did not want the energies and loyalties of citizens monopolized by the groups to which they belonged, to the exclusion of their civic love and duty. But a major part of the reason for this position is the "realist" view which Rousseau had of the tendencies of all groups. Furthermore, Rousseau did not think it likely that any society could remain free of solidified interests. In a manner similar to that of Madison in *The Federalist* No. 10, he looked to the struggle of interest groups to produce a stalemate, from which the principle of distributive justice emerges as it were behind the backs of the participants in the struggle.[13] Presumably, the existence of numerous diverse groups would seriously interfere with the formation of a homogeneous majority opinion which sought basic transgressive changes in the pattern of economic relations. Rousseau says, ". . . take away from these same (particular) wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences."[14] The meaning of the arithmetic metaphor is simply this: when some try to flourish at the expense of others, they go, by definition, beyond the claims of the principle of distributive justice; but when these excessive claims are eliminated from the deliberations that conclude in law, distributive justice is served.[15] If society could not be made up of men who placed themselves in a direct, unmediated relationship with each other and who in the privacy of their conscience came to their own conclusions as to what was just and hence fit to be made law, then the next best thing was to have

[13] *Cf.* the view of John W. Chapman that, "Expression of the general will cannot be a purely mechanical process in which conflicting personal goods offset and cancel each other. This they do, but only if each of the participants is motivated by desire for the general welfare and actively seeks to discover the course of action that promotes it." (*op. cit.*, p. 45.)

[14] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. III, p. 26. See also note 1, pp. 26-27. See the discussion of this sentence in *Montesquieu and Rousseau, Forerunners of Sociology*, by Émile Durkheim, trans. by Ralph Manheim (Ann Arbor, 1960), pp. 107-108. For further discussion of the inevitability of particular interests, see "Political Economy," pp. 290-291.

[15] The principle of distributive justice not only prohibits the selfish augmentation of one's own interest, but may also hurt us in our legitimate interest. For example, we will have to keep our promises, and honor our contracts, even though shifts in circumstance make it difficult for us to do so. See Rousseau, "Political Economy," p. 312.

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a society made up of interest groups of equal strength, each able to defend itself, and each prevented by the others from seeking to aggrandize. The good society will cultivate the sentiment of benevolence in every man; at the same time, its economic and social structure will be such as to make up for the inevitable lapses of that sentiment. When each group can keep what belongs to it, and cannot take what does not belong to it, justice rules.

But whatever the differences of wealth in society, the principle of distributive justice places restraints on the strong, for it morally disbars them from using their strength to the limit. The very reciprocity of the social contract works to the equal benefit of all; and if one is to be faithful to the terms of the social contract, one must never, in one's strength, take from the weak: the rich must not take from the poor, nor the many from the few.[16] Hopefully, advantage and justice will not be at odds. Society should be such as to make it implausible for groups to think that they can thrive at the expense of other groups. At the same time, unjust actions will have a tendency to upset the social order, and thus threaten the protection of the property of the unjust; and therefore ultimately be imprudent.[17] Again, it is equality—not, of course, "absolutely identical" degrees of powers and riches for everybody—which helps to keep injustice from being advantageous, or justice from tending to appear as a harsh circumscription of the pursuit of advantage.[18]

We must now fit the general will into these considerations. There are a few things to be remembered about this concept. The general will is expressed only in laws. And laws should

[16] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. XI, p. 50; and "Political Economy," p. 305. It is the very security afforded by civil society that gives an interest enough strength to allow it to feel capable of aggrandizement. To employ that strength in aggrandizement is to accept the sacrifices of others in order to deny them the benefits which justify their sacrifices. Looked at in this way, aggrandizement violates the demands of fair play.

[17] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VII, p. 18.

[18] In a society in which there are great distinctions of wealth, the social contract becomes an absurdity: "The terms of the social compact between these two estates of men (rich and poor) may be summed up in a few words: 'You have need of me, because I am rich and you are poor. We will therefore come to an agreement. I will permit you to have the honour of serving me, on condition that you bestow on me the little you have left, in return for the pains I shall take to command you.'" ("Political Economy," pp. 323-324.) Rousseau goes on to advocate a system of progressive taxation.

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embody the principle of distributive justice; laws should be just. Rousseau (speaking of political agencies) says, ". . . it is needful only to act justly, to be certain of following the general will."[19] This is, of course, a matter of definition. We must also remember that Rousseau speaks of the common good: the general will looks only to the common good: laws should look only to the common good. Just as the aim of an individual's will is the good of that individual, so the aim of the general will is the good of society as a whole, the common good.[20] But what is the common good? Is it something mystical, some good different from, and higher than, the good of each man in society? The answer is an unequivocal No. The common good is ". . . the common element in . . . different interests."[21] What do all interests have in common? In a word: preservation. Rousseau says, ". . . individual interest always tends to privileges, while the common interest always tends to equality."[22] By "equality," Rousseau does not ever mean equality of property, equal holdings. He rather means equal consideration, equal entitlement to protection, whatever the size of the holding. In addition, every man has an equal interest in remaining alive (life) and in remaining master of his own will (liberty). There is no other common good or common interest: there is no other reason for which the social contract was first made: there is no other reason for which society exists. Rousseau also says, "The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves."[23] Rousseau is not Hegel. The general will wills justice; and if a citizen wishes to be in accord with the general will, he must always vote in law-making deliberations in the way by which he feels justice—the common good or the common interest—will be

[19] Rousseau, "Political Economy," p. 297.

[20] Rousseau, "Political Economy," pp. 289-290.

[21] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. I, p. 23. See Derathé, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le Science Politique de son temps,* pp. 237-241, 353-357.

[22] Rousseau, *Émile,* p. 426. Rousseau's words are: ". . . l'intérêt privé tend toujours aux préferences, et l'intérêt public à l'égalité." (*The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,* ed. by C. E. Vaughan, vol. II, p. 153.) *Cf.* Rousseau, bk. II, chap. I: "—la volonté particulière tend, par sa nature, aux préferences, et la volonté générale à l'égalité." (Vaughan, Vol. II, p. 40.) See also Rousseau, bk. II, chap. III, p. 26.

[23] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. IV, p. 29.

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served. He may, of course, be wrong: hopefully, but not necessarily, more citizens will be right than wrong. More important, it is to be hoped that most citizens will *want* to be right; that is, will want to be in accord with the general will. Naturally, there is a constant temptation to pursue one's interest (or the interest of one's group) at the expense of others. But in the good society —which is the just society—things will conspire to produce just laws. And by "things" must be meant the virtuous inclinations of the citizenry combined with a proper economic and social structure.

3.

The two concepts present in association with distributive justice are autonomy and fair play. On the concept of autonomy in Rousseau's political thought, there is abundant good writing.[24] Rousseau says, ". . . obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty."[25] We prescribe to ourselves when we take part in the deliberations that conclude in law: law imposed on us, or emanating from a (morally) distant source, no matter how good the law, leaves us in a condition of dependence. We ourselves must see what law is called for, and then go on to make it with others. Autonomy thus contains the procedural requirement for calling a law good; and that requirement is defeated even by representative government. For even representative government takes out of our hands the deliberations that conclude in law: when we live under a representative government we, in effect, alienate our wills. We may recognize a law made for us by our representatives, or by other political agents, as satisfactory or utilitarian. But unless we help to make the law ourselves, we are placed in the position of being (at best) wards in the care of some superior agency. On the other hand, we do not have liberty when we prescribe to ourselves any law whatsoever. There is a substantival requirement which the law must meet, if we are to be free; and this is the same as the substantival requirement for calling a law just; the law must look to the common good, it must realize the general will, it

[24] See, for example, G. D. H. Cole's Introduction (see note 8 above) pp. xli-l; Ernest Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, esp. pp. 57-70, 96-107.

[25] Or: obedience to a law we did not make, but could repeal.

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must embody the principle of distributive justice. The concept of autonomy cannot be understood apart from the concept of distributive justice. Alluding perhaps to an old Roman legal adage, Rousseau says, ". . . it (the general will expressed in law) must both come from all and apply to all."[26] Laws are to be made by the citizens, and the laws are to be just. Only then are the procedural and the substantival requirements for proper law satisfied. And only then are we in a condition of moral liberty, a condition immensely better than the condition of natural liberty. Moral liberty thus combines distributive justice (the protection of one's life, liberty, and property) with autonomy.

4.

We must now turn to our third concept, the concept of fair play, and thereby complete our sketch of the outlines of Rousseau's political philosophy. We must ask: What brings into being the operation of fair play? The answer is: the need for some sort of sacrifice on the part of the citizen. In *The Social Contract,* Rousseau speaks of the sacrifice involved in defending one's country in time of war; in *A Discourse on Political Economy,* he speaks of the sacrifice involved in the payment of taxes. Rousseau says, "He who wills the end wills the means also, and the means must involve some risks, and even some losses. He who wishes to preserve his life at others' expense should also, when it is necessary, be ready to give it up for their sake."[27] Every society necessitates restrictions and sacrifices; and Rousseau, with his matchless sense of the real, does not think that even the good society can be free of them. For him, one splendid thing about the good society is that it is alone among societies in exacting sacrifices according to the demands of fair play. For only in the good society will there be a strict correspondence between benefits and sacrifices. The supreme benefit of the good society is the establishment of distributive justice through the medium of autonomy; everyone shares in the making of the laws by which he lives, and those laws will be, ideally, protective of everyone's life, liberty, and property. When, therefore, the citizenry, in its sovereign capacity, makes laws requiring military service or imposing taxes, the individual citizen can feel, in

[26] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. IV, p. 29.

[27] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. IV, p. 32.

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obeying those laws, that he is merely sharing *equally* in those things which make the continued existence of his society possible, and therewith, the continued existence of his civil liberty possible. No one in the good society is exempt. Everyone's benefit is tied to everyone else's. Both the benefits and the obligations of the good society are reciprocal. One cannot help oneself except by helping others; one must inevitably help oneself by helping others. In the good society, in all cases where sacrifice is required for preservation, sacrifice for others will be the necessary and sufficient condition for preserving oneself and/or one's liberty and/or one's interest. Fair play demands that he who benefits must pay the *necessary* price for those benefits. But suppose men lose their lives, their all, in defense of their society? Isn't that to make a cheat of the social contract? Rousseau replies, "Their very life, which they have devoted to the State, is by it constantly protected; and when they risk it in the State's defense, what more are they doing than giving back what they have received from it? What are they doing that they would not do more often and with greater danger in the state of nature, in which they would inevitably have to fight battles at the peril of their lives in defense of that which is the means of their preservation."[28] Rousseau's answer adds a strict utilitarian consideration to the appeal to fair play.[29] If one is blind to the demands of fair play, there is always the utilitarian calculation to fall back on. If a man is incapable of moral feelings toward his fellows; or if a man chooses to ignore the fact that as he defends others they defend him, he must at least come to realize that at its most demanding, his civil condition (in the good society) is no worse than the natural condition. But in any case, Rousseau's stress is on the concept of fair play.

It will be noticed that common to the concepts of distributive justice and fair play is the element of reciprocity. In each case, a man does to others as he would be done to by them. On the one hand, he agrees to respect the civil rights of others, who in turn are to respect his. That is to be just. On the other hand, he agrees to make sacrifices for others, who in turn are to make the same sacrifies for him. That is to be fair. In both cases, mutual benefits result; and in both cases, self-interest and love of one's fellows work together in the mind of each man.

[28] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. IV.

[29] See Rousseau's coupling of "duty and interest," bk. I, chap. VII, p. 17.

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5.

Out of these concepts of distributive justice, autonomy, and fair play, how have commentators extracted a theory of collectivism or despotism or totalitarianism or of individualism? Rousseau's whole aim is to advocate a small community in which all citizens share the responsibility to use their autonomy to frame laws that answer to the demands of distributive justice and fair play. One would think that if the above description is correct, Rousseau's political philosophy could be called "rationalist," if it had to have a tag. I do not wish to deny that there are statements in Rousseau's writings that seem to beg for one or another of the foregoing interpretations. Still, I would say that, despite appearances, whenever we think we have a reason for calling Rousseau collectivist, despotic, totalitarian, or individualist, we are wrong; and wrong because we have failed to notice that the principles of distributive justice, autonomy, and fair play (which are neither collectivist nor despotic nor totalitarian nor individualist) are at issue, singly or jointly. Let us see how these things can be so.

6.

We shall first examine the charge that Rousseau was a collectivist: the charge that Rousseau looked to the submergence of the individual in his society, and the sacrifice of the individual's interests and aspirations to those of society as a whole. Now it is true that Rousseau speaks of the making of the social contract as an act which ". . . creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will."[30] But these words, whatever unpleasant connotations they may have for the modern liberal reader, do not constitute a defense of any kind of collectivism, even the best sort we could imagine. In *A Discourse on Political Economy,* Rousseau is eloquent in his rejection of the view that the sacrifice of one man for the benefit of the rest is morally permissible.[31] Unless all stand ready to share risks, the sacrifice of even one man, for any reason at all, is, to Rousseau, unforgivable. The principle

[30] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VI, p. 15. See also "Political Economy," pp. 289-290.

[31] Rousseau, "Political Economy," pp. 303-304.

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of fair play must *always* be respected, even though a utilitarian consideration could possibly dictate isolated abandonments of that principle. Though Rousseau uses the organic metaphor to speak of society,[32] he does not use it with the generally conservative intentions accompanying that metaphor.

Another reason why some have inclined to calling Rousseau collectivist is his great love of ancient city-states, and his stress on individual involvement in public affairs. It is often recognized that the idea of community was important to Rousseau. Rousseau says, "The better the constitution of a State is, the more do public affairs encroach on private in the minds of the citizens."[33] This may indeed seem ugly to us; something like a fascist slogan. But Rousseau's preference for a political community in the form of a city-state allows of a very simple explanation; and that explanation is intimately connected to all we have so far said. The explanation is that only in a city-state, if anywhere, could the principles of distributive justice, autonomy, and fair play be simultaneously realized. Larger political units could, in theory, realize distributive justice and fair play, but not realize them in conjunction with autonomy. That is to say, these units could, in theory, have civil liberty; but not moral liberty in all its fullness. Size alone would prevent them. Only when all citizens could gather together and make the laws which bind them would it be possible to speak of moral liberty. (Furthermore, the chances are greater in a small community that men will desire the reign of justice. For only a small community could be so organized, and contain such practices and institutions as to breed in men an understanding of, *and* a love for, the right political principles.)[34]

[32] Rousseau, "Political Economy," p. 289. He complains of the inaccuracy of the metaphor. See also Derathé, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-413.

[33] Rousseau, bk. III, chap. XV, p. 93.

[34] See Rousseau, "Political Economy," p. 301. For a careful and stimulating discussion of Rousseau's advocacy of the small community, see Bertrand de Jouvenel's Introduction to his edition of *Du Contrat Social* (Geneva, 1947). Jouvenel shows how Rousseau thought it possible for each man in a small, stable and homogeneous society to include his fellows within his *amour de soi*, and to have his *amour-propre* weakened. On p. 131, Jouvenel summarizes his views. We could say that Rousseau favored the existence of an agrarian city-state because it alone could be small, economically simple and economically static. We have already seen that smallness is a precondition of autonomy; smallness also makes it possible for a man to

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7.

We turn now to the charge that Rousseau advocates totalitarian principles. The passage in his writings which seems most favorable to the totalitarian interpretation of Rousseau is the following:

> "These clauses (of the social contract), properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alienation of each associate, together with all his right, to the whole community. . . ."[35]

It would appear that by the terms of the social contract the individual is left in helpless bondage to capriciousness: he cannot count on a minimum area of rights which the sovereign majority is permanently forbidden to invade. But to see Rousseau as a ruthless majoritarian is to misunderstand him. The only limits that Rousseau is interested in placing on liberty are the limits dictated by the principles of distributive justice and fair play.[36] In justice, rights entail obligations. Without corresponding obligations, there would be no rights, only privileges, a species of injustice or unfairness.[37] What is allowed to one, must be allowed to all; what is to be given up by one, must be given up by all. And only that is to be given up which is necessary for the preservation of the civil rights of all. The lesser is given up for the greater. As long as society remains good, the only sort

love his fellow-citizens, and feel himself to be involved with them in a coöperative enterprise, namely, a community. If a society is economically simple, conflicting interests tend to be avoided. If a society is economically static, selfishness, acquisitiveness, tends to be avoided. See also *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, p. 177; and Rousseau, bk. II, chap. IX, and bk. IV, chap. I.

[35] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VIII, p. 14. But see Rousseau, bk. II, chap. IV, p. 23; "Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact, only such part of his powers, goods, and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what is important." And bk. IV, chap, VIII, p. 138, note 1: "'In the republic,' says the Marquis d'Argenson, 'each man is perfectly free in what does not harm others.' This is the invariable limitation, which it is impossible to define more exactly.'"

[36] See Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State*, pp. 121-122; and Derathé, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158, 170-171, 342-344. Derathé shows how Rousseau recognized natural law as a limitation on the Sovereign. See also G. D. H. Cole's defense of Rousseau in his Introduction to his edition of Rousseau's writing (see note 8 above), p. xliv.

[37] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VII, pp. 17-18. See also bk. I chap. VI, p. 14.

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of encroachment made on rights will be encroachment made on the rights of all, in equal measure; and the only reason for encroachments will be necessity.[38] Of course, unscrupulous men can always use the argument of necessity for encroachments that will serve particular interests. But Rousseau's theories are meant for good societies alone. A critic of Rousseau could ask, Why does Rousseau not allow for some agency of government which would have the last word on encroachments, and judge whether necessity required any given encroachment? In this way, individual rights would be given total protection. To this it could be answered that such an agency (like, say, the Supreme Court of the United States) would, in effect, share the sovereign power with the citizenry; and by doing so, would dilute the principle of moral autonomy and keep the conscience of the people. It would cheapen the office of citizenship. It would make it seem that the good society did not depend on the virtue of its members. In a good society, it would thus be useless and morally harmful. When improper encroachments are made, the society in which they are made is irretrievably gone. Rousseau's principles then lose their applicability. On the assumption, however, that the people in their sovereign capacity are seeking to make laws that serve the common good (properly understood: see above), there can be no limits to their will. Rousseau says, ". . . as each gives himself absolutely (in the making of the social contract), the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome for others.[39]

8.

There are also two phrases in Rousseau's writings that have made trouble for him, and lent plausibility to the view that his principles favored totalitarianism. These phrases are "forced

[38] In *Émile*, Rousseau says, "If the sovereign power rests upon the right of ownership, there is no right more worthy of respect; it is inviolable and sacred for the sovereign power, so long as it remains a private individual right; as soon as it is viewed as common to all the citizens, it is subject to the common will, and this will may destroy it. Thus the sovereign has no right to touch the property of one or many; but he may lawfully take possession of the property of all, as was done in Sparta in the time of Lycurgus; while the abolition of debts by Solon was an unlawful deed" (p. 425).

[39] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VI, p. 14.

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to be free" and "the reign of virtue"; phrases which are glittering, or, at least, striking, and seem eminently to lend themselves to the designs of political maniacs. It is, therefore, quite urgent to try to understand what Rousseau could have meant by them.

Referring to the phrase, "forced to be free," Rousseau says:

> In order that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence.[40]

It is clear that for "forced to be free" to make sense, three things must be understood: the identity of those to whom the phrase applies, the meaning of "free," and the connection between being free (having liberty) and the general will.

From the preceding quotation it would seem, though not with absolute certainty, that the words "forced to be free" apply not to those who break the law—that is, to criminals—but to those who are tempted to evade the requirements of the law because it goes against their interests, and who must be persuaded or induced to obey; to *potential* criminals. This reading of these words is reinforced by another comment that Rousseau makes. Rousseau says, "At Genoa, the word 'liberty' may be read over the front of the prisons and on the chains of the galley-slaves. This application of the device is good and just. It is indeed only malefactors of all estates who prevent the citizen from being free. In the country in which all such men were in the galleys, the most perfect liberty would be enjoyed."[41] Rousseau does not here say that the man in chains is free, and imply thereby that whenever one is prevented from continuing in a life of criminality, one is "really" or "truly" free. Rather, Rousseau says that

[40] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VII, p. 18. See also bk. I, chap, VI, p. 14: "Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over which he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has." Also, in the Characters of La Bruyère, the following sentence occurs: "Les hommes souvent veulent aimer, et ne sauroient y' réussir: ils cherchent leur défaite sans pouvoir la rencontrer, et si j'ose ainsi parler, ils sont contraints de demeurer libres" (*Du Coeur*, p. 16). Rousseau uses *forcer*, where La Bruyère uses *contraindre*.

[41] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. II, p. 106, note 2.

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all *law-abiding citizens* are free when protected from those who transgress, from those who substitute their own selfish wills for the general will, the will which aims at distributive justice.

In addition to those who must be persuaded or induced to obey the law, there are others to whom the phrase "forced to be free" applies. Rousseau says, "When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free."[42] Thus, those who attempt to have an unjust law passed—a law that promotes the interests of one or some at the expense of others—are, in effect, forced to be free when they allow themselves to be concluded by the majority, whose will is putatively the general will. In sum, those who indicate a readiness to disobey a just law, and those who try to have an unjust law passed, come within the scope of the phrase, "forced to be free."

We now must see how Rousseau is using the word, "free." Rousseau distinguishes between natural liberty (or independence) and moral liberty.[43] Moral liberty has two components: civil liberty and autonomy. Civil liberty is a condition in which there are no restrictions on doing what one pleases except for those restrictions set up by law; that is, restrictions applicable equally to oneself and to all other men in one's society, and framed only in accordance with the terms of the social contract. Autonomy is the ability to take part in the framing of the laws which set up the restrictions. To be forced to be free is to be forced to preserve one's civil liberty and to be autonomous; to be forced to be free is to be forced to be in a condition of moral liberty.

In a state of nature there is only natural liberty. The fact is

[42] Rousseau, bk. II, chap. II, p. 106.

[43] The distinctions between natural, civil, and moral liberty occur in Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VIII, p. 19. The distinction between independence and liberty occurs in *Letters from the Mountain*, no. VIII, in *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. by C. E. Vaughan, vol. II, pp. 234-235. For a discussion of this latter distinction see Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State*, pp. 116-117. In bk. II, chap. VII of *The Social Contract*, Rousseau also says that one of the tasks of the Legislator is that of ". . . substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence nature has conferred on us all" (p. 38). And in bk. I, chap. VI, Rousseau contrasts natural liberty and conventional liberty (p. 14).

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that the consequence of everyone's having natural liberty is the possibility that everyone can lose his natural liberty and become a slave, at some time or other. Civil society contains laws, restrictions on the will of all, precisely in order to remove the possibility. But when a man acts in such a way as to indicate that he is ready to disobey the law, he is risking a return to the state of nature, with its possibility of slavery for himself. His threatened disobedience, if undeterred, may culminate in an act which oppresses a neighbor, and which therefore may cause the neighbor to defend himself with any means at hand. In this struggle, the oppressor endangers his civil liberty. Rousseau says, ". . . for no sooner does one man, setting aside the law, claim to subject another to his private will, than he departs from the state of civil society, and confronts him face to face in the pure state of nature in which obedience is prescribed solely by necessity."[44] Or, his threatened disobedience, if undeterred, may help to bring about the dissolution of the *whole* civil society, and with it, a return of *all* to the state of nature, including the man who is inclined to disobedience. Precedent for successful evasion of the requirements of the law is established; the law is brought into disrepect; the obligations which bind society together are weakened. Rousseau says, "The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body public."[45] When civil society is undone, the possibility of slavery—perhaps for those whose disobedience destroyed civil society—revives.

In the case of the man who out of selfishness or ignorance tries to have an unjust law passed, similar considerations hold. The civil society which is the subject of Rousseau's discussion is the good society; and in the good society, unjust laws must eventually lead to antagonism, and perhaps to dissolution and a return to the state of nature. To live by a law which derives from the general will, even when one thinks that that law inhibits the pursuit of one's advantage, is to live by that which preserves one's life, liberty, and property. In the good society, however, one's life, liberty, and property can be preserved only when one respects the lives, liberty, and property of all others; that is, only when justice reigns, only when the general will is realized. One's fate is tied to that of one's fellow-citizens.

[44] "Political Economy," p. 294.

[45] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VII, p. 18.

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Thus, intimidated obedience to the law (when necessary) works together with majority rule to prevent the re-emergence of the natural condition, and hence the re-emergence of the possibility of slavery for *all* men.[46] The intimidated man and the outvoted man are forced not to risk becoming slaves; they are forced to abide by the terms of the social contract; they are forced to retain their civil liberty at the expense of doing whatever they please, when what they please to do is contrary to justice.

But, we may ask, though one can be intimidated or outvoted and still have *civil liberty,* can one be intimidated or outvoted and still be *autonomous?* Rousseau is quite aware that there seems to be something paradoxical here, and attempts to remove the paradox by saying:

> The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free. . . .[47]

The temptation, however, is to feel that Rousseau has removed the paradox by resorting to an Idealist trick. That is to say, we feel that Rousseau is distinguishing between two selves in each person, a lower self which is aggressive or impulsive; and a higher self which is rational, moral, or perhaps altruistic, and is the seat of our "constant will." The lower self may get the better of the higher self; or the higher self may never be fully developed. Each man must, therefore, be constrained to live according to his higher self, or to live as if he had a higher self. The constraint may even come from some external source which claims superior insight into the nature and demands of the higher self. And when we notice that Rousseau says that ". . . the mere impulse of appetite is slavery . . .,"[48] we may consider our Idealist reading of Rousseau correct.

We must realize, however, that Rousseau means nothing very extraordinary by "constant will." His assumption is that no man who is minimally rational could ever want to be a slave, or to risk becoming one. Since this is so, it follows that no rational man could want to do anything that would jeopardize that which keeps him from slavery; namely, civil society. When,

[46] Naturally, society relies, in the last instance, on the punishment of crimes actually committed, to preserve itself from the natural condition.

[47] Rousseau, bk. IV, chap. II, p. 106.

[48] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VIII, p. 19.

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however, civil society is the good society, civil society can be preserved only if the general will prevails; that is, only if distributive justice prevails, only if every man is protected in his own. As we have seen, Rousseau's premise is that violations against the principle of distributive justice in the good society will lead to disorder and possible dissolution.[49] The obligation to be just is thus reinforced by a pragmatic consideration. Consequently, every rational man's constant will must be the general will. To follow one's constant will is to be autonomous, is to live by the law that one would give oneself if one were not temporarily led astray by impulse, or excessive appetite. And when we remember that the general will looks to the preservation of the life, liberty, and property of even the man who voted against the general will, we see that the protection of legitimate interest remains at the center of Rousseau's considerations. Obedience to law *tout court* is not equivalent to freedom; acting on desire or impulse *tout court* is not slavery. Rather, obedience to nothing except laws which embody the general will (one's constant will) is equivalent to moral freedom; while acting from desire or impulse is to sacrifice one's moral freedom to one's independence, and threatens to throw one back into the natural condition with its threat of slavery. When we are forced to be free, nothing supererogatory is being demanded of us; nor is conformity to anything mystical or supra-personal being demanded of us.

Finally, we must recall that Rousseau acknowledges that one who dissents from a law may do so in the name of justice, and be right in his claim: the majority may have made an unjust law. But in that case, the phrase "forced to be free" would no longer apply; that phrase is relevant only when the principle of distributive justice is respected, only when the general will has actually been embodied in the given law. An unjust law is analogous to the will of a master: to be forced to obey an unjust law is to be forced to be something very much like a slave. Rousseau's argument ". . . presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority; when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible.[50]

[49] Rousseau, bk. I, chap. VIII, p. 18: "The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body public." Implicit is the view that injustice *should* lead to undoing.

[50] Rousseau, bk. IV, chap. II, p. 107.

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Referring to the second phrase, "the reign of virtue," Rousseau says:

> The second essential rule of political economy is no less important than the first. If you would have the general will accomplished, bring all the particular wills into conformity with it; in other words, as virtue is nothing more than this conformity of the particular wills with the general will, establish the reign of virtue.[51]

(Rousseau is addressing the Legislator: him who would found a society or is entrusted with the task of reforming an existing one.) The first thing to say about this phrase is that it is not meant to apply to a condition in which a government takes it upon itself to impose virtue (or what it considers to be virtue) by legal sanction on a recalcitrant population used to living in the old bad ways. The reign of virtue is not the rule of Robespierre, nor of Antonio in *Measure for Measure*. The reign of virtue, rather, is a condition in which people make and obey laws in conformity with the general will, and do so with their heart in it. To repeat Rousseau's words, ". . . virtue is nothing more than . . . conformity of the particular wills with the general will." For the vast majority, the conformity will be free, uncoerced; and it must be kept in mind that the general will looks only to the common good, the good of every single man in civil society.

But how is virtue to reign? That is, how can men become good citizens who make the laws by which they live (and those laws good laws)? "To form citizens is not the work of a day; and in order to have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children."[52] This is only possible in a society newly

[51] Rousseau, "Political Economy," p. 298.

[52] Rousseau, "Political Economy," p. 307. See Rousseau's discussion of education of children in common, pp. 307-311. In his very interesting book, *op. cit.*, John W. Chapman says, "The question is whether his methods for intensifying social sentiment are consistent with both his view of human dynamics and his moral ideals" (p. 55). Chapman concludes that "The totalitarian aspect of Rousseau's political theory lies in his proposals for intensifying social sentiment. . . . The difficulty is that the means by which he seeks to secure social unity and sentiment transfers the individual from the center to the circumference of value. Authoritarian means do not achieve liberal ends" (pp. 86-87). What makes Chapman's conclusion so worthy of attention is that he does not find in Rousseau's doctrine of the general will, nor in other key parts of Rousseau's theory, grounds for holding Rousseau to be a totalitarian. Nevertheless, I do not think it could be said that Chapman has proved his case. That is, he has not shown that

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founded or plastic enough to be radically reformed, for the Legislator must introduce customs and practices which provide the proper medium for the cultivation of all those sentiments favorable to the common good, and thus reinforce the effects of education. And Rousseau never forgets the connection between "virtue" and the legitimate (that is, unavaricious) interest of each man in society:

> Do we wish men to be virtuous? Then let us begin by making them love their country: but how can they love it, if their country be nothing more to them than to strangers, and afford them nothing but what it can refuse nobody? It would be still worse, if they did not enjoy even the privilege of social security, and if their lives, liberties, and property lay at the mercy of persons in power, without their being permitted, or its being possible for them, to get relief from the laws.[53]

In sum, education in the principles of distributive justice, autonomy, and fair play, combined with a suitable social structure will produce "the reign of virtue" in the good society. Rousseau intends nothing more complicated or pernicious than that.[54]

Rousseau's prescriptions for education and social arrangement diminish human *rationality*. That they may inhibit the full development of human *individuality*, in the modern sense, is doubtless true. But the latter tendency in Rousseau's thought neither amounts to a totalitarian aspect, nor defeats the ends of political life which Rousseau wished to prevail.

[53] Rousseau, "Political Economy," pp. 302-303.

[54] There are two other reasons which have inclined commentators to think of Rousseau as totalitarian or despotic: the place of the Legislator in Rousseau's political theory, and Rousseau's notion of civil religion. Limitation of space prevents a detailed consideration of these two points. But we can say here that neither can be part of any legitimate attempt to fix the label of totalitarian or despot on Rousseau. On the Legislator, we must notice that the Legislator is not a permanent component of the good society; that he does his work at the inception of a society; that he does not make laws, but initiates institutions, habits and practices which promote the workings of the political order; that the people of a country must give their permission before he can begin his work, and then must pass on his proposals; and that there is no provision in Rousseau's thought for an act of usurpation on the part of a would-be Legislator. So far was Rousseau from being a revolutionary that he has his pupil Émile settle down in his (Émile's) native country out of piety, rather than seek out some better land (see *Émile*, pp. 437-438). On the notion of civil religion, we can say that, of course, Rousseau's restrictions on freedom of opinion are intolerable. But we must remember that Rousseau himself believed in its major doctrines,

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We turn now to the charge that Rousseau advocated individualist principles. It is correct to say, I think, that in one sense of the term Rousseau was an individualist theorist; but not correct in another sense. At the center of Rousseau's political philosophy, as we have seen, are the principles of distributive justice, autonomy, and fair play. That is to say, Rousseau's thought is focused on the individual man as a moral agent and as a creature of rights and duties. Society exists to make it possible for individual men to preserve themselves and their own by means of law: it has no other reason for being, no higher purposes. And in so far as this line of argument makes of a writer an individualist theorist, Rousseau is an individualist theorist. (Then, too, the way in which Rousseau favorably contrasts the natural condition with the civilization he knew, makes us want to call him an individualist theorist.) He is an individualist where, say, Hegel, Treitschke, and Maurras are not. But for Rousseau, the insistence on civil liberty and on the political application of moral autonomy—though radical for its day—is not the consequence of an individualist bias in temperament. Rather, the principles of distributive justice, autonomy, and fair play are principles, the absence of which reduce men in society to the status of slavery. They are the principles which, taken together, constitute the necessary conditions for the creation of a society of *persons,* in the strictest meaning of that word. They are the principles indispensable to the existence of morality, pure and simple.[55]

On the other hand, Rousseau is not an individualist in the sense in which Schiller, Humboldt, and, best of all, J. S. Mill, are. He did not delight in a society in which all tastes and talents and eccentricities were permitted and even encouraged. He believed in community and citizenship too much to espouse

namely, a provident God and an after-life. Rousseau has no theory of the noble lie. He seems to have been sincere in his profession that certain beliefs useful to society were, at the same time, true.

[55] In the words of Leo Strauss: "Hence Rousseau's answer to the question of the good life takes on this form: the good life consists in the closest approximation to the state of nature which is possible on the level of humanity. On the political plane that closest approximation is achieved by a society with the requirements of the social contract." (*Natural Right and History,* Chicago, 1953, p. 282.) *Cf.* Bertrand de Jouvenel, *op. cit.,* pp. 94-95.

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any doctrine that tends to isolate men from each other and to urge men to pursue private satisfactions and to refine private talents, at the expense of their concern with, and involvement in, public affairs.[56] The most pressing matter of all for Rousseau was to make of civil society a morally acceptable sphere. The cost of such an enterprise would perforce be the advanced development of "individuality" (to use Mill's word). And though one may find such a cost ridiculously exorbitant, one cannot find Rousseau's position contemptible, or deserving of the abuse which has been given it by friends of "the open society."

Conclusion

We could find many things in Rousseau's political theory as presented in *The Social Contract* and *A Discourse on Political Economy,* which seem irrelevant to our reasoned thought today. Rousseau's ideals, as he knew, were inextricably tied to the city-state and to a simple and unexpanding economy.[57] Relevance aside, however, it would be desirable to come to see what Rousseau was trying to say. We may find that Rousseau is saying things in an artificial or confusing way, which Hobbes or Locke or Hume or Kant said better. But we cannot find that he was defending collectivism, despotism, totalitarianism, or individualism. Are we then not entitled to say to his defenders: Watch how you defend him; and to say to his critics: Please, no more slanders?

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[56] Especially instructive, in this regard, is Rousseau's discussion of the respective merits of Socrates and Cato in "Political Economy," p. 302.

[57] See Rousseau, "Political Economy," pp. 306, 311, 313, 316.

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THE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FRONTIER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

A HISTORY OF TWO PENINSULAS

Much has been written about the unity of the Mediterranean, and rightly. For no one who has travelled in that region can fail to notice not only the great similarity of landscape and physical conditions of its various parts, but also the similarity of the temperament, physical appearance, outlook and way of life of its many peoples. And yet there is a profound cultural cleavage in the Mediterranean, splitting it into Christian and Muslim halves. This split coincides with the break in the shoreline of the Mediterranean formed by the Straits of Gibraltar at one end and the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus at the other, a break which marks the conventional borders of Europe with Africa on the one hand and Asia on the other.

Christian and Muslim Zones

It cannot be said that these straits constitute formidable natural obstacles—indeed it is possible to swim across all three. But they do mark the limits of two of the major religions of the world. South of them, the only Mediterranean country where Christians claim to be a majority is tiny Lebanon (the claim is disputed and the facts are obscure, but this does not affect the argument), and to the north the only country with a Muslim majority—a very small one—is the equally tiny Albania; in neither does the total population reach the 1.5 million mark. Muslim minorities, aggregating some 3.3 million, are to be found in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania, and there are a further 2.3 million Muslims in European Turkey. These are matched by Christian minorities, totalling nearly 3 million, in Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan, plus 1.5 million European settlers in North Africa.[1] In both halves the previous religion has been extirpated from what was formerly one of its

[1] These figures, which are approximate, have been compiled from various sources, notably Louis Massignon, ed., *Annuaire du Monde Musulman* (Paris, 1955); *Statesman's Yearbook; Encyclopedia of Islam; Encyclopedia Britannica;* and national yearbooks; an attempt has been made to bring the available figures up to date.

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most brilliant centers: in North Africa, the home of Cyprian and Augustine, native Christianity seems to have died out in the twelfth century; in Spain, the home of Ibn Hazm and Averroes, Islam disappeared in the seventeenth century.

Moreover, in both halves, during the last hundred years or so, a process of polarization has been taking place, with Muslims moving southeast and native Christians northwest. In the decades immediately preceding the First World War tens of thousands of Turks and other Muslims left the European parts of the shrinking Ottoman Empire and settled in Anatolia and hundreds of thousands of Greeks, Armenians, and Christian Arabs emigrated westward to various parts of the world. The upheavals and tragedies of the First World War accelerated the process: almost all the Armenians left in Turkey emigrated, as did 1.2 million Greeks, who were replaced by over 600,000 Turkish or Greek speaking Muslims from Greece. The exodus of Turks from the Balkans continued in the interwar period, and rose once more in 1950-1951, owing to mass expulsion from Bulgaria; altogether, between 1923 and 1954, Turkey received over one million immigrants. At the same time, emigration of Christians from the southern half was rising rapidly, though here the outflow was not so much of native Christians, albeit that continued, as of the descendants of European immigrants who had settled in Arab lands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most notworthy movements were those of Italians from Libya after 1943, of various Europeans from Egypt following the Suez crisis of 1956, and of Frenchmen from Morocco, Tunisia, and, to a much smaller extent, Algeria; total Christian emigration from these countries since the Second World War has been about 500,000, and the process is by no means at an end.

Geographical Background

The purpose of this essay is to trace the steps by which Christianity and Islam reached their present boundaries. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to draw attention to two geographical features of the Mediterranean. First, the main islands—Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, the Balearics, Crete, and also Malta—are closer to the Christian than to the Muslim half; the only significant exception is Cyprus, the others being Ruwad off the Syrian coast, Jerba and Kerkenna off the Tunisian, and the tiny Pantel-

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leria and Lampedusa group. This enumeration of course excludes islands in the seas opening on the Mediterranean, namely the Adriatic and Aegean. Secondly, each end of the Mediterranean is dominated by a large peninsula—the Anatolian and the Iberian, which are very roughly equal in size, Anatolia being one-fifth larger than Iberia; each peninsula is cut off from its mainland by a very high mountain range—the Taurus and Armenian mountains, with the Caucasus in the rear, and the Pyrenees—and juts towards the strait marking it off from the opposite mainland. It will be seen that much of the history of the interaction of Christianity and Islam in the Mediterranean revolves around these two peninsulas.

Historical Phases

1) Pre-Islamic

Of the pre-Muslim history of the Mediterranean, only one characteristic need be noted. The coasts of Anatolia had been subjected to a very powerful Greek influence, and those of North Africa and Southeast Spain to a somewhat less powerful, but nonetheless real, Punic influence. In other words, each peninsula was tied by a strong bond to what was to become a powerful element in the religion which subsequently dominated the *other* half. This initial cultural influence probably retarded the absorption of Iberia into Christianity and Anatolia into Islam.

2) Early onslaught

Islam had no sooner burst out from Arabia, in 633, than it headed for Constantinople. The first siege took place in 669, the second in 674-680, and the third and last in 716. All three were beaten off and the Arabs withdrew to Syria. Henceforth, for over three centuries, Arabs and Byzantines exchanged border raids across a line which shifted back and forth along the base of the Anatolian peninsula. In the second half of the tenth century, under the vigorous "Macedonian" dynasty, the Byzantines pushed deep into Syria, occupying Aleppo, Baalbek, and several coastal cities, but they were later forced back towards their Anatolian base.

However, almost simultaneously with their last unsuccessful attack on Constantinople, the Muslims crossed the Straits of

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Gibraltar, in 711. By 732 they had passed the Pyrenees, reached the south of France, been defeated at the battle of Tours and pushed back. Here, too, for over three centuries, the battle lines swung back and forth in Northern Spain. Here, too, the vigorous Omayyad dynasty pushed deeper into Christian territory in the second half of the tenth century, its campaigns culminating in the sack of Santiago de Compostela in 997. At the same time, sea raids were taking place across the Mediterranean. Muslim attacks on the Italian and French coasts were frequent in the ninth and tenth centuries, as were Christian attacks on the North African coasts in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

3) The conquest of the peninsulas

Neither John Tzimisces nor Al Mansur found worthy successors, and the weakness of the Byzantine Empire on the one hand and the Spanish Muslim states on the other was soon dramatically demonstrated. In 1071 the Turks under Seljuk leadership won the decisive battle of Manzikert (Malazgerd), which opened before them the whole of Anatolia and allowed them to raid as far as the sea of Marmora. Simultaneously, a Christian offensive in Spain led to the no less important capture of Toledo, in 1085, which also opened the way to Andalusia and the Muslim south and allowed the Spaniards to raid as far as Cadiz.

But both of these disasters provoked strong reactions from the more vigorous and barbarous co-religionists of the victims, who rushed across the Straits to their help. In the East came the First Crusade of 1096 and the subsequent expeditions. These succeeded in pushing back the Seljuks some distance and thus postponed for several centuries the Muslim conquest of Byzantium, but in the process inflicted fatal damage on its cultural and social structure. Similarly in the West the Almoravids (Al Murabitun) crossed over from Africa in 1086 and by defeating the Spaniards at Al Zallaqa gave a new lease of life to Muslim Spain; they were followed in 1145 by the Almohades (Al Muwahhidun). But here, too, a high price was paid in cultural deterioration and religious intolerance.

In both peninsulas, however, the halted advance was resumed after a century or so. In Anatolia, by the end of the twelfth century, the Seljuks and Ghazis pushed back towards the Straits and in the fourteenth century their place was taken by the more vigorous Ottomans, who obtained their first foothold in Europe

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in 1354. And in the West, the victories of Ferdinand III of Castile (1217-1252), following the decisive battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, resulted in the conquest of practically the whole of southern Spain, a conquest that was confirmed by the victory of Rio Salado in 1340. Ferdinand actually occupied, by treaty, some African fortresses and in 1415 the Portuguese started a systematic conquest of Africa with the capture of Ceuta.

At this stage, the fate of both remnants, Constantinople and its immediate neighborhood, and the Kingdom of Granada, was sealed but their fall was delayed by misfortunes that befell their enemies. The victory of Timur Leng over Bayazid I at Ankara, in 1402, shook the Ottoman state and it took another half century to regain enough strength to attack and capture Constantinople in 1453. And the hostilities between Castile, Aragon and Portugal, the feudal anarchy prevailing and the wars of succession, delayed the final conquest of Granada until 1492. The fall of both cities aroused deep emotions in Christianity and Islam, but neither led to positive action by the co-religionists of the defeated party to avenge its loss—not even when Granada sent a desperate appeal to the newly Muslim Istanbul, just as, fifty years earlier, Constantinople had in vain appealed to Christendom.

4) The struggle between the peninsulas

Much of the sixteenth century was dominated by a bitter struggle between the two peninsulas, which formed the bases of the two major world powers of the day, the Spain of Charles V and Philip II, and the Turkey of Selim I and Suleiman. It may be added, parenthetically, that their population was roughly equal, Spain having some 8 million and Portugal 1 million, while Anatolia had over 5 million, with another 6 million in European Turkey.[2] The powers not only clashed directly in the Mediterranean but pursued their landward expansion. The Ottomans were pushed back from Vienna in 1529, with Imperial help, and in the same year the Spaniards were expelled from Algiers, with

[2] The figures for Spain and Portugal are taken from Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris, 1949), p. 348, and those for the Ottoman Empire from O. L. Barkan, "Essai sur les données statistiques des régistres de recensement dans l'Empire Ottoman aux XV^e^ and XVI^e^ siecles," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 1, Part I, 1957.

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Ottoman help. Both powers renewed their assaults, and registered notable successes, such as the capture of Tunis in 1535 and Buda in 1541, but neither could concentrate all its forces on the other since each was distracted by another power and by a religious schism in its rear. For Spain the power was France and the schism Protestantism, while for the Ottomans it was Iran and Shiism. At the same time, it may be noted, the other Iberian power, Portugal, was making desperate efforts to conquer Morocco and vigorously fighting the Turks in the Red Sea.[3]

The Spaniards remained in North Africa until the eighteenth century and returned, together with the French and Italians, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the Ottomans stayed in the Balkans until the twentieth, but all ultimately failed not only in that they lost their empires but, more important, in that the religion and basic culture of their subjects did not change.

5) The Islands

The history of the islands may be briefly told. The Muslim onslaught of the eighth-tenth centuries resulted in the total or partial occupation of Cyprus, Crete, Sicily, Malta, and the Balearics and in frequent raids on Corsica and Sardinia. But with the passing of sea power to the Christians in the tenth-eleventh centuries all these islands were recaptured. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Turks reconquered Cyprus and Crete, but they did not change their fundamentally Christian character and, except for the island of Ruwad off the Syrian shore and those of Jerba and Kerkenna off the Tunisian, Cyprus is the only island with Muslim inhabitants, Crete having lost its Muslims after the First World War.

Underlying Factors

Any attempt to explain the phenomena noted above must take up three separate, though interrelated, questions: What

[3] Other interesting points in the relations of the two peninsulas include the parallel attempts of each to form an alliance with the chief enemy of its rival, Turkey with France, and Spain with Iran; the emigration of the Jews from Iberia to the Ottoman Empire, where they were warmly welcomed; the regionalism that prevailed in both until their unification at the end of the fifteenth century; and the cultural symbiosis of Christians, Muslims and Jews in both until mounting intolerance in the Spanish and Ottoman religious establishments undid the effects of the tolerance formerly shown by the rulers. I am indebted for some of these, and other, points to Professor Bernard Lewis.

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were the factors that influenced the general position of the Christian-Muslim frontier? What were the factors which brought about the ultimate inclusion of Anatolia in the Muslim zone and Iberia in the Christian? And what factors determined the sequence of events?

1) The Christian-Muslim frontier

Various explanations have been given for the failure of Islam to spread further north than it did. Some of these are based on physical geography. The most obvious is the existence of the Mediterranean. For although Islam has spread across seas, notably into East Africa and Indonesia, most of its advance has been overland and the presence of a large body of water, which was more often an arena of warfare than a channel of trade, must have constituted a serious obstacle. Again, nearly six centuries ago, Ibn Khaldun entitled one of the chapters in his *Prolegomena,* "Arabs Conquer only Plains";[4] it is a fact that Islam was carried into most of the mountainous regions lying on the periphery of the Arab World (Anatolia, Caucasus, Spain and, to a certain extent, Morocco) chiefly by Turks and Berbers, and it may well be that the high mountain chains of Southern Europe acted as an effective barrier to Arab, and subsequent Muslim, invasion and expansion.

A second geographical explanation, which complements the first, is based on climate. Islam grew up in, and adapted itself to, a dry region. The main habitat of the Muslim peoples is the vast zone stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to China, where marked aridity is either a year-round or at least a seasonal phenomenon.[5] The tropical forests lying south of this zone have for centuries acted as a barrier against Islam and it is only recently that, helped by European pacification of these regions and by improved communications and by the spread of modern medicine, Islam has once more resumed its southern advance. But the forests of the north have proved insurmountable obstacles; a possible explanation of this resistance may be

[4] Ibn Khaldun, *Prolegomena,* edited by Quatremère (Paris, 1858), vol. 1, p. 269.

[5] See Charles Issawi, "The Bases of Arab Unity," *International Affairs,* XXXI (January 1955), p. 36, and the maps in Peveril Meigs, *World Distribution of Arid and Semi-Arid Homoclimates,* Unesco mimeographed document NSI/A21/37/rev. (Paris, December 28, 1952).

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that "in the oak-forested Balkan mountains or in the area of Chinese civilization the ban on pork has slowed down conversions,"[6] and pig-raising is one of the main traditional forms of livelihood in the Balkans—though it should be added that pig-raising was also widespread in Anatolia.

This leads to a third explanation, of a sociological nature. Although it had its origin in sedentary Mecca and Madina, Islam spread rapidly among nomads, the group best adapted for life in an arid zone. As a French geographer put it so well:

> "The frontiers of Islam seem to coincide very generally with those of pastoral nomadism, or at least with regions that the nomads could influence politically. . . . The contrast between the Islamic and Christian shores of the Mediterranean shows perfectly this difference between a shore completely controlled by nomads, who find their natural home in the neighboring deserts, and a shore unified into a solid peasant civilization, against which invasions simply peter out."[7]

As the same author points out, this is also true of the southern frontier of Islam in Africa.[8]

A complementary sociological explanation, also given by Planhol, stresses the crucial rôle of cities and trade routes in the peaceful penetration of Islam:

> "The expansion of Islam seems therefore to be linked to means of communication; the religion spreads along trade routes and in coastal areas but is hindered by all natural obstacles to social life (mountain ranges and densely forested areas) as well as by the simple inertia of the rural population. . . . The Moslem religion may be thought of as a sort of gigantic octopus, the arms of which reach far down the main roads and project far in front of the animal's actual body."[9]

This explanation fits very well with the expansion of Islam in Eastern Africa and Southeast Asia since, until the irruption of the Portuguese at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Muslims dominated the Indian Ocean and were its main traders. But although during most of the ninth and tenth centuries Muslims dominated the Mediterranean and captured most of its islands, they never obtained control over the trade between the

[6] Xavier de Planhol, *The World of Islam* (Ithaca, 1959), p. 121.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 123.

[8] See also the remarks on "desert power" in Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History* (London, 1958), p. 55.

[9] Planhol, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

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Muslim and Christian worlds which, important as it was to Europe, was of minor significance to the Muslims compared with the Eastern trade. This trade, which before the Muslim conquest had been largely conducted by Syrians and other eastern Mediterraneans, remained in the hands first of the Byzantines,[10] then of the southern Italians (Amalfites, Neapolitans and others) and later of the northern Italians (Pisans, Genoese, Venetians and Florentines), Provençals and Catalans. And by the eleventh century sea power had definitely passed into Christian hands, where it was to stay with one brief interruption in the sixteenth century.[11]

Two other explanations, based on long-term relations between the major civilizations, may be briefly considered. E. F. Gautier has pointed out that the Westernmost limits of Islam coincided with those of the Carthaginian domain, namely, Southeastern Spain and Sicily.[12] But a better fit can be shown between the limits of the Arab world and the area inhabited by various Semitic peoples before the Arab conquest.[13] Secondly, there is the question of the relation between the three major civilizations of the Western world in medieval times: the Islamic, the Orthodox Christian and the Western Christian, to use the terms adopted by Toynbee; but this is better discussed under the next heading.

2) The incorporation of Anatolia in Islam and the reincorporation of Iberia in Christendom

Some of the factors noted in the previous paragraphs may help to explain why Islam finally incorporated Anatolia but failed to hold on to Iberia. In the first place, the Anatolian peninsula is distinctly more arid than the Iberian: it receives less precipita-

[10] A small amount of trade was carried on through Spain and France, by Rhadanite Jews.

[11] This topic is discussed in a very interesting but not always reliable book by Archibald R. Lewis, *Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean* (Princeton, 1951) and in the excellent contribution by Robert S. Lopez, "The Trade of Medieval Europe: The South" in M. Postan and E. E. Rich (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (Cambridge, 1952), vol. II, *Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages.*

[12] E. F. Gautier, *Moeurs et coutumes des musulmans* (Paris, 1949), p. 142.

[13] Charles Issawi, *loc cit.*

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tion over the year, its dry season is much longer and it contains larger stretches of arid land.[14] Secondly, the interior of the Anatolian Peninsula is somewhat less broken up than that of the Iberian, and fewer barriers impede the advance of the invader once he has succeeded in penetrating the mountain chains ringing Anatolia. Thirdly, and as a consequence of these two phenomena, there is the existence of the vast dry central plateau of Anatolia. This plateau has, from time immemorial, furnished the ideal conditions for the rise of the pastoral nomadic groups so closely associated with Islam, and made it possible for these nomads to grow in numbers and acquire sufficient strength to overwhelm the sedentary inhabitants of the periphery.

Another, more significant, difference between the two peninsulas is that Anatolia lies next to the heartland of Islam, the Arab-Persian area, whereas Iberia lies next to the heartland of Western Christendom, the French-Italian area. Islam conquered Anatolia through the Turks, who had been converted and civilized in the course of their passage through the Persian and Arab countries. It attempted to use for the same purpose the Berbers in Spain, but here it was operating very far from its base. North Africa was not comparable to Iran and the Levant as a cultural training ground, and the Berbers proved no match for the Galicians and Franks, drawing strength from the adjacent Christian heartland.

This leads to a still more important factor, the cultural. The Arabs seized Spain from the Arian Visigoths and the Turks conquered Anatolia from the Byzantines and took the Balkans from other Orthodox peoples. But neither Arabs nor Turks succeeded in penetrating deep into, or holding for a long time appreciable portions of, the continental domain of the much tougher Catholic Christian civilization.[15]

[14] The greater aridity of Anatolia, and the greater length of its dry season, are brought out clearly both by maps showing total annual or quarterly rainfall (See Food and Agricultural Organization, *FAO Mediterranean Development Project* (Rome, 1959), p. 8 and *The Oxford Atlas* (1958), pp. i-v.) and by maps showing climatic regions such as those in Meigs, *op. cit.*, and *Goode's World Atlas* (1960), pp. 8-9.

[15] The Arabs were beaten off at Tours, and held parts of southern Italy only briefly; the Turks were pushed back at Vienna, Vicenza and Taranto and held Croatia and large parts of Hungary for a comparatively short period of time.

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A comparison of the three civilizations in the medieval and modern periods leads to the following conclusion. The Orthodox civilization, although far more vigorous than the clichés "Byzantine decadence" and "Byzantinism" would suggest, and although for several centuries it showed both great fortitude against external attacks and considerable inner creativity, finally succumbed before the Islamic. The Islamic civilization also showed great strength in many fields of economic, scientific and artistic activity and in addition to overwhelming Byzantium (which had been weakened by the Crusades) it made deep inroads into the domain of the Hindu civilization. But neither could compare with emerging Western Christian civilization, the most active and powerful the world has yet seen. Already by the eleventh century, Western Christianity had taken the offensive against Islam in Spain, Sicily, North Africa and, even closer to the heart of Islam, in Palestine. And with every year that passed, Western Christendom gained over Islam in economic and cultural strength, and could generally more than hold its own in war as well.

In these circumstances, what is puzzling is not that Islam did not spread farther north but that the counter-offensives of Western Christendom in the twelfth, sixteenth and nineteenth centuries produced so little results in the religious field. In spite of quite long periods of European occupation, not one of the Muslim countries of Asia or Africa has witnessed any substantial conversion to Christianity, or become permanently incorporated in Christendom, and this is the greatest witness to the continued strength of Islam.

3) The sequence of events

The question of the factors determining the sequence of events outlined above must be raised, but the present writer must also confess his utter inability to answer it. The remarkable parallelism between the development of events at both ends of the Mediterranean, the synchronism of ebb and flow, is surely more than a coincidence or an optical illusion. It may point to some profound and as yet unsuspected rhythms in the history of the contact of civilizations. The question is a fascinating one, but it is still unanswered.

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"RADICAL" IMPERIALISTS WITHIN GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 1912-1918

IT IS generally known that the abandonment by the German Social Democratic party (SPD) of revolutionary Marxism before 1918 was a consequence of the growth of Revisionism, which repudiated a number of Marxist dogmas. The Revisionists were no longer persuaded that the lot of the proletariat would inevitably deteriorate, that the capitalist economy was headed for collapse and, most important, that a revolutionary seizure of power by the working class must precede the establishment of socialism. Within the SPD there existed, of course, a large group, the so-called Orthodox Marxists, who staunchly resisted all attempts to change the doctrines of the party. For them Marxism was a faith, a set of unalterable dogmas, and they refused to enter into any compromise with "bourgeois aims or ideology"—as they believed the Revisionists were doing. But what has been little noted is that after 1912 there appeared among these Orthodox Marxists a small group who set forth a position with regard to imperialism that, in effect, also marked a departure from Marxism. This group still used Marxist categories and Marxist terminology, but the conclusions they reached differed sharply from those traditionally held by their colleagues.

No matter what their views regarding the *nature* of imperialism,[1] Orthodox Marxists had always subscribed to the SPD's official pronouncements which condemned every manifestation of colonial expansion. The party, as a matter of principle, refused to look with favor upon any policy pursued by a capitalist state, which, by definition, was considered an enemy of the working class. The party also advanced a host of economic arguments against imperialism. Colonial expansion, it was argued, was imposing heavy financial outlays upon Germany, and because of the prevailing system of indirect taxation the proletariat would have to bear an inordinate share of the expense. As capitalists invested in colonial areas and utilized the cheap

[1] For the various analyses of imperialism—and the subtle distinctions between them—offered by Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and Rudolph Hilferding, see E. M. Winslow, *The Pattern of Imperialism* (New York, 1948), pp. 148-188.

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labor of coolies, the argument continued, the consequence would be either lower wages or mass unemployment in Germany. As long as capitalism could expand abroad the catastrophe that was expected to result from internal strains would be postponed, and, according to Marxist theory, economic collapse was a precondition for the demise of the entire capitalist order. Finally, the SPD evinced a moral revulsion against the frequently brutal treatment of the natives in the colonies and the saber-rattling engendered by imperialist rivalries. The latter, it was feared, would lead to war between major countries, producing terrible destruction and frightful losses in human lives.[2]

In 1912, however, a small number of Orthodox Marxists began to challenge this position on imperialism.[3] Basing their argument on the teachings of Marx, they held that although they could not welcome imperialism as a positive good, they had to recognize, as determinists, that it was a necessary stage through which capitalism had to pass before socialism could be established. Therefore, they maintained, the only correct Social Democratic stand toward imperialism was one of indifference. What is particularly interesting about the new position is that while it initially called for an attitude of indifference toward

[2] The SPD's arguments against imperialism were set forth most cogently in the minutes of the Party Congresses. See especially the *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1901,* p. 61, hereinafter cited as *Protokoll.* See also: *Protokoll, 1898,* pp. 51, 140; *Protokoll, 1900,* pp. 156-8; *Protokoll, 1912,* p. 529.

[3] These Orthodox Marxists were not the only ones to do so. Already in 1907 a number of right-wing Revisionists had begun to oppose the SPD's official stand on imperialism. Their arguments in favor of colonial expansion were strikingly similar to those of bourgeois imperialists, who stressed economic need, nationalism and the cultural superiority of Western states. But the right-wing Revisionists made three additional points. First, they emphasized not so much how imperialism profited the bourgeoisie or even the nation as a whole, but rather the immense benefits it brought to the working class. Second, they were convinced that the pursuit of imperialist policies greatly facilitated the attainment of socialism. Third, they were willing to give unqualified support to German imperialism only if the Empire were genuinely democratized. In advancing these three theses they felt that they were remaining faithful to the basic socialist creed. For details see Abraham Ascher, "Imperialists Within German Social Democracy Prior to 1914," *The Journal of Central European Affairs,* XX (January 1961), pp. 397-422, which deals with the right-wing imperialists within the SPD.

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colonial expansion it became transformed into one that favored full support for it.

I

Differences over the question of imperialism emerged among Orthodox Marxists at the Party Congress of 1912. The delegates were debating a resolution introduced by Hugo Haase, a leader of the radicals, calling for international agreements for the reduction of armaments. In the course of his official report Haase severely denounced imperialist expansion on the ground that it caused international rivalries and the armaments race. Anton Pannekoek and Paul Lensch took the lead in criticizing Haase's motion. Both dismissed as totally un-Marxian the view that capitalist states could abandon the armaments race; they were convinced that militarism was as "necessary" as capitalism itself. While developing this general thesis they presented their new stand on imperialism.

Anton Pannekoek, born in Holland and active in the SPD, was one of the most radical Marxist publicists in Germany before the First World War. He believed that in Germany, where genuine democracy did not prevail, the proletariat would never be able to assume political power by parliamentary means. "Mass action" (or "social revolution") by the working class would be necessary. At the appropriate moment a well-disciplined proletariat, constituting a majority of the nation, would resort to mass meetings, street demonstrations and the general strike. Such action, Pannekoek thought, would so effectively cripple bourgeois society as to force the ruling class to surrender its power.[4]

For Pannekoek imperialism was of the utmost importance in arousing the working class to mass action. As the political program and ideology of modern capitalism, imperialism had an enormous impact upon the domestic scene. First, it had given rise to a certain cohesion among the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, who had been drawn into supporting the country's

[4] Anton Pannekoek, "Massenaktion und Revolution," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXX (July 1912), pp. 541-550.

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Weltpolitik by the vision of a powerful Germany spreading her sway over vast continents and ruling millions of natives. Second, the piling up of armaments, the growth of large armies and navies and the wars of conquest accompanying imperialism all entailed the expenditure of huge sums of money and enormous sacrifices of blood. Since all these burdens had, in the final analysis, to be borne largely by the proletariat, Pannekoek was convinced that their lot was becoming unbearable. Third, these burdens also weighed heavily on the disorganized petty bourgeoisie. Until the era of imperialism, said Pannekoek, the latter stratum had been relatively indifferent to capitalist exploitation; now, however, it was being driven into the camp of the proletariat by the hardships resulting from imperialist expansion. Pannekoek believed, then, that because of the imperialist surge prognostications which Marxists had made for several decades were finally being realized: that the middle classes would disappear and the masses would undergo a process of "immiserization."

Once united by a community of interest, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat would command sufficient power to begin the final struggle against the ruling class. Pannekoek offered a vivid description of these developments:

> Imperialism threatens the masses [both workers and petty bourgeoisie] with new dangers and catastrophes, and thus whips them into a state of resistance; the taxes, the rise in prices, the danger of war—all these necessitate staunch resistance. But the roots of these evils are due only partially to parliamentary legislation and, therefore, can be fought against in the parliament with only partial success. The masses themselves must adopt the plan of exerting pressure on the ruling classes. But such a course of action requires increasing power on the part of the proletariat. The contradiction between the helplessness of the parliament as well as of our [SPD] parliamentary fraction effectively to fight against these harmful manifestations and the proletariat's growing consciousness of its own power becomes ever more evident. Therefore, mass action is a natural outgrowth of the imperialist turn modern capitalism has taken and is, in fact, the necessary form that the struggle against imperialism must assume.[5]

In the light of the crucial significance of imperialism in bringing on the revolutionary situation, the SPD's policy of opposing

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 541-542.

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it was, in Pannekoek's mind, foolhardy and senseless. He felt that this policy might conceivably have had some success when Germany first became interested in colonialism, for at that time large sections of the bourgeoisie still resisted its temptations. But with the upper middle class solidly united on this issue, success was highly unlikely. And Pannekoek warned that if the SPD's opposition were by some chance to succeed in lightening the burden upon the masses, a moderation of their revolutionary zeal might actually ensue. At the first sign of some amelioration, moreover, the petty bourgeoisie would be eager to withdraw from the proletarian camp. The unity of the masses in their struggle against capitalism would then be endangered.

Pannekoek did not deduce from these considerations that socialists ought to support or advocate an imperialist course: they simply ought to adopt the same attitude toward expansionism as toward the new labor-saving machines, which were accepted as an inevitable by-product of the capitalist system. In addition, he urged the SPD to analyze all contemporary developments in order to see to what extent they tended to strengthen the workers as a class and to what extent they promoted their aims. The party then had to determine how best to take advantage of all favorable circumstances and strike the decisive blow not against militarism, heavier taxes or, in particular, imperialism, but against the entire capitalist system. "We want to fight with all our might against this dangerous and most violent form of capitalism. But we do not want to do it by pushing capitalism back into one of its earlier forms. That is impossible. There is only one way: we must pass through imperialism into socialism."[6] "Our struggle against imperialism is not designed to end it, but rather to mobilize the masses against it."[7]

Views very similar to those of Pannekoek were held by another Orthodox Marxist, Paul Lensch. Anticipating Lenin by four years, Lensch contended that imperialism was the "last and highest stage of capitalist society." This new manifestation of capitalism was a consequence, he declared, of the almost unin-

[6] *Protokoll, 1912,* pp. 422-423.

[7] Anton Pannekoek, "Deckungsfrage und Imperialismus," *Die Neue Zeit,* XXXII (October 1913), pp. 113-114; See also Anton Pannekoek, "Das Wesen unserer Gegenwartsforderungen," *Die Neue Zeit,* XXX (August 1912), pp. 810-817.

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terrupted prosperity that had prevailed during the twenty years prior to 1912. While the proletariat's wages had risen during that time, they had not kept pace with the increase in productivity. Consequently, the capitalists, reaping huge profits, were confronted with a perplexing problem: What were they to do with their wealth? First, said Lensch, they used it to crush all competition at home; this resulted, on the one hand, in the ruin of the petty bourgeoisie, the artisans and the small farmers and, on the other, in the concentration of capital in banks and the formation of cartels and syndicates. But still there remained a surplus of capital. To dispose of it the capitalists invested abroad and thus they "completed the process, begun at home, in foreign areas." There the wealth was used to build railroads, highways, harbors, to work new mines, to introduce electricity, and so on. In short, the capitalist system was engulfing the world. Lensch was confident that, once the process of extending the European economy had been completed, the death-knell of capitalism would be sounded.

> While the productivity of the worker rises and rises, while the colonial countries themselves come under the sway of capitalism and now also seek investment opportunities for their surplus capital, the chances to realize a profit on this capital become ever slighter. Capitalism suffocates in its own fat. Wage labor, the condition and basis necessary for the capitalist order, proves to be the insufferable fetter for the continuation of the process of production. It [the capitalist order] is torn asunder. The working classes, who create surplus wealth from which the ruling classes can no longer realize a profit, seize political power and effect the great revolutionary measures which are themselves an outgrowth of economic developments. We see, then, that in reality imperialism signifies the era of revolution, that it is the last word of capitalism. . . .[8]

Lensch viewed the armaments race as a component of the desperate drive by capitalists to find areas for profitable investment. The need for such areas had become so pressing that they were prepared to go to war in order to discover and safeguard them. And the fact that there had been an enormous rise in the production of arms during the previous ten years throughout Europe only proved that capitalists everywhere were facing insurmountable obstacles in their attempts to invest their surplus wealth profitably. Clearly, Lensch maintained, no armaments race mo-

[8] Paul Lensch, "Miliz und Abrüstung," *Die Neue Zeit,* XXX (August 1912), p. 770.

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tivated by such desperation, by such compelling needs, could be stopped by mere "international agreements."[9]

Furthermore, Lensch argued that in the realm of international relations the armaments race connoted a "continuation of international [economic] competition by other means."[10] Admittedly, England, though an imperialist power, favored a general reduction of armaments. But that was due to the fact that she was a "state living off earned income" *(Rentnerstaat)* and, like all *rentiers,* was concerned only with the preservation of the status quo. She feared the rising industrial states threatening to overtake her in the bitter economic and imperialist rivalry. England's aim, therefore, was to halt the advance of capitalism by preventing the new industrial states from developing to their full capacity.

> At one time the English bourgeoisie tried, by means of free trade, to relegate all other nations to agrarianism and keep them in that condition, and thus preserve England's position as the only industrial state in the world; now she plans, by means of general disarmament, to keep all capitalist states, and especially a capitalist state as powerful, young and potent as the German Empire, in a condition of subordination and to establish herself for all time as the mistress of the seas.[11]

Lensch could not understand why international socialism should contribute to the continued domination of one capitalist state over all others. If that were to remain the case, the ultimate victory of socialism would be infinitely more difficult than had been believed. He quoted Engels to the effect that so long as England enjoyed her industrial monopoly, her proletariat, also benefiting from their country's privileged position, would not actively oppose the bourgeoisie and strive to establish socialism. Indeed, the English workers' movement had always been weaker than any other precisely for that reason. By virtue of its great wealth the English bourgeoisie had been able to keep the proletariat relatively satisfied, and this, in turn, tended to moderate class hatred and conflicts. Lensch warned that only when England's naval supremacy had been smashed, and with it her monopoly over industry, would the English workers gain class

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 771.

[10] *Protokoll, 1912,* p. 416.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 417.

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consciousness. Then the path to international socialism would be clear.[12]

Lensch confessed that the means by which capitalist countries would destroy England's naval supremacy were most distasteful to socialists. But he pointed out that progress within capitalism had always been accompanied by unsavory brutalities. The sharp rise in the productive capacity of labor, without which a socialist organization of society was unthinkable, had been one of the great achievements of capitalism; yet this advance had caused the "sacrifice of hundreds of thousands, the misery and poverty of the masses." While socialists abhorred these evils, they could not fail to "acknowledge that capitalism's journey over human corpses ends in socialism."[13] Similarly, they could not fail to realize that even the armaments race and imperialism, though repulsive in their immediate effects, were essential for the progress of humanity. As Lensch so picturesquely put it, it was not the function of socialists to "correct the examination papers of world history" and say to it: "Dear world history, we are returning your work! It abounds with errors. We have marked them with a red pencil. In the future we expect better work from you."[14]

In a sense the thesis developed by Lensch and Pannekoek was most challenging to the other radicals in the SPD. For the latter had generally accepted the analysis of imperialism offered by Rosa Luxemburg and Rudolf Hilferding, both of whom had argued that "colonial exploitation is so vital a necessity to the continued existence of the capitalist system that it could not

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

[13] *Protokoll, 1912,* p. 418.

[14] See Lensch's speech in *Protokoll, 1912,* pp. 415-19. Pannekoek's and Lensch's arguments against Haase's resolution on disarmament were supported by the delegate Max Cohen, who also felt that the armaments race was an integral aspect of capitalism. Cohen accused Bernstein, who had stated that even to entertain the possibility of a world war was to declare the world bankrupt, of injecting ethical considerations into the discussion of a system that leaves no room for ethics. Capitalism, Cohen maintained, could not exist without violence and no international agreement could prevent catastrophe from befalling the world. World peace would be assured only after the triumph of socialism. See *Protokoll, 1912,* p. 429.

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long continue without it."[15] If that was indeed the case, would they not have to agree that the armaments race, too, was unavoidable? Karl Liebknecht, speaking for the radicals, did not think so. In fact, he severely criticized Lensch and Pannekoek for adhering to a mechanistic conception of society and its development. He accused them of not understanding the Marxist method of analysis, which called for a consideration of every social problem from a dialectical standpoint. Thus, they did not realize, said Liebknecht, "that while there are necessary tendencies within capitalistic society, there was no absolutely necessary trend in any direction."[16] All the necessary tendencies, moreover, were at all times being counteracted by opposing tendencies. In true dialectical fashion, Liebknecht declared that "everything was temporarily necessary and nothing was permanently necessary."[17] From these premises he drew the conclusion that although imperialism and the armaments race were inevitable concomitants of the capitalist economy, the proletariat represented an opposing force to these trends. The duty of the working class was therefore to fight against imperialism and *all* its specific manifestations.

Some Social Democrats repudiated Lensch's and Pannekoek's position on the basis of certain very practical considerations. Grumbach, a delegate at the 1912 Congress, dubbed their thesis a "conservative-fatalistic-ideological-Marxist conception." He pointed out that their view, if accepted by the party, would be extremely damaging to the SPD and international socialism. He warned that bourgeois parties in foreign countries would gleefully declare to their socialist movements that German Social Democracy had found excuses—couched in theoretical formulations—for not fighting against an armaments program that the German nation strongly favored.[18] Another telling criticism was

[15] Brynjolf J. Hovde, "Socialistic Theories of Imperialism Prior to the Great War," *The Journal of Political Economy*, XXXVI (October 1928), p. 571; Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital* (Vienna, 1910); Rosa Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1921).

[16] *Protokoll, 1912*, p. 425.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 426.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 424-25.

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levelled at Lensch and Pannekoek in *Die Neue Zeit* (the major theoretical journal of the SPD) by Gustav Eckstein. He observed that their attitude had been possible only because the German parliament had no real power and merely voted "yes" or "no" on bills introduced by the government. However, if the German political system were democratized and the parties were allowed to determine the budget, an adoption by the SPD of Pannekoek's and Lensch's views would impose embarrassing restraints upon the party. For belief in the absurdity of opposing any facet of the capitalist order would rule out an attempt by the SPD to eliminate from the budget the amount designated for building an empire and a navy. German Social Democracy, due to a slavish adherence to a preconceived ideological system, would be in the unenviable position of tacitly consenting to imperialist and military expenditures.[19]

II

The entire controversy points up the hazards of relying upon a philosophical system to provide ready-made solutions to problems arising in a specific political situation. It was a misfortune of German Social Democracy that in trying to formulate policy on a concrete political question its members invariably exhausted themselves discussing the proper Marxist prescription. On the question of imperialism this was especially difficult to determine.

On the one hand, Pannekoek and Lensch could have asserted that for Marx the crucial question in evaluating international conflicts was always whether the policy of a particular country tended to promote or retard the coming of the revolutionary situation. Thus, Marx in effect exonerated British rule in India on the ground that it had been instrumental in "causing a social revolution in Hindostan." On the basis of similar reasoning, he advocated Prussia's seizure of Schleswig-Holstein in 1848, urged

[19] Gustav Eckstein, "Imperialismus and Rüstungsbeschränkung," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXX (September 1912), pp. 907-16.

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a revolutionary war against "reactionary" Russia and the annihilation of the "South Slavic barbarians."[20]

Or it could have been argued that in a sense Pannekoek's and Lensch's position was but a logical extension of a major theoretical tendency in Marxist thought. This tendency emerged shortly after Marx's death when his successors began to analyze the real meaning of his teachings. Probably the most controversial and vexing issue was the problem of determinism. One group, dominant within German and even within international Social Democracy, regarded Marx as a determinist. It was the deterministic aspect of his thought, they contended, that made his entire theoretical system scientific, made it possible to predict, in broad outline, future developments.

More specifically, their argument ran as follows: Since Marx had taught that the law of capitalist development must ultimately lead to the triumph of socialism, it was impossible artificially to create a revolutionary situation; certain phases of economic organization were necessary before society would be ripe for the new order. Karl Kautsky, for many years the undisputed leader among socialist theorists, expressed this view clearly:

> The socialist party is a revolutionary party but not a revolution-making party. We know that our goal can be attained only through revolution. We also know that it is just as little in our power to create this revolution as it is in the power of our opponents to prevent it. It is no part of our work to instigate a revolution or to prepare the way for it.[21]

It is not difficult to see how this theoretical position can induce an attitude of passivity, even of fatalism, towards contemporary historical developments. For if a certain pattern of evolution is

[20] See Marx's article on British rule in India in New York *Tribune*, June 25, 1853. For Marx's views on contemporary foreign political developments see: Franz Mehring, editor, *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle* (Stuttgart, 1902), III, pp. 187-91, 236; August Bebel and Eduard Bernstein, eds., *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Engels und Karl Marx, 1844 bis 1883* (Stuttgart, 1913), pp. 319-23; Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, eds., *The Russian Menace to Europe* (Illinois, 1952), *passim*. For a discussion of Marx on imperialism see Solomon F. Bloom, *The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx* (New York, 1941), pp. 48-56.

[21] Karl Kautsky, *The Road to Power*, translated by A. M. Simons (Chicago, 1909), p. 50.

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inexorable, why should one—indeed, how can one—oppose any particular aspect of that pattern?[22]

Liebknecht and his colleagues might have made an even stronger case for their position. They could have pointed out that while statements favorable to European expansion can be cited from Marx's writings, no clear-cut pronouncement on the development of the imperialist movement during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is to be found in his works. Marx died too early for that. But it is certain that during his lifetime he never urged socialists—as did Pannekoek and Lensch—to oppose any measures designed to lighten the burden of the working class because he believed that the harder the lot of the proletariat the nearer society was to a socialist revolution.

Moreover, although Marx claimed that because of internal contradictions the capitalist system must, with dialectical necessity, crumble and give way to socialism, there is overwhelming evidence that his theory of historical development was not nearly as rigid as Pannekoek and Lensch assumed. In his political tracts on past and contemporary developments he devoted considerable space to the rôle of personalities, ideas and chance.[23]

[22] It should be pointed out that a deterministic position does not *necessarily* lead to fatalism. It can engender *activism*, as was the case with Calvin and Lenin. Indeed, Lenin implicitly rejected the notion that Marxism was a strictly deterministic system, without, however, repudiating his adherence to Marxist doctrine. He contended that it was incumbent upon Marxists, as the most advanced stratum in society, the select few who understood the laws of social and economic development and who knew the direction in which history was moving, to arouse the revolutionary consciousness of the working class, spur them on to revolutionary action and thus to accelerate the demise of capitalism. Lenin and his followers, usually referred to as voluntarists, might be compared to the Calvinists of the sixteenth century, who though they firmly believed that man was saved not by his own merit but by God's grace, did not therefore escape into a world of quietism and inactivity. On the contrary, as Sabine put it, "what better motive can there be to relentless activity—to steel the will and if need be, to harden the heart—than a whole-souled conviction that a man is the chosen instrument of God's will?" Similarly, the voluntarists within Social Democracy conceived of themselves as the chosen instrument of history. See George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (3rd ed., London, Toronto, Wellington, 1953), p. 312. On Lenin's voluntarism see Alfred G. Meyer, *Leninism* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 29-36 and *passim*.

[23] See Solomon F. Bloom, "Man of his Century: A Reconsideration of the Historical Significance of Karl Marx," *The Journal of Political Economy*, LI (December 1943), p. 498.

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He flatly asserted that "The emancipation of the working class is the work of the working class itself."[24] He himself worked diligently and ceaselessly to teach the masses the need for revolutionary action. Finally, it must be noted that in his own lifetime Marx had condemned all attempts mechanically to apply his "historico-philosophical theory"; he objected to those who considered it "a kind of algebraic 'table,' from which, given enough factual data, automatic answers to all historical questions could be mechanically 'read off.' "[25]

Alfred Meyer is probably right when he states that the deterministic and voluntaristic positions in Marx are not inconsistent with each other. "Marx cannot be classified either as a determinist or as an opponent of determinism. In his opinion, history is the product of human action, even while men are products of history. Historical conditions determine the way man makes subsequent history, but these historical conditions are themselves the result of human action."[26] Or one might argue, as does Isaiah Berlin, that while for Marx the final goal of history is determined, the speed and the efficiency with which that goal is attained will depend upon human initiative and "on the degree of understanding of their task by the masses and the courage and efficiency of their leaders."[27]

Whether or not Marx was a determinist, the thesis of Pannekoek and Lensch is important and interesting because of its conservative implications. If taken seriously as a general guide to political action it would have meant that the Social Democratic Party, by 1912 representing about one third of the German electorate, would have had nothing to do but wait for the demise of capitalism. The SPD would not have been able to take any stand whatsoever on the many issues in German politics. However, although this would have been an absurd position for Social Democrats to take, those who advocated it were in a paradoxical situa-

[24] Karl Marx, "General Rules of the International Working Men's Association," Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (London, 1951), vol. I, p. 350.

[25] Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment* (2nd ed., London, New York, Toronto, 1948), p. 121.

[26] Alfred G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, 1954), p. 10.

[27] Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

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tion. They favored no policy that would disturb the status quo and still were able to claim that they were more radical than anyone else.

What is also significant about the Pannekoek and Lensch thesis is that it could be extended logically into a full-blown defense of territorial expansion. For if imperialism is the last and necessary stage before socialism, it may be argued that the sooner imperialism runs its course the faster the proletariat will attain its goal. And if that is the case, would it not be wiser—certainly more in accord with the interests of the working class—actively to support imperialism?

III

After the outbreak of the First World War precisely this line of reasoning was *one* of the arguments set forth by a few Orthodox Marxists in defense of German imperialism. The most notable proponent of this argument was Heinrich Wilhelm Carl Cunow, an adept Marxist dialectician, prominent radical theorist and from 1917 to 1923 editor of *Die Neue Zeit*.[28] Basically, his thesis repeated Pannekoek's argument of 1912, but with one important difference: Cunow favored imperialism whereas Pannekoek had viewed it with indifference. Cunow contended that "Whatever in the course of time assumes reality and life is historically necessary."[29] Whether any specific historical event was desirable, dangerous or immoral was irrelevant. From these premises it followed that imperialism was simply a necessary stage in man's progress toward socialism. As Cunow put it, imperialism was a "more progressive, more potent form of capitalism in which finance capital has replaced industrial capital."[30] Economically, it prepared the ground for a socialist order in that it led to the concentration of the means of production in the hands of big capitalists, to the separation between ownership

[28] During the early 1920's Cunow devoted himself to academic studies and produced two massive works: *Die Marxsche geschichts-, gesellschafts- und staatstheorie: grundzüge der Marxschen Soziologie* (Berlin, 1920-21), two volumes; *Allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeschichte: eine Übersicht über die Wirtschaftsentwicklung von der primitiven Sammelwirtschaft bis zum Hochkapitalismus* (Berlin, 1926-31), four volumes.

[29] Heinrich Cunow, *Parteizusammenbruch?* (Berlin, 1915), p. 16.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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and management of the means of production, to the process of expropriation of small business by large corporations and to the formation of huge combines.[31] Opposition to imperialism, therefore, was as absurd as the yearning of some during the early stages of the industrial revolution to outlaw machines. Cunow found such a stand contrary to the very essence of Marxism, and hence he did not hesitate to express approval of Germany's quest for colonies.[32]

A different and more striking defense of German imperialism was advanced by Lensch, who had an altogether remarkable career in politics. He spent his early years in the SPD on the extreme left-wing fringe of the movement. In 1905 he sharply denounced the Revisionist theoretical journal, *Sozialistische Monatshefte,* for publishing articles in support of the "bourgeois notion" that Germany's thriving economy required the protection of a powerful fleet. From 1909 to 1912 he edited the ultra-radical *Leipziger Volkszeitung.* In 1912, as we have seen, he took what he believed was the most radical stand on imperialism. When the First World War broke out he counselled the SPD not to vote for war credits. By 1916, however, Lensch was the most rabid socialist advocate of expansionism. After the war he suggested that the SPD strike the whole concept of class struggle from its program. By this time he was a correspondent for the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,* a newspaper owned by the ultra-conservative industrialist Hugo Stinnes, and no longer belonged to the SPD.[33]

In Germany Lensch was the first fully to apply Marxist categories and terminology to the analysis of international affairs.[34] Elaborating a theme he had advanced in 1912, he declared in 1916 that the World War was a world revolution, a struggle between revolutionary Germany and counter-revolutionary Eng-

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 15.

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 14, and *passim.*

[33] See Hans Herzfeld, "Paul Lensch: Eine Entwicklung von Marxisten zum nationalen Sozialisten," *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte,* IX (October 1927), pp. 263-306.

[34] Apparently the first person ever to do so was the Italian political writer Enrico Corradini, whose ideas strongly influenced the Fascist movement. See Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (2nd ed., New York, 1944), pp. 193-95.

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land. To the notion that colonial expansion was an unavoidable stage through which capitalism had to pass he now added the idea that the objective function of Germany, no matter what specific policies she pursued, was to bring humanity closer to the realization of the socialist ideal. Thus Lensch, too, no longer considered German imperialism a necessary evil, as he had in 1912, but a progressive force for international socialism. He could not but conclude that the historical process, cunning in its ways, was such as to require the SPD to support the inevitable march of German imperialism.

His argument was belabored but clever. The struggle between Germany and England was not, he said, a conflict between social classes in the ordinary Marxist sense. Nor did the political system of a nation "affect the question whether from the point of view of historical development, a country is to be regarded as revolutionary or not."[35] Despite her democratic institutions, England constituted the bulwark of the counter-revolution because she sought world domination by converting "whole nations into her proletarians."[36] Moreover—and here he repeated a point he made in 1912—the English labor movement derived too many benefits from English supremacy to oppose the government's drive to exploit the rest of the world. The concept of the international solidarity of the proletariat had therefore lost all meaning for English workers.

Nevertheless, Lensch was convinced that England would not long remain a world power. For the principles of individualism and free trade were still predominant in the country, and they had given rise to a loose, unorganized, anarchic economy, incapable of continued progress. They also had prevented the emergence of a strong national state that could take measures to further raise the workers' standard of living. Because of these circumstances, Lensch adjudged England a "mechanism" rather than an "organism." "It has been disputed," he wrote, "whether there really is an English State, and whether what is described as the English State is not merely an accumulation of independent individuals whose relations with one another are as mechanical

[35] Paul Lensch, *Three Years of World Revolution* (London, 1918), p. 26, hereafter cited as *Three Years*. Other works in which Lensch developed similar ideas were *Der Arbeiter und die deutschen Kolonien* (Berlin, n.d.); *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1915).

[36] Lensch, *Three Years*, p. 129.

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as those of the monads described by Leibnitz. English capitalism, too, has really remained a mere mechanical accumulation. . . ."[37]

Germany, however, stood out as the most advanced, and therefore most revolutionary, state in the world. Ironically, it was Germany's backwardness, both economically and politically, that had enabled her to forge ahead of all other countries. There were, Lensch asserted, three principal reasons for this: First, Germany had become industrialized later than most other countries and had thus skipped the earlier, anarchic stages of economic organization. Second, since democracy did not prevail, the bourgeoisie had not expended its energy on politics, but rather devoted its enormous organizational skills to improving German business practices. Third, the Government had been most considerate in providing high protective tariffs. Consequently, small, inefficient business had been mercilessly uprooted and replaced by monopolies, cartels and syndicates, which controlled production, prices and distribution. The upshot had been the rise of a new type of economy, one which Lensch termed "organized capitalism." His enthusiasm for this new economic system was unbounded:

> . . . the form which Capitalism tended to assume in Germany was that of the establishment of social control over production. That is its enormous service, its true significance in the world's history. *It was the first practical attempt on the part of a capitalistic society, an attempt spontaneous in its origin, but systematically carried out and on a large scale, to penetrate behind the mysteries of its own mode of production,* and to control those social laws to the natural domination of which men had hitherto submitted blindly.[38]

Lensch maintained that the SPD had completely failed to understand this new development. It did not realize that the struggle for socialism had shifted from the sphere of internal politics within the individual nations to the external arena of international relations. Lensch urged the party to recognize that labor had become much more socialized and the economy far more thoroughly and efficiently organized in one country—Germany—than in any other. Nowhere else, he declared, was Social Democracy as powerful, labor blessed with so many benefits, and the proletariat as well disciplined and enlightened.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 213-14.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 38. Emphasis is Lensch's.

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There could be no doubt that "Socialism is coming, and in fact has to some extent already arrived."[39] Further development towards socialism, however, was being hampered by a powerful foreign state, England. The best evidence for this was the deliberate refusal to accord Germany a fair share of the world's markets and colonies. In fact, the conflict of 1914 had resulted from the persistent attempt of England to impede the rise of Germany. Lensch expressed this view in Marxist terms: ". . . the war of the Entente against Germany resembled the attempt of the lower bourgeoisie of the pre-capitalistic age to prevent the decline of their own class by destroying the newly invented machine, no matter what might be the effects upon technical progress and the development of society."[40] Only their traditional sense of inferiority had up to this time prevented the Germans from understanding their historic mission. It was time the SPD recognized Germany's revolutionary rôle and accorded the state its wholehearted support.

Lensch enthusiastically depicted Germany's mission:

> Germany wants to destroy the English world domination, in the first place, merely because she will thereby serve her own interests; *but by so doing Germany will become a world historical nation, because her special interests are at the same time the general interests of progress and historical development.* As a consequence of her own particular situation, Germany will become the champion of that "progress in the consciousness of freedom," which is Hegel's definition of the world's history. Liberation from the yoke of the English world domination is not merely a concern of Germany; it concerns all nations. All the nations suffer under it; all have an interest in its overthrow; but none of them have had the strength to effect it. But Germany has this strength.[41]

Once the war had been victoriously concluded, the English colonial monopoly was to be dissolved. Germany's overseas holdings were to be substantially increased to assure her the possibility of an ever-expanding economy. On the continent Germany, permanently allied with Austria-Hungary, would be so powerful as to constitute a "modernized Roman Empire of the German

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 204.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-89. Emphasis is Lensch's.

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nation."[42] Above all, a victory by Germany would signify the triumph of the new progressive "organized capitalism" over the old, decadent, individualistic type still prevalent in England. The English proletariat, no longer benefitting from their country's world domination, would gain class consciousness and seriously agitate for socialism.

IV

That a few Orthodox Marxists should have offered arguments in favor of imperialism after 1914 is not as startling as it may seem. We have already shown how their ideological rigidity might predispose them to do so. Even more important is the fact that the outbreak of the war disoriented the entire Social Democratic movement. Although there had been much talk for many years within the SPD on how to halt a war between bourgeois powers, when hostilities began no one knew quite what to do. In this time of national crisis it turned out that the attachment to the Fatherland was much stronger and deeper than anyone had suspected. Certainly, few were willing to embark upon any course of action that might weaken the country. On the contrary, very quickly socialists were able to persuade themselves that support for Germany was the correct policy. For many the struggle represented nothing less than a war of defense against an enemy striving to crush Germany. Others conceived of it as a holy war against the barbarian and reactionary colossus in the East. And virtually all socialists feared a loss of mass support or, even worse, violence if the party opposed a war to which the population gave enthusiastic approval.

Although most members of the SPD simply assented to the war, a small, constantly growing and increasingly vociferous group was so inspired by nationalistic sentiment that it swung over to the side of the most bellicose expansionists in Germany. Most of those belonging to this group had been Revisionists before the war, but, as has been shown, there were even a few Orthodox Marxists whose emotional ties to their country were

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

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so strong that they came to support virtually all its policies during the war.[43]

The line of argument developed by the radicals in defense of imperialism is striking not only because it represented a departure from Marxism or differed sharply from Social Democracy's official stand on colonial expansion, but also in three other respects. In the first place, a basic element of it was a notion quite alien to the German socialist movement, that in view of the inexorability of the historical process any concern with the morality of a political act is irrelevant. Second, the radical imperialists' line of argument, especially as developed by Lensch, contained a distinct note of hostility towards England, which was depicted as a ruthless exploiter that had deliberately blocked German aspirations. This was something new within German Social Democracy, for by and large the movement had always been favorably disposed towards England as a country that had evolved into a democratic state and whose proletariat had continuously made progress in the matter of economic benefits and political rights. Finally, Lensch's view that in international relations Germany constituted the oppressed proletariat and England the capitalist exploiter could not but lead to the suggestion that within Germany all classes should subordinate their own interests to those of the state and that their primary concern should be to secure a great empire for the nation. For the implication was clear: if Germany did not succeed in becoming a major imperial power, her *entire* population would be subjected to intolerable economic oppression.

Within the SPD, of course, very few were willing to adopt

[43] In this article I have discussed the ideas of those radicals only who couched their support of imperialism primarily in Marxist terms. The other radicals who became imperialists justified their new stand on grounds similar to those of the Revisionist expansionists in the prewar period. Max Cohen, who had supported Lensch and Pannekoek in 1912, belonged to this group after 1914. See Max Cohen, "Das englische Weltreich," *Die Glocke*, I (1915-1916), pp. 522-24; Max Cohen, "Mitteleuropa," *Die Glocke*, I (1915-1916), pp. 573-83; Max Cohen, "Imperialistische Randbemerkungen," *Die Glocke*, I (1915-1916), pp. 381-92; Parvus, the editor of *Die Glocke*, a journal of the SPD imperialists during the war, was also a radical. Probably the most ardent expansionist of all these radicals was Konrad Haenisch. See Konrad Haenisch, *Der deutsche Arbeiter und sein Vaterland* (Berlin, 1915); Konrad Haenisch, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie in und nach dem Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1919); Konrad Haenisch, *Krieg und Sozialdemokratie* (Hamburg, 1925).

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these novel ideas. But it is a curious fact that with some modifications they eventually became highly popular among extremists both on the right and the left. To cite but two examples: the Nazis were given to speaking of Germany as a beleaguered proletarian nation struggling to free herself from capitalist exploitation by Western states under the leadership of England; and among Communists it is fashionable to defend, in the last analysis, every foreign political move of the Soviet Union on the simple ground that as a socialist state it is more progressive than any other.[44] Small in number though they may have been, the radicals whose ideas we have examined seem to have articulated political views that received wider currency—in the turbulent era of the 1920's and 1930's—than anyone in their day would have believed possible.

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[44] In this connection it is interesting to note that while Lensch became a writer for the ultra-conservative press, Pannekoek achieved prominence as a Communist during the 1920's.

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THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY OFFICER

THE purpose of this article is to examine the character of the Imperial Russian Army officer in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The method of approach assumes that the officer was a product of: 1) the historical heritage of the officers corps, 2) the social origins of the individuals composing the officers corps, 3) his military education, and 4) the social and economic conditions existing in the Russian Empire at that time. Data on such subjects as rank, pay, uniforms, and military organization and tactics, unless they are pertinent to one of the categories enumerated above, are not included.

The Russian Army officer before 1850

The officers' ranks, according to the *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia,* were first established in 1680 in the regiments of the *Streltsi.* In 1703, at the time that Peter I established the Russian regular army, the rank of Second Lieutenant was created, in 1711 the rank of Major, and in 1716 that of Lieutenant Colonel. In 1722 the Table of Ranks divided the officers into "Staff-Officers" and "Line-Officers." The former included the rank of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel; the latter the ranks of Second Lieutenant through Captain, inclusive.[1] Prior to the introduction of these ranks, the "leaders" of the *Streltsi,* the first units of the standing army, were appointed by the Tsar as were the leaders of the militia when it was called into active service. These "leaders" were drawn from the nobility or from among the foreigners who had drifted into Russia and claimed some knowledge of military science. The positions of military leadership, it appears, were filled in much the same manner as those of a non-military nature and, as such, took on the significance and tenure of any other governmental position.

Ivan IV (1533-1584) decreed that not only those who held estates in service tenure, but also those who owned inherited lands, were required to perform active service beginning at age

[1] "Ofitseri" (Officers), *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 1955.

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fifteen and continuing until death or incapacity.[2] It was this nobility or *dvorianstvo* that provided the military leaders, and from which they continued to be drawn almost exclusively, until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Guards regiments had their origin between 1683 and 1689 and evolved from the playmates of Peter I. The first two Guards regiments, the Preobrazhenski and Semenovski, played significant rôles in the palace revolutions of the eighteenth century, became the source, for a short time, of all officers of the army, and, being garrisoned in the capital, provided the most desirable assignments. They rapidly became associated with wealth and political power and increased in number to include, eventually, four infantry Guards regiments and two full divisions of cavalry Guards regiments. Those officers who came from families possessing political power or wealth could usually obtain an assignment to one of the Guards regiments, and, in some cases, it became traditional for each generation of a particular family to serve in one particular regiment. Also traditional was fast living, and it was not uncommon for the Guards officers to play cards all night and not sit down to dinner with champagne until five or six in the morning.[3] So notorious was this life that parents looked with some foreboding on their sons going to the capital to serve as officers. In Pushkin's novel *Kapitanskaia Dochka* the hero's father says: "What is he to learn serving in Petersburg? To drink wine and to play cards? No, . . ."[4] The Guards regiments will be discussed below in more detail in the sections on education and service life. Here it is sufficient to note that while service in these regiments was, for the officers, closely connected with the social life of the capital, this service was not typical of that in the bulk of the Russian army, and, in fact, the numerical strength of these Guards regiments was insignificant.

A decree of January 16, 1721, and the "Table of Ranks" established by Peter I on January 24, 1722, provided that every person achieving the rank of officer also became a member of the hereditary nobility. In addition, this "Table of Ranks" dis-

[2] Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia—A History and an Interpretation* (New York, 1957), p. 195.

[3] A. S. Pushkin, "Pikovaia Dama" (The Queen of Spades), *Sochineniia* (Works), (New York, 1944), p. 422.

[4] A. S. Pushkin, *Kapitanskaia Dochka* (The Captain's Daughter) (Moscow, 1951), p. 8.

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tinguished between the civilian and military service and provided for all officers beginning their service in the lowest grade and progressing by promotions through the various grades.[5]

> Government service thus became the principal source of the coveted distinction of dvorianstvo . . . [but] the path that led to hereditary dvorianstvo continued to be obstructed by many obstacles of an unofficial nature, by deep-rooted prejudices, and by the reluctance of the old families to accept newcomers in their midst.[6]

The requirement, established by Ivan IV, that all *dvorianstvo* must serve until death or incapacity was changed by Empress Ann. A decree of December 31, 1736, reduced the term of compulsory service, both military and civil, to twenty-five years.[7] All conceivable schemes were used to avoid service when such service was repugnant to the individual or his family. One method used to reduce the twenty-five years' compulsory service was for the father to enlist his son in a regiment at an early age so that when he reached manhood he had only a short time left to serve. Such a case is documented in the novel *Kapitanskaia Dochka*. The story, which took place during the reign of Catherine II, relates how the hero's father enlisted him in the *Semenovskii* Guards regiment when he was apparently still a baby (rebenok). Very likely there were limits as to who could make use of this ruse, because even in this example the enlistment of the young hero was allowed only as a favor by a particular prince who was probably an important person in St. Petersburg. In any case, the young man was considered to be on leave from the time of his enlistment and did not enter active service until he was sixteen.[8]

Peter III freed the nobility from the obligation to serve by a decree of January 17, 1762. Thereafter, service was voluntary, and the officers had the right to resign except in wartime.[9] This decree made it easier for the *dvorianstvo* to avoid service but the frequency of wars, the continued omnipotence of the Tsar, the tradition of service, and the continual increase in the number of impoverished nobles must certainly have combined to make service generally mandatory or even desirable. The fact

[5] Florinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-421.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 482.
[8] A. S. Pushkin, *Kapitanskaia Dochka*, p. 7.
[9] Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

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that service conditions depended more on the reigning monarch than on existing regulations is illustrated by the requirements of service in the Guards. When Emperor Paul, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, came to the throne he purged from the rosters all those who had only a nominal connection with the regiments.[10] However, at the end of the century we find the conditions which Paul tried to correct still in existence. A former officer of the Tsar who later was also an officer in the Red Army wrote:

> Officers . . . frequently left regimental service for long periods, resuming it only on being appointed to command of a squadron, for which they would usually have to wait not less than ten to fifteen years and sometimes longer. . . . Ten officers were listed on the strength of our squadron but never more than five, however, would be present at one time.[11]

The status of hereditary nobility, opened by Peter I to those achieving the rank of officer, became unobtainable following the issuance of a manifesto of June 11, 1845, which conferred hereditary nobility only on those army officers who achieved the rank of Colonel (rank 5) and "personal" nobility (a meaningless designation) on those achieving lower officer ranks.[12]

Having surveyed the high points in the development of the officer corps up to 1850, the remainder of this article will be devoted to a more detailed examination of the development of the Imperial Russian Officer during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Education of the Imperial Russian Army Officer

During the period, 1856 to 1861, which immediately followed the disastrous Crimean War, it was determined that 74 per cent of the officers entering the army had not received a completed education in a suitable institution of military education.[13] D. A. Miliutin, minister of war from 1861 to 1881, wrote:

> The greater part of the officers consist of people who have not received either military or scientific training. The cadets are sent to a

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 625-626.

[11] Lieutenant-General A. A. Ignatyev, *A Subaltern in Old Russia* (London, 1944), p. 73.

[12] Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 776.

[13] A. V. Fedorov, *Russkaia Armiia v 50-70 gg XIX v.* (The Russian Army from 1850 to 1880) (Leningrad, 1959), p. 180.

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> regiment without any kind of scientific training, having served on a level with soldiers of more or less the same age, promoted to officer rank without any kind of examination, not even to mention military science.[14]

This condition improved through gradual reform until, in the opinion of General Denikin, the Russian officer personnel, by 1911, were equal in skill to the German and superior to the French.[15] The credit for this remarkable progress is given by both Western and Soviet historians to D. A. Miliutin whose long term of service as minister of war had the beneficial effect of projecting his reforms beyond the reach of the more conservative ministers who followed him.

At the time Miliutin became minister of war in 1861 (having been assistant minister since 1858) the officer corps was derived from four sources: 1) graduates of military academies and schools, 2) graduates of the cadet corps and Guards military schools, 3) outstanding non-commissioned officers, and 4) those promoted to officer rank from the volunteers (according to A. V. Fedorov this group consisted basically of the half-educated young men of the nobility). Of the 50,567 officers obtained from these sources during the period 1825-1850, only 14,415 were from military educational institutions. Those from the military academies were well-educated and highly sophisticated while often those drawn from non-commissioned ranks had difficulty in signing their names.[16]

By the 1850's the number of Cadet Corps *(Kadetskii korpus)* schools, the first of which had been established in St. Petersburg in 1731 by Empress Ann, had increased to twenty. The course was for nine years and was divided into three parts: 1) preparatory—one year, beginning between the ages of six and eight, 2) general—five years, and starting not later than ages ten to twelve, and 3) specialized—three years, beginning between the ages of fourteen to eighteen. Upon graduation, these cadets received army commissions.[17]

[14] Lenin State Library (GBL) USSR, Manuscript Department, *Fond* (Collection) D. A. Miliutin, *Memuari* (Memoirs), volume 13, p. 318, cited in Fedorov, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

[15] A. I. Denikin, *Put Russkogo Ofitsera* (The Path of the Russian Officer) (New York, 1953), p. 58.

[16] Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

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At this time there also existed four military academies: Nikolaevskaia Academy of the General Staff, (a school attended by officers and to be discussed below), Mikhailovskaia Artillery School, the Nikolaevskaia Engineer School, and a Medical-Surgical Academy. In addition, there were two schools associated with the Guards regiments, and hence more closely associated with the nobility than with other schools: the Regiment of the Nobility *(Dvorianskii polk)* (later to become the Konstantinovskoe Military School), and the School of Guards Midshipmen and Cavalry Cadets (later to become the Nikolaevskoe School of Guards Cadets).[18]

Then in 1863, after having had the advantage of five years in which to study the problem, Miliutin, with the approval of the Tsar, abolished all Cadet Corps Schools except four (Pazheskoe, Finliandskoe, Sibirskoe, and Orenburgskoe). In the place of these schools, which graduated only six hundred cadets per year, a system of military schools graduating two thousand per year was established. In this new system, the first type of school was the Military School *(Voennoe uchilischche)*: infantry, cavalry, artillery, military topography, and so on. (In order to prepare young men for these Military Schools, twenty military gymnasiums were established.) Those graduating in the first half of a class were given the rank of Second Lieutenant, and those in the lower half, the rank of Ensign. The stress in the Military Schools was on regimental tactics; however, two foreign languages, chemistry, mechanics, analytic geometry and Russian literature were included in social studies.

Because the Military Schools could provide only five hundred young officers, there were established between 1864 and 1871 seventeen Cadet Schools and, at the same time, ten junior secondary schools to prepare the young people for the Cadet Schools. Those entering the Military Schools had to have completed the secondary school course, those entering the Cadet School only the junior secondary school. Training in the Cadet Schools lasted two years. During the first year general subjects were studied; in the second year, special subjects such as tactics, handheld weapons, topography, and the fundamentals of artillery. The course in tactics received emphasis, and the bulk of the tactical instruction was on company tactics. The major differ-

[18] P. Zaionchkovski, *Voennye Reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii* (Military Reforms in Russia during the 1860's) (Moscow, 1952), p. 223.

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ence between the Cadet Schools and Military Schools was that the former were subordinate to the military districts in which they were located, and the graduates returned to the unit from which they were sent and in which they served as volunteers to qualify for the Cadet School. Promotion to the rank of officer and assignment to duty depended on the commander of the regiment in which they served.[19]

According to A. V. Fedorov, prior to the introduction of universal military service the various institutions of military education were open only to the privileged classes, mainly the nobility. Only the Orenburgskoe and Sibirskoe Cadet Corps schools accepted children of military and civil service personnel not of the nobility or of sufficient rank. After the initiation of the universal military service law a person from any class could enter the schools, but Fedorov maintains that, in actuality, the educational requirement plus the reluctance of the privileged classes to accept those of a lower social status into institutions for military education effectively maintained the officer ranks almost solely for the upper classes.[20]

There are too many references in literature to the bourgeois or proletarian origin of officers to accept Federov's observation that the schools were limited to the upper classes. But if his concept of the "upper classes" includes the middle classes, then what he writes is consistent with other reports. General Ignatyev, who had attended the Kiev Cadet School and in later years served in the Red Army, wrote that with the exception of certain schools in St. Petersburg, the military schools for cadets "were almost all composed of children of the officers, officials, and petty landed gentry. . . ."[21]

In 1888, still a third type of school emerged as a source of young officers. The first of these was the "Moscow Cadet School with the Military School Course."[22] From its name one can see that it was a combination of the two existing types of schools. Evidence indicates that the new school may have been regarded as a transition in the upgrading of all Cadet Schools to the scholastic level of the Military Schools. The first item is a state-

[19] Fedorov, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[21] Ignatyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

[22] Denikin, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

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ment by Miliutin early in 1862, that is, before the beginning of the reforms in military education, in which he said:

> The primary material for the formation of officers . . . should consist of a cadet . . . having taken an examination in general science *not lower than gymnasium level.*" [The present writer's emphasis][23]

Granted that he hoped that this education would be obtained in civilian schools—which did not happen—nevertheless, this indicates the level which he felt was a minimum for cadets who were to receive the specialized training to become officers. The second item of evidence is that, in fact, all institutions for the training of cadets to become officers became Military Schools by 1911.[24]

The program and rules were the same for this new type of course as for the Military Schools except that those who enrolled were volunteers who had completed at least a secondary education in a civilian institution.[25] The assignments for graduates of the Cadet Schools with a Military School course were less attractive than those for the young officers of the Military Schools but held more promise than the assignments of graduates of the plain Cadet Schools. The latter were still dependent on their regimental commander for their commissions and future. General Denikin, who had graduated from the Kiev Cadet School with the Military School course, wrote that in his class of approximately ninety new officers assignments were: one Guards, five or six field artillery, five or six engineers, and the rest infantry. It was traditional that only persons of the nobility were assigned to the Guards, and this tradition was reinforced by stories among the cadets of how young officers of non-noble birth, having reported for duty at a Guards regiment, were not accepted and had to ask for other assignments.[26]

In picturing the life of a cadet, it is instructive to consider the description given by a former officer of the Imperial Russian Army who had attended the Military School Course of the Kiev Cadet School. The bulk of the officers graduated from

[23] Lenin State Library (GBL) USSR, Manuscript Department, *Fond* D. A. Miliutin, *Memuari*, 8004, p. 15, cited in Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[24] Denikin, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

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institutions of military education since the reforms of the early 1860's had come from the cadet schools and were therefore representative of the army officers towards the end of the nineteenth century.

> There began a new life, restricted by four walls, beyond which was a forbidden world seen only on days off. The schedule of daily activities was strict and exact, by the hour and minute, day and night, work and leisure, even intimate functions—everyone under the fire of ten other people's stares.
>
> In view of the fact that we were equal in terms of pay in the cadet course, we lived almost as soldiers. The life was extraordinarily modest, since our daily allowance (about 25 kopeks) was only 10 kopeks higher than a soldier's, the uniform and underwear we received were also a soldier's, and at the same time of a poor quality. The majority of cadets received from home a small sum of money (my mother sent me 5 rubles each month). But there were cadets who were homeless or of very poor families, and who were satisfied with an official allowance consisting at that time of 22½ (private) or 33 1/3 kopeks (private, first class) per month. With this they bought tobacco, toothbrush or postage stamps. But they conducted themselves stoically.[27]

The most illuminating aspect of the training of the Imperial Russian Officer is the apparent absence of instruction in political science or even current affairs. This gulf in the education of officers assumes even greater significance in the light of the relative ease with which a "handful" of men captured the government in October, 1917, and destroyed the already dwindling fighting effectiveness of the army. This ignorance of political affairs made the army incapable of playing any effective part in the two revolutions of 1917 which, in turn, led to the tragedy of the Civil War in which Imperial Russian officers fought in large numbers on both sides. General Denikin wrote:

> . . . we finished school with sufficient special knowledge for the future service. But neither the academic program, the teachers, nor the authorities considered widening the mental outlook of the students, to answer their deepest questions. Russian life at that time was seething, but all so-called "accursed questions," all politics . . . was going by us.[28]

Still another school for the training of young men to become officers was "His Imperial Majesty's School of Pages." Entrance

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 62.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

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to the school was by order of the Sovereign, and this honor was given, with rare exceptions, to the children of generals or grandchildren of full generals. The length of the course was a total of nine years. The last two years were identical with those of the Military Schools with the exception that the Pages became perfect in French and German. During their senior year, the pages took part in the Court activities and assisted the various members of the royal family in their official functions. Even though numerically insignificant (the total strength of the Pages School was only two hundred), it represented some of the most powerful families of Russia, and the graduates took precedence in rank over their contemporaries graduated from other schools.[29]

The Universal Military Service Law of 1874

On January 1, 1874, the Tsar signed into law the new regulations governing service in the Russian Army. Article 1 stated: "The defense of the throne and the fatherland is a sacred duty of every Russian subject. The male population without exception is made subject to military service."[30] This law was, like the reforms in military education, a product of D. A. Miliutin, who was himself educated in the military, occupied several important army posts, and taught in a military academy.

In 1831 the responsibility for providing recruits was placed on the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, children of soldiers, and, in general, on those subject to the poll tax. The obligation to provide recruits for the army was a social or group obligation and not an individual one. The requirements were apportioned out to villages and sections of towns on the basis of one recruit for about twenty-six persons subject to the recruitment. In about ten to twelve per cent of the cases, mercenaries were hired or bought to fulfill the requirement. The term of service was twnty-five years and conditions were at times brutal.[31]

The new law in addition to making service universal, regardless of class, reduced the term of service to fifteen years—six years'

[29] Ignatyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

[30] "Ustav o voinskoi povinnosti" (Regulation on Military Service) [January 1, 1874], *Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii Pravitelstva* (Collection of Statutes and Decrees of the Government) (St. Petersburg, 1874), p. 2.

[31] Zaionchkovskii, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

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active service and nine years in the reserve. Not everyone served: criminals were excluded; individuals with various family obligations were exempted; others were unfit for service. Lots were drawn by those who had no exempting circumstances, and from this group the levy was filled. The term of service was reduced for those who were required to serve in remote and harsh regions and for those who had received advanced formal education. The amount of education decreased the required term of service proportionately; those with a secondary or higher education could also volunteer for service without drawing lots and thus cut in half whatever term would otherwise have been required of them. For example, a university graduate who volunteered for military service would have had to serve only three months. Obviously the upper classes still enjoyed considerable advantage, but nevertheless progress was made. Corporal punishment was abolished; the sons of nobility served side by side (even if for short periods) with former serfs; everyone had a personal obligation to serve.

The army under this law consisted of a standing army and a militia. The standing army was made up of three parts: 1) the army, replenished yearly by the draft; 2) the reserve made up of those who had fulfilled their active duty obligation; 3) the forces of the Cossacks and other minority groups. The militia consisted of all those between twenty and forty years of age capable of bearing arms, including those who had fulfilled their reserve obligation. The militia was to be called into service only in case of extreme emergency, and then only after the reserve had been called.[32]

A better appreciation of the significance of the new recruiting law can be gained from an examination of the statistics of those drafted. In 1874 the persons taken into active military service were:

Nobility and upper class	2,252
Merchants	909
Lower middle class and artisans	12,713
Peasants	127,491
Others	5,093
Total	148,458 [33]

[32] "Ustav o voinskoi povinnosti," January 1, 1874, *passim*.

[33] Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

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This then was the beginning of a new army. The increased quality of the recruits could not but have a beneficial effect on the officer corps. This raising of the cultural level of the army carried with it two important consequences. The officers were faced with recruits equally as intelligent as themselves and therefore had to pay more attention to their own personal conduct and education, and army commissions became more attractive to capable people. These beneficial results, however, would take time to make themselves felt in the form of a better army.

Service life

The life and assignment of an officer depended on his social status, the military school from which he graduated, and his relative standing in his graduating class. Graduates of the School of Pages had the greatest chance of being assigned to the Guards regiments. Officers from the Military Schools received average assignments. For those who graduated at the end of the list at a Cadet School:

> . . . there was left only "Headquarters" with great historical names—posts in the open country far from the city, . . . or posts in the desperate Siberian back-woods. In several of these, outside the fence of the regimental cemetery was another cemetery for those who had committed suicide, in which were buried young officers who had not become used to the depression and primitive, remote life.[34]

The life led by the Guards officers was the most interesting and the least typical. The atmosphere of the various Guards regiments was affected by the tradition of service of generation after generation of aristocratic families, and the selection of new officers depended to a great extent on the verdict of the officers of the regiment. Service in these regiments was closely connected with the social life of the Capital. During the winter months this meant starting out late every evening to appear at one of as many as forty houses for which ball invitations had been received. Drinking was carried on to a disastrous extent. In the Chevalier Guards an officer "had to be capable of downing ten goblets of champagne in the mess." In the Horse Guards, it was difficult to leave a "Thursday dinner . . . alive." At social affairs it was bad form to discuss the service; Russia was seldom

[34] Denikin, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

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discussed; very few had been abroad, and no one even considered the subject of politics.[35]

There is great temptation to dwell too long on the Guards. Literature provides innumerable interesting descriptions. But life in the great mass of the army was very different: monotonous, dull, and lonely.

> We were stationed in the little town of N—. In the morning there was drill and the riding school; dinner with the regimental commander or in a Jewish inn; in the evening there was punch and cards. In N— there was not a home open to us or a single marriageable girl. We met in each other's rooms, where one never saw anything but uniforms.[36]

In his book on the life of the army officer, Denikin describes what he calls a typical surrounding. As a young officer he was assigned for duty with the Second Field Artillery Brigade in the town of Bela, Sedletskaia province, in the Ukraine. The population of the town was about 8,000 of whom 5,000 were Jews and the rest Poles. Both the Jewish and Polish communities were, in effect, closed to the Russian officers. The intelligentsia in Bela was small and consisted exclusively of service people, both military and civilian. Within this small group all social activity took place. Drinking was not as heavy as in the Guards in St. Petersburg. World problems and politics were discussed, but the state system was not questioned, and political movements of the Left were looked upon with considerable distrust. "In a word it was a grey life, with few interests, but people by keeping busy and staying cheerful endured it without tears and complaints."[37]

An infantry regiment with barracks in the town of Z. is portrayed in great detail in the novel *The Duel* by A. Kuprin. The married officers occupied comfortable houses throughout the town, and the bachelor officers had a room or two in private residences. A small house in the center of town served as an officers' mess; there the officers spent their time when not on duty, read the service journal *Russki Invalid,* criticized appointments and discussed service life. Heavy drinking was common,

[35] Ignatyev, *op. cit.,* pp. 66, 92-96.

[36] A. S. Pushkin, "Vystrel" (The Shot), *Sochineniia* (New York, 1944), p. 338.

[37] Denikin, *op. cit.,* pp. 75-78.

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due to the lack of purpose and the feeling that service was a form of slavery from which there was no salvation. The non-commissioned officers performed all the work and the officers, apparently lacking in any sense of duty, did as little as possible. Only during the summer when the battalions and companies had to perform various field exercises or when a great review was scheduled did the officers shake themselves out of their lethargy and take a direct, active part in training. In this regiment, there was one company which was well trained, highly efficient, and in which morale was high. Such rare exceptions appear throughout literature either as vehicles by which authors of novels by comparison depict the low standards existing at that time, or as actual cases which can be found in all armies even under the most adverse conditions.[38]

As an escape from this life two roads were open. The officer could resign, which raised the additional problem of how to earn a living in a predominately agricultural country, or he could try to pass the examinations for entrance to the Academy of the General Staff.

Nikolaevskaia Academy of the General Staff

At the end of the decade which saw the reforms introduced in the institutions for military education there were five academies specifically designed for the advanced military education of officers. The Nikolaevskaia Academy of the General Staff was the only one open to officers of all combat arms. The others were more highly specialized and had prerequisites which are suggested by the titles of the academies: Medical-Surgical Academy, Engineer Academy, Artillery Academy, and the Law Academy.[39] Compared to the total number of officers in the army, the total number of student officers in all these schools was insignificant.

The Academy of the General Staff alone will be examined here because it was the academy to which the greatest number of officers could go, providing they passed the necessary tests, and because it was the most desirable as the path to higher command.

In 1863 the requirements for entrance to the Academy of the General Staff were raised to include the passing of an examina-

[38] A. Kuprin, *The Duel* (New York, 1916), *passim.*

[39] Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

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tion, not less than four years' duty with the troops (including at least two years of line duty), and a statement by the applicant's regimental commander regarding his morals and devotion to duty.[40]

The process of qualifying for entrance was enough to discourage all but the most ambitious. Denikin, who entered the Academy in 1895, relates that 1500 officers took examinations at the headquarters of the various military districts, and, out of those, only 400 to 500 passed and were sent on to St. Petersburg for further screening. There, a second examination reduced the number to between 140 and 150 officers, who were then enrolled. By the end of the course only 100 remained. Ordinarily, only half of those completing the course were assigned to the General Staff while the remainder returned to their units. In Denikin's class, due to a series of administrative conflicts over assignment of standings, the entire class was eventually assigned to the General Staff. But had the normal percentage received the General Staff assignment, that is 50 per cent, then only 3.3 per cent of those who had originally taken the examinations at the military district headquarters would have survived to receive their General Staff assignments.[41]

The first two years of the course consisted primarily of lectures on a great number of military and general subjects. The general education list was rather impressive: languages, history of the foundation of international law, slavic history, State law, geology, advanced geodetics, astronomy, and spherical geometry. The military subjects tended to be out-of-date, with the stress on the tactics of ancient generals such as Caesar and Hannibal, but they also included some discussion of the Prussian King Frederick II. More recent subject matter, such as the military art of Suvorov, was poorly presented, and only in 1897 were lectures begun on the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. The third and last year was spent on research and map exercises.[42]

Members of the General Staff occupied a status which separated them even from their former comrades of the vaunted Guards

[40] Tsentralnii gosudarstvennii voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (TsGVIA) (The Central Military-History Archive), 1862, D. 47541, LL 145-147, cited in Fedorov, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

[41] Denikin, *op. cit.*, pp. 86, 101-110, 118.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

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regiments. Graduation from the Academy in the top half of the class, and assignment to the General Staff was the road to success in the army. Prior to the First World War the higher command positions were occupied to a great extent by members of the General Staff: Regimental Commanders—25 per cent; Infantry and Cavalry Division Commanders—68 to 77 per cent; and Corps Commanders—62 per cent.[43]

The Imperial Russian Army Officer in Retrospect

The officer formed by this system of military education and seasoned by service in the regiments appears differently to different people. The Russian author Kuprin has one of his characters in *The Duel* say:

> Only look at our officers. . . . What are they who remain for any time in the service? . . . If there's a spark of ability or talent in anyone, it is extinguished in schnapps. . . . If anyone in the regiment happens to scrape through his entrance examinations for the Staff College—which, by the way, hardly happens with us once in five years—he is pursued by hatred.[44]

Lieutenant Greene, the American Military Attache in St. Petersburg and observer in the Russo-Turkish War, wrote:

> In the regiments of the line—the great body of the army—this superficial elegance and smattering of knowledge [observed in the officers of the Guards regiments] is quite lacking though it is partly made up by a greater familiarity with the technical duties of their profession.[45]

Kluchevsky in his *History of Russia* saw the defects in the army as stemming from a failure of the military schools to provide the officer corps with the means to communicate with the rank and file of the army. He saw the officer corps as still a privileged class more interested in careers than in the vocation of an army officer.[46] But perhaps a more basic defect than the lack of communication was the lack of convictions to communicate. Had there been conviction on the part of the officers that their way of life was just or that progress and reforms were being

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

[44] Kuprin, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-326.

[45] F. W. Greene, *Sketches of Army Life in Russia* (New York, 1885), p. 27.

[46] V. O. Kluchevsky, *A History of Russia* (London, 1931), Vol. V, p. 283.

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made as rapidly as possible, then a way would have been found to communicate this to the rank and file.

The Civil War showed that if the officer corps had a common philosophy, conviction and dedication were not part of it. Denikin relates the history of two of his classmates as being illustrative of the great split which took place during the Civil War when former Imperial Russian Army officers served by tens of thousands on both sides. One classmate, Pavel Sitin, had attended the Academy of the General Staff and commanded an artillery brigade in the First World War. But he was one of the first to serve the Bolsheviks and commanded the Southern Red Front against Denikin's volunteer army during the winter of 1918. Another classmate, Silvester Stankevich, earned the George Cross in 1900 while serving in the China Command. During the First World War, he commanded the 4th Infantry "Iron" Division. In the Civil War he served under Denikin, commanding the Volunteer Division in the Don Basin while fighting against the forces of Pavel Sitin. There he died.[47]

Conclusion

What is most striking about the Imperial Russian Army Officer of the latter part of the nineteenth century is that he was apolitical. This apparent contradiction between the relatively high level of education and the lack of political understanding is explained by the curricula arising out of the reforms in military education of 1862. The general field of political science was almost completely ignored. In spite of this, one might have expected an increase in political consciousness as a result of the growing number of children of the middle class entering the officer corps. There are no indications that this happened, but rather the opposite: the new additions completely conformed to, and reinforced, the standards established over the previous three hundred years. They had come from mean or modest circumstances and been educated far beyond the level of the social milieu from which they came. Only in the military services could they continue to live in the manner to which they had become accustomed. Failing to understand the deep social unrest existing in the country, they remained indifferent to it or were repelled by it.

CAPTAIN OLIVER ALLEN RAY, USA

[47] Denikin, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

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REVIEWS

Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase. By J. L. TALMON. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.—xiii, 607 pp. $8.75.

The great virtue of Professor Talmon is that he writes as a man absorbed in his subject. He puts many things extremely well: his book abounds in colorful and striking phrases. His purpose is not to offer a cool and methodical analysis of one doctrine after another, nor to trace in detail the influence of thinker upon thinker. He has a thesis to defend, of which he gives the gist on page 155, when he says: "It goes however to show once more how irreconcilable are the love of freedom and the yearning for salvation." The thinkers he discusses—Saint-Simon, Fourier, Fichte, Marx, Lamennais, Michelet, Mazzini and others—saw themselves as liberators and yet were willing to sacrifice the individual to the community. They were all, as Professor Talmon sees them, in one way or another, totalitarian; they believed in a historical process culminating in what they thought desirable. Professor Talmon sees in this belief the root of their totalitarianism. For example, he says on page 248: "Although *prima facie* postulating the liberation and self-expression of the individual as the goal of History, Michelet places collective self-realization far above individual freedom. This was inherent in the basic assumption of the universal scheme of history." Anyone holding that there is a destiny of mankind or of the nation, to be accomplished by great men or by some class or other or by the "people," is putting forward a doctrine dangerous to freedom. Your authentic liberal, your Tocqueville or J. S. Mill, holds nothing of the kind.

Professor Talmon's sympathies are strongly with Tocqueville and the younger Mill; and certainly, their devotion to freedom was more scrupulous and consistent by far than that of the men whose "Messianism" Professor Talmon discusses. So much cannot be denied.

Yet Professor Talmon spoils his case by trying to prove too much, and also by sometimes leaving the reader uncertain of quite what it is that he wants to prove. For example, he says on page 208: "The central importance of the doctrine of the

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self-alienation of man in early Marx is enough to prove his totalitarian-democratic ancestry: passionate concern for the individual leads to totalitarian patterns." That there were better liberals in the nineteenth century than Marx is certain. But how is his interest in "self-alienation" evidence that he was inclined to be totalitarian? Or is Professor Talmon suggesting something different from this? If so, what can it be? Again, Professor Talmon admits that Lamennais, in his democratic period, preached full liberty of opinion, and yet says that his doctrine carries with it the implication that the people's will is exclusively valid. But he does not explain what Lamennais meant by this exclusive validity. He may have meant something perfectly consistent with his belief in full liberty of opinion; and yet Professor Talmon takes it for granted that he did not. Yet again, to say, with Mazzini, that the majority may not express the "true" will of the people is not necessarily illiberal; it is not to imply that a minority which believes itself to express that will has the right to coerce the majority. Mazzini may sometimes have been illiberal. I do not wish to suggest that he was not. But his having said this is not in itself evidence that he was illiberal.

Professor Talmon's interpretation of historical events is sometimes as free and odd as his interpretation of other men's theories. Having said that Louis Napoleon's success was not due only to the Napoleonic legend, he goes on: "We have seen repeatedly in the course of this study how easily the vision of a History one and indivisible . . . focuses for its believers on a man of destiny." But it was the intellectuals who were most affected by this vision, and they did not help Louis Napoleon to power. He owed his success to the peasants, to the *petits bourgeois,* to the army, to the church: to classes and groups indifferent to the theories whose totalitarian bias is exposed by Professor Talmon.

Professor Talmon is perhaps rather a victim of his own style, which is apt to be loose and rhetorical. His arguments are too often unconvincing or obscure; he lacks rigor, subtlety and discrimination. True, several of the writers whose theories he discusses also lacked these qualities. Nevertheless, if justice is to be done to them, the doer of it must have these qualities; he must be more lucid, more exact, more delicate in his handling of ideas and arguments than they were. Professor Talmon is "impressionistic"; he brings vividly home to us how he feels about some of the great men and events of the last century. He

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does this with admirable force and conviction; but this, presumably, is only part of his purpose, for he must surely also want to help us understand them better.

JOHN PLAMENATZ

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Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. By GEORGE F. KENNAN. Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1961.—x, 411 pp. $5.75.

One highly useful if "unplanned" benefit from George Kennan's absence of several years from a direct rôle in public policy has been the opportunity, in his years of ripe maturity and prime vigor, to bring his remarkable fund of diplomatic experience, his deep feeling for Russian history and culture, and his gift of lucid and moving exposition to bear on the study of American-Soviet relations. As Mr. Kennan correctly points out, these relations, of an exasperating complexity, have never been examined in their full sweep. And, as he modestly refrains from pointing out, they have rarely been studied from the twin vantage points of historical detachment and personal engagement. This gap has now been filled in some measure by Mr. Kennan's survey.

Based primarily on lectures delivered at Oxford and Harvard, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* offers the reader most of the advantages—spontaneity, freshness of statement, flashes of humor—of its origin, as well as some disadvantages—lack of time for the detailed weighing of evidence and unequal depth of supporting research. Because of the author's durable sense of discretion, it contains no "revelations" of American diplomacy, and any such contributions will have to wait for a later phase of an active career. The first third of the study reflects the depth of research and historical re-creation that has gone into the making of Mr. Kennan's first two volumes, and the last third draws heavily on his participation in United States policy since 1933 for many insights and judgments.

There is no dearth of brilliant insights scattered through this study: the tragic dilemma of the Russian Provisional Government in attempting to press on with the war; the dogmatic world-view of the Bolsheviks and of their messianic rôle in making history; the fumbling motives and actions of the allied interventions; the contradictory strains in the halfhearted Soviet efforts to "contain" Hitler's expansionism; the cold and calculated suspicion with which Stalin dealt with his wartime allies, com-

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pared with the naïve trust he showed toward Hitler. These and many other passages should be read and pondered by all who wish to escape the fallacy of time-bound judgments and distinguish the permanent from the expedient in Soviet designs and actions.

It is, of course, an easy matter to suggest missing evidence or differing points of view that deserve to be considered in a comprehensive survey, and only a few examples can be mentioned here. The Japanese intentions and decisions of 1918, with respect to prostrate Russia, were rather more complex than is suggested here (page 100), as was demonstrated in James W. Morley's *Japanese Thrust in Siberia, 1918* (New York, 1957). Similarly, the Czechoslovak seizure of the Transsiberian Railroad (pages 98-99) cannot be fully understood unless we are reminded of the persistent attempts by Moscow to bring this small but well organized force under its own control. It should also have been made clear that until December, 1918, and the failure of the German Räte Congress to follow the Soviet lead, Lenin had supported the Independent Socialists, not the Spartacists (page 153). Likewise, during the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 General von Seeckt's hopes and plans went much farther than is implied here (pages 176-177). More surprisingly, the author, it seems to me, overstates substantially the "illusions" about Soviet policy that allegedly influenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt's dealings with Stalin in 1941-1945 (page 355). In a characteristically lucid passage (page 373), the author contrasts Roosevelt's reluctance during World War II to pre-determine territorial and political settlements in Europe with his eagerness to make even more far-reaching decisions in respect to East Asia.

Apparently Mr. Kennan intended at one stage to end his broadly sketched analysis with Stalin's death. To have done so would, he came to feel, leave the reader with the impression that nothing had changed in Soviet policy since 1953. A hasty concluding chapter reflects his persistently optimistic interpretations of recent Soviet trends. By the time of his death Stalin ". . . had created a situation in which, fortunately for the Russian people, fortunately for us, it would have been very hard for any other Stalin to establish himself in his place" (page 387). The Soviet Union ". . . has never regarded action by its own [military] forces as the *main* (italics in original) agency for the spread of world revolution" (page 389). The general trend of Soviet policy, ". . . especially in recent years, has been in the direction of normalcy—towards a preoccupation with internal and defensive interests in the Soviet state, away from the world

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revolutionary dreams of the early aftermath of the Revolution" (page 394).

Many readers will, no doubt, form their opinions on whether Khrushchev's policies in Berlin, Laos, the Congo, Cuba and elsewhere are "normal" and "defensive," and on whether the 1961 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a "dream" in an "aftermath" or a carefully calculated and far from unrealistic plan of action.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Rôle of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy. By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN. Princeton University Press, 1960.—vii, 353 pp. $7.50.

Professor Barghoorn of Yale University is one of the most distinguished American specialists on Soviet affairs, and this is another important contribution by him to our understanding of the Soviet system.

Barghoorn has specialized, in the last decade in particular, upon analysis of Soviet propaganda, the Soviet image of the United States, and Soviet nationalism, all factors of enormous importance, all difficult to analyze and describe, and all generally neglected by Western scholars. This volume is a pioneer study of the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes as a weapon in the Soviet arsenal. It demonstrates clearly and conclusively how the Soviet government promotes its concept of peace, publicizes "Soviet socialist civilization," demonstrates its apparent appreciation of other cultures, and acquires technical knowledge, all as part of a continuing effort to increase its power and expand its influence.

The Soviet Cultural Offensive concentrates upon the period since Stalin's death in 1953, particularly the last four years, but the preliminary chapters provide a useful summary analysis of the earlier decades of Soviet rule. After analyzing the place of Soviet cultural diplomacy in Soviet strategy, the main themes of Soviet propaganda since 1953, the system of controls the Soviet government places upon the free flow of people and information, and the organization and training of those who direct and participate most actively in this kind of campaign, Barghoorn turns to the various regions of the world. His analysis is especially useful because he provides comparative data on the British, French and American approaches to cultural relations.

The book is based upon long study of the subject and immense data. Professor Barghoorn spent the years from 1943 to 1947 as

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press attaché in Moscow, and he has made a number of later visits. He has followed Soviet politics and Soviet foreign policy carefully in the Soviet press, and he has corresponded with or talked with many Russian emigrés and with American and other scholars and others who have visited the Soviet Union. He has ranged widely in his definition of his subject and in his search for information. Indeed, some of his most effective conclusions derive from statistical data culled from a careful reading of Soviet journals and newspapers, checked carefully against other sources of information.

One of the particular values of this study is the attention devoted to the intensive Soviet campaign to isolate the Soviet peoples from other cultures, an interesting proof of the Soviet fear of contamination. These defensive barriers are as significant in the Soviet effort as the drive to influence the minds of other peoples, and they constitute an important part of the set of rules under which the Soviet Union tries to force other governments to compete in "cultural competition." Barghoorn is especially clear in describing the problems and handicaps this creates for the Soviet rulers.

As a pioneer study of an immensely complex and difficult subject, this is a most useful work, especially valuable because of its breadth of view and fund of information. It places this Soviet drive, the importance of which is often exaggerated, in perspective; some may be surprised, for example, to learn that there were only 17,000 foreign students in Russia in 1958-1959. The structure of the book is sensible and clear, but the individual chapters are badly organized; indeed, there is often no apparent connection between consecutive paragraphs. One might also question Professor Barghoorn's conclusion that Western Europe remains the principal target for the Soviet cultural campaign, even though the figures available do support his position. However, no one can deny the clarity with which he has identified the problem which Soviet cultural diplomacy poses for us.

ROBERT F. BYRNES

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Economic Thought and the Irish Question, 1817-1870. By R. D. COLLISON BLACK. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1960.—xi, 299 pp. $7.00.

Although classical political economy never dominated English policy toward Ireland, individual political economists like Malthus, Senior, McCulloch, Torrens, Wakefield, and the two Mills exerted very considerable influence on the reports of royal commissions and the cabinet policies of the Melbourne, Peel,

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and Russell governments. Nevertheless—no doubt a cynic might say "therefore"—Ireland up to and after the Great Famine was an unhappy land afflicted by mass poverty, unsympathetic rulers, apathy on the part of its natural leaders, and inability to encourage the kind of capitalist enterprise which was visibly enriching England. Mr. Black's model analysis of the relation between economic thought and economic policy blames these dreary facts upon neither English indifference nor a dearth of policies to be applied. On the contrary, there was an embarrassing profusion of remedies to a problem which the classical economists readily diagnosed as an inappropriate relationship between two rates of growth: population and capital.

Here the disagreements began. How, indeed, could capital be persuaded to increase more rapidly than population? One answer was emigration. After the simple arithmetic of political economy, Torrens and Wakefield from the first and Senior and John Stuart Mill somewhat later strongly promoted a rectification of the resource-population ratio which diminished the size of the denominator. Another panacea was land reform. But again the reformers could not agree. John Stuart Mill, wiser as well as more humane than most of his associates, advanced the claims of peasant proprietorships as a stimulus to industry, prudence, and capital accumulation. In contrast, the authoritative Malthus favored radical conversion to the English system of large-scale cultivation and amiably predicted that the excess population would be "swept off" to the towns and cities. Various reformers found the remedy in one version or another of tenant right designed to reward improving tenants rather than underserving landlords.

Poor relief caused similar dissension among the economists and the statesmen. Among others McCulloch favored unqualified application of the New Poor Law system of workhouse relief to Ireland. He and his followers ignored the circumstance that what was barely tolerable in an expanding society like England was utterly intolerable in a stagnant, poverty-stricken land like Ireland. Economists like Poulet Scrope, on the other hand, took more realistic note of Ireland's special situation and advocated unlimited outdoor relief to the needy as well as to the destitute. Still others preferred to depend essentially on private charity. Senior suggested that the poor be put to work on the construction of such useful public works as railroads.

The catalogue of policies included the reclamation of waste land, in which Ireland abounded, and the promotion of private investment. It was never clear that either agriculture or indus-

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try promised the kind of profit which might lure capital from England, much less persuade improvident Irish landlords to trade their extravagant style of life for the anxieties of the prudent entrepreneur. In some measure, at some time, each of these remedies was tried, frequently several at a time. Yet when the potato blight came, none of these policies sufficed. The usual English responses—public works and public relief—were miserably inadequate. And Ireland entered that demographic decline which continues to this day.

This is the sad story which Mr. Black tells with great skill in this meticulously documented volume. It tells us a great deal about classical political economy. Though the school was cohesive in general doctrine, it lamentably failed to agree on Irish policy. Its failure, John Stuart Mill honorably excepted, to develop a realistic program highlights a defect of the school, its lack of historical sense. Some attention to history might have persuaded the economists that Ireland and England were so different that the political economy appropriate to the second could only injure the first. Jacob Viner's wise introduction points the final moral: "I am struck by the fact that the nineteenth-century history of Ireland seems to offer a striking illustration of the possibility that a greater prevalence of uncalculating compassion and sympathy with suffering may at times be a better instrument of reform than the most carefully reasoned weighing of prudential pros and cons in deciding whether immediately helpful expedients would in the long run do more good than harm."

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

BARNARD COLLEGE

1400 Governments: The Political Economy of the New York Metropolitan Region. By ROBERT C. WOOD, with Vladimir V. Almendinger. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—xviii, 267 pp. $5.75.

Adam Smith once wrote: "Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice." At the national level we no longer put such confidence in the Invisible Hand, but at the local and regional levels similar views still lie at the core of the "conventional wisdom." Hence it is not surprising—although this reviewer regards it as regrettable—that the nine volumes of the New York Metropolitan Region Study have concentrated on estimating what the Invisible Hand has in store during the next twenty-five years for the New York area. Professor Wood's book, which "focuses on

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those public activities which seem most likely to affect this distribution of firms and households throughout the region" (p. vii), is the study's sole bow in the direction of political science.

Once pressed down on this Procrustean bed of trying to help predict future jobs and population, Wood and his research assistant wade through the relevant statistics of taxation and governmental expenditures. Their conclusion: Government will have little or nothing to do with the future over-all shape of the New York region. The "public sector" will perform functions that Adam Smith never dreamed of, but any effective central planning will *not* be among these. Particular local governments may succeed in maintaining the "right kind" of suburbia; others may be fortunate in luring the "right kind" of industry. But on balance the 1,467 political entities of the 22-county area can be discounted: their policies will approximately cancel each other out (malodorous industries may not be welcome in Westchester, but there is always New Jersey). Local governments—like firms and households—will each maneuver as best they can. The over-all pattern, including such basic questions as whether the region might best have a population of 15, 20, or 25 million (in this thermonuclear age), will be left to the Invisible Hand.

Wood analyzes the rôle of the public sector under two main headings: pressures for governmental services, and patterns of governmental response. Treatment of the former is the less impressive. The costs of extreme population agglomeration (and also of dispersion) are only touched on incidentally; the emphasis is on an elaborate attempt to apply "factor analysis" (a technique familiar to psychology) to explain expenditure differences among 64 various New Jersey communities.

The various local governments have responded in different ways. Westchester County has followed a long-run strategy of permitting only the "right kind" of growth (thus avoiding what Wood terms "Bronxification"). Less fortunate, or less foresighted, areas have adopted short-run strategies of manipulating tax rates and assessments, seeking increased state (and federal) aid, or (as in fast-growing Nassau County) creating special districts in a desperate effort to make ends meet. The New Jersey counties, by contrast, have concentrated on holding down the demands for service rather than devising ways to meet them (the "no new tax" shibboleth seems to serve as part of the local oath of office).

What of the vast regional "enterprises," such as the Port of New York Authority? Wood points out that these are generally dominated by a market-place philosophy and supported by user-charges. Profitable functions—like prosperous suburbs—thrive in

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grand disregard of the rest of the picture. Thus, "committed to the principle that changes in the private sector are generally for the best, the Regional agencies move to support the present lines of development" (p. 172). This, needless to say, is one of perpetual Growth (an American fetish which seeks to repeal the Law of Diminishing Returns) and further diffusion of population (Los Angeles, not New York City, is thus the prototype of the future).

One can admire the skill with which the workings of the regional Invisible Hand have been unraveled without necessarily admiring the pattern which is emerging. There comes a time when what is needed is not more projections, but new ideas. At the national level Adam Smith has yielded to Keynes: we know how to use the Visible Hand of government, indirectly, to make the "locally rational" behavior of individuals and firms more satisfactory from an over-all point of view. At the regional level, however, we have no "general theory" of metropolitanism, no Keynesian breakthrough, no public policy beyond accepting the workings of the Invisible Hand (with scattered local limitations). This was not the task that the New York Study set out to do, but its findings make the need for such work all the more obvious.

DOUGLAS PRICE

COLUMBIA COLLEGE

The Long Revolution. By RAYMOND WILLIAMS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1961.—xiv, 370 pp. $5.00.

Mr. Richard Crossman has hailed this as "the book I have been waiting for since 1945." It has received if anything more public attention than its predecessor, *Culture and Society,* on which Mr. Williams says (p. ix) that he has "read more than fifty thousand words of comment." The two together constitute the most ambitious analysis of Britain's current condition and its historical antecedents yet to emerge from the New Left.

The book ranges from an abstruse discussion of "The Creative Mind" to a factual account of "The Growth of the Popular Press." It concludes with a section, part descriptive part prescriptive, entitled "Britain in the 1960's." The point in attacking on such a wide front is to show how everything correlates, how misleading it is to attempt a discussion of the arts abstracted from the social, political and economic context, or an analysis of politics torn from all cultural roots.

Stated as a general truth, this interdependence of the elements

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in any culture is acceptable, though hardly a revelation. But in working out its implications, difficulties arise. On the level of analysis, it requires a polymath to discourse informatively on all aspects of a culture as complex as that of modern Britain. Each specialist who reads Mr. Williams' book may feel that the author has some interesting things to say about other fields, but little that is new on the reader's own subject. Thus a political scientist will not find the discussion of recent British elections very helpful, while a specialist in fine arts might feel that Professor Gombrich's lucid masterpiece, *Art and Illusion,* makes Mr. Williams' discussion of certain aspects of creativity seem opaque and out-of-date. The author examines the decade of the 1840's with the aid of "the theoretical methods and concepts" (p. 54) which he has adumbrated; the result, he concludes, makes it "clear that analysis of the kind described is feasible" (p. 71); the reader is not surprised, merely curious as to how this exercise differs, in method, from the work of so conservative an analyst of early Victorian England as G. M. Young.

On the level of policy making, the concept of an indivisible culture raises awkward questions. How can it be squared with any pluralistic vision of society? Does it not threaten us with ubiquitous government? When it comes to positive proposals, Mr. Williams recommends that "most theatres" be put under public ownership, "preferably by local authorities" (p. 341); that a "Books Council" be set up to supervise the publishing industry (pp. 342–343); even that "in certain cases" local authorities might become the owners of local newspapers (p. 344). He is too good a liberal to follow this logic ruthlessly, but the nature of the problem is exposed by these half-measures, and by his uneasy presentiment "that we seem reduced to a choice between speculator and bureaucrat" (p. 339). How do we resolve such dilemmas? He answers in platitudes: "The principle of the official in a democratic organization is quite clear: he administers within an elected policy, and is responsible to the membership for his actions. The practice, we all know, can be otherwise, but given an adequate constitution and genuine equality of membership it is still the best and most responsible system known" (p. 340).

There are perceptive passages in this book, such as the analysis of different kinds of conformity and non-conformity (pp. 85–93). One respects the author's deep desire to find alternatives to the more repellent features of modern industrial society.

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"It is not time then for the reasoned catalogues of sober achievement, but for new creative definitions," he says (p. 354). His book does more to demonstrate the need, however, than to fill it.

RICHARD W. LYMAN

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Futilitarian Society. By WILLIAM J. NEWMAN. New York, George Braziller, Inc., 1961.—412 pp. $6.00.

Mr. Newman's book is an attack upon American conservatism. The Futilitarian Society is the conservative society, which "cannot expand and develop—*will not* expand and develop—the opportunities for change and freedom. . . . [and hence] it is a society which is useless to man because it has nothing to suggest about how man can meet new problems and how he can create new and better ways of living" (p. 14). The attack is waged on a wide front, beginning with what the author calls the "Old Conservatism" (William H. Chamberlin, Felix Morley, James Burnham and Barry Goldwater are his examples), then going on to a lengthier consideration of the New Conservatism (Peter Viereck, Russell Kirk, Clinton Rossiter and Walter Lippmann), and concluding with a critique of the "Conservative Mood." The emphasis, however, is not upon the particular writers named, but upon conservative thought and opinion in general. These "ideologues" are considered in detail because their ideology "reflects" conservative opinion in America.

Newman writes well. His prose is usually clear and vigorous, often witty, and occasionally moving. But the book is also ridden with certain faults which are, unfortunately, of more than trifling importance. First, Newman's conception of conservatism as a species of political thought is inadequate. He recognizes "two aspects of conservatism—its general approach to change and innovation, and its specific values on social problems [which] make up the whole that is conservatism" (p. 43). This is all right as far as it goes, but it is not made clear how these two "aspects" are related logically—whether one could be deduced, or shown by a psychological necessity to follow, from the other; which, if either, is the defining characteristic and so on. Nor does he have anything adequate to say about the relation between American conservatism and its British and Continental counterparts. The result is a distorted and oversimplified view of conservatism that haunts him all the way through the book. Second, Newman has tried to discover in American thought a fundamental schism between a liberal-progressive and a con-

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servative strain of thought. He has made it his task to show that, contrary to Louis Hartz (one of his principal targets), the American mind is divided deeply and permanently between liberalism and conservatism, and that to allow oneself to be lulled into ignoring or glossing over this division is to give comfort to the conservative cause: There *is* an enemy! There *is* a conflict, and we must never forget it!

Newman's argument is not convincing. Conflict there is, but not of the character that he describes. In need of a tangible representative of the conservative enemy, he has been led by this interpretation to take the New Conservatives very seriously as political theorists and ideologues. He probes for their basic motivations and assumptions, tests them for consistency, and exposes the "real" nature of their thought by making explicit the ultimate but unstated conclusions to which they lead. There may be a certain formal justification for this procedure, but one feels that the spirit of these writings has been missed. With the exception of Lippmann, they have not tried seriously to offer systematic political thought or ideology, and have certainly not succeeded; in fact, the things which seem to be significant in their work are their passions rather than their reasonings, the values they put forward and those they reject, rather than the underlying rational arguments. But in Newman's book, the cherubic Dr. Kirk appears as the "Karl Marx" of the New Conservatism (p. 122). Finally, he has been unfair to the New Conservatives in his substantive interpretation of their work. After a fine chapter on the "Old Conservatism" (which yearns for the "Garden of Eden" of nineteenth-century *laissez faire* liberalism), he goes on to argue that Kirk, "for all his fancy phrases . . . does not differ significantly . . ." in his convictions from the basic beliefs of the Old Conservatives. Then, as if this were not enough, he offers an interpretation of Clinton Rossiter and Walter Lippmann, one of the conclusions of which is that the form of New Conservatism espoused by them is in agreement with that of Kirk on fundamentals, while differing only in emphasis and temper. Let it suffice to say that this is wrong: that Kirk differs profoundly from the Old Conservatives in purpose and approach, and that Lippmann, Rossiter, and the others differ equally from Kirk.

Newman's chapters on the "Conservative Mood" are much more interesting. Here, his polemical style becomes very effective. Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, and Daniel Bell are considered as examples of this style of thought, the tendency of which is to tell Americans to look inward, to understand themselves, so that they would in turn know "how to defeat the future by

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acting as they always had in the past." Although I think that he has indicted Hartz unfairly in this connection, I must say that in general he has picked a worthy target and scored heavily on it. These chapters, and the one following them dealing with the new suburban style of living as a symbol and product of the Conservative Mood and its futility, add up to a forceful reply to all those who would relegate political idealism, enthusiasm, ideology and reformism to our national adolescence. A final, and also worthy, chapter under the heading deals with the ideas of that great fosterer of the Conservative Mood, Henry Luce.

PHILLIP C. CHAPMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

A Forward Strategy for America. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, WILLIAM R. KINTNER, and STEFAN T. POSSONY. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961.—xii, 451 pp. $5.95.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania presents this book as a sequel to its earlier volume, *Protracted Conflict,* which examined the principles and techniques of Communist strategy. The new volume prescribes United States policy for meeting the Communist challenge. Besides chapters on technology, military policy and arms control, the book contains treatments of economic aid policy, diplomacy, psychological operations, the economic base of policy, and the organization of the government for foreign policy. This broad focus reflects the authors' belief that all the various arms of policy form an organic whole. The Communists flexibly combine all available tools in following their doctrine of "protracted conflict"; if the free world is to compete successfully, it must do the same.

Any attempt to integrate military and non-military techniques is to be applauded, but unfortunately the effort here is strained and unconvincing, as it was in the predecessor volume. As a term representing the various modes of the "cold war" (subversion, propaganda, unconventional warfare, infiltration, war by proxy and by fomenting internal revolution, and so on), "protracted conflict" is as good as any other, and at several points the authors themselves use it in this restricted sense. But when they describe nuclear warfare and nuclear deterrence as aspects of the protracted conflict they are obviously forcing a unity which does not exist. They assert, for example, that a thermonuclear exchange could be the climactic phase of the

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protracted conflict. The purpose of the latter is to "change the strategic balance in such a way that either the aggressor can risk the plunge, or, conversely, the defender is successful in maintaining the power to deter the would-be aggressor." Even after taking over Europe, Asia and Africa by a process of subversion and piecemeal nibbling, the Communists must still seek to render impotent American retaliatory power, for "the struggle ends only with the total destruction of the weapons of one or the other contestant." Now, it is very hard to see how such successes could significantly increase the enemy's capability or desire to launch a nuclear attack on the United States. Protracted conflict is an alternative to nuclear warfare, not its prelude. Clearly, the more successful the Communists are in making gains by cheap indirect means the less incentive they will have to precipitate all-out war.

The weakest part of the book is the chapter on military strategy. Most of what is said here has been said before by other writers and said better. The treatment of arms control is more original and incisive, arguing for a new approach based on stable mutual deterrence and reciprocal exchange of information, rather than on disarmament. The chapters on economic aid, economic growth and governmental organization contain many useful suggestions.

The book's primary message is that the free world must undertake a much more active economic and political offensive against the Communist bloc itself, designed to roll back the Iron Curtain, liberate Eastern Europe, and eventually to overthrow the Soviet regime in Russia. This is the meaning of the term "forward strategy." The United States must first achieve a military advantage, and then, by non-military means, seek to exploit "contradictions" in the enemy's camp. Our propaganda should clarify alternatives for the Russian and Eastern European peoples, lay down a concrete reform program "to assist the return to liberty and representative government," and demonstrate the inconsistencies and fallacies in Communist dogma. We should shift from a "passive" to an "active" economic strategy, seizing all opportunities for economic warfare against the Sino-Soviet bloc. Specifically, we should link economic aid to underdeveloped areas with a quarantine on any trade which profits the U.S.S.R., engage in preclusive buying in Eastern Europe to deprive the Soviet Union of needed commodities, and set up a system of trade rewards and punishments for the satellite nations.

While the West undoubtedly should do what it can to create conditions favoring the weakening and eventual breakup of

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Communist rule, this reviewer cannot agree with the authors' belief that this should be a primary operational objective of American policy. Communist domination of Eastern Europe and Russia rests on military might, not consent, as Hungary so clearly demonstrated. In the face of this fact, any political and economic offensive based on a hope for early and fundamental results is doomed to frustration. There is danger that a "forward strategy" would divert us from the far more immediate and important problem—simply to hold the line against further Communist advance. Yet, for all its defects and bias, this book is a forthright statement of a point of view which deserves to be heard.

GLENN H. SNYDER

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

The Spanish Civil War. By HUGH THOMAS. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961.—xxix, 720 pp. $8.50.

Few modern conflicts have equalled in ferocity the Spanish civil war or brought into combat a more complex mixture of ideological and political forces. Moreover, into this struggle between Spanish Anarchists, Communists, Republicans, the Church, monarchists and Fascists were injected German, Italian and Soviet arms, agents and combat teams, along with a host of volunteers from many other nations which in effect turned this ill-fated land into the first major battleground of the great conflicts of the mid-twentieth century.

This book by a former officer of the British Foreign Office and lecturer at the Royal Military College has been conceived with the ambitious design of providing an objective history of the struggle in its political, military and diplomatic aspects. To a commendable degree it has succeeded in avoiding the polemics that have characterized so much of the writing on this episode. The volume gives the fullest and quite the most insightful account of what transpired within Republican circles, especially the infighting between the liberal democratic elements, the labor unions, the powerfully organized Communists, and the Anarchists. The story is somewhat less definitive on the Nationalist side. This differential can be attributed in considerable measure to the fact that the memoirs and views of those attached to, or sympathetic with, the Republican cause, including not only the Spanish exiles but also such writers as Hemingway, Louis Fischer, Jellinek, Madariaga and others, have spoken out more graphically and at greater length than General Franco and the

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Falangists. Mr. Thomas has consulted a wealth of source material that has become available in late years and interviewed many participants within and outside of Spain. There is no internal evidence that he was able to discuss the war in detail with the *Caudillo* himself, however. As the author remarks, nevertheless, there are shadowy sides to every historical picture; even "if every official paper bearing on the war in every country had been available to me, I do not know that I would gain a totally accurate impression of the subtle minds of, say, General Franco and the Republican Prime Minister, Dr. Negrín. And would a ton of military and other papers enable one to form a complete picture of what the war meant to the Spaniards?" The remarkable thing on the Nationalist side is that Franco with his reticence and lack of clearly formulated political ideas or system other than compromise was able to hold together such powerful elements as the Army, the Church, the Falangists and the Monarchists. The tie that bound them then, and does now, of course, was a common passionate opposition to a state and society governed by Anarchists, atheists, Communists and undisciplined Socialists. But it must also be said for General Franco's statesmanship that he was able to keep his nation out of World War II after all of the destruction it had suffered in the civil war notwithstanding the heavy obligations he owed to Germany and Italy for his own victory.

Mr. Thomas' book contains a masterful presentation of the strategies and decisive campaigns. It also affords the most comprehensive piecing together and appraisal of the extent and significance of foreign assistance and intervention known to this reviewer. In these respects the book is an outstanding contribution to modern history and to the literature of international and comparative politics. It is regrettable that the author does not give more attention to the sociological and economic aspects of the war; there is much that still needs to be known about these angles. The treatment of the international Non-Intervention and Patrol Systems leaves much to be desired. Little of fundamental consequence with respect to these is added to what was known twenty-five years ago. The workings of the scheme are not fully explained and the whole is passed off in too glib a fashion. There is no doubt that the arrangements were employed to cover up much of what was going on, to deny matériel to the Government forces, and to gain time, as well as to avert a European war and to save the faces of the French and English governments. Nonetheless, the Non-Intervention and Patrol Systems constitute a very interesting prototype and case study of what an international inspection and control scheme, whether

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for nuclear arms or outer space activity or for the "neutralization" of some small country like Laos, might entail or be manipulated into today. For here were international inspectors and patrols, embargo agreements and laws, an international committee to police the whole, together with diplomacy functioning in an atmosphere of suspicion, rivalry and conflict not unlike that prevailing between East and West today.

Taken by and large Mr. Thomas' book brings a large amount of fragmentary knowledge concerning the war into sharper focus than heretofore. It is a refreshingly readable work of scholarship. The sad feature of the Spanish situation is, as the author concludes, that notwithstanding the death of probably 600,000 persons and untold suffering and loss, Spain "remains in travail"—a land where freedom of speech is limited, where but one party is permitted, where many remain in prison for political crimes, and where repressive measures are deemed "essential if the explosion of another civil conflict is to be avoided."

NORMAN J. PADELFORD
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Spain and Defense of the West: Ally and Liability. By ARTHUR P. WHITAKER. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1961.—xviii, 408 pp. $6.00.

Since the outbreak of the civil war in 1936, the question of Spain—its ideological, political, and economic institutions and goals—has been responsible for persistent tension and unrest both for the Spanish people and the world at large. In the first stages of the Franco rebellion, only the governments of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy understood that it was, or could easily be turned into, the prelude to World War II; by contrast, the governments of the democratic states for long failed to see the world-wide implications of the internal Spanish conflict. Likewise, scholars in the western countries paid virtually no attention to Spain in the last two decades—apart from literary and historical studies reflecting a tradition of long standing. In the field of the social sciences, and particularly in that of politics, Professor Whitaker's new book is the first and only scholarly treatment of the Franco regime in the English language.

The focus of *Spain and Defense of the West* is, as its title suggests, the American alliance with Spain since 1953 and all the issues of policy and conscience which such an alliance was bound to create for the United States. But, abandoning a narrow

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treatment of his subject through diplomatic documents and the analysis of purely international events and forces, Professor Whitaker has chosen the broader and more imaginative method of studying this basic issue of United States-Spanish relations since the Pact of Madrid in 1953 against the domestic background of Franco Spain. As a result, about half of the book (Chapters III-VII) is devoted to a searching and thoroughly documented analysis of Franco Spain as seen from the inside. First, the author raises the fundamental issue of the "two Spains" in the light of recent Spanish history and as seen by Spaniards themselves. Next, he examines the main sources of support for the Franco dictatorship as well as the forces of opposition. While anti-Franco sentiment is widespread, the greatest weakness of the opposition is its internal divisions, "one of the strongest props of the Franco regime" (p. 195). The author's analysis of the various opposition groups is one of the most important chapters in the book, since it contains a great deal of material hitherto unavailable. At the same time, the fact that the author is able to mention names of anti-Franco leaders and groups might suggest that the Franco regime is in its last stages. In his discussion of Spain's economic development under Franco the author points to the persistent stagnation in agriculture in contrast to the great progress made in industry. This imbalance, so typical of most authoritarian and totalitarian economies, may yet prove to be one of the main sources of discontent with the Franco regime on the part of the Spanish people. The last major topic of domestic Spanish policy—the changing rôle of the Catholic Church—is analyzed by the author in a spirit of fairness and impartiality. Looking into the future, Professor Whitaker is led to the conclusion that "the hierarchy is still on the whole a staunch supporter of the present regime and of the authoritarian principle" (p. 284).

Where do we go from here? After surveying the rôle of Franco Spain in international affairs (Chapters I, II, VIII, IX), Professor Whitaker presents in his last chapter (X) some findings and conclusions that are of vital importance, not only to the student of modern Spain, but also to policy-makers in Washington (and, to a lesser extent, in London, Paris, and Bonn). First, the author suggests that the meaning of the terms "intervention" and "nonintervention" be re-examined in relation to American policy toward Spain, both on the economic and political fronts, and that American pressure should be brought to bear on the Franco regime with the objective of greater liberalization. Realizing the periodic necessity for any democratic state to make military alliances with nondemocratic

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states, Professor Whitaker proposes that the United States policy toward the Franco dictatorship should revert to the "cool and correct attitude" of 1953 rather than that it be based on the notion that "allies must be bosom friends" (pp. 388-389).

Since Professor Whitaker wrote his magistral volume, there has been a change of administration in Washington. Without explicitly abandoning the policy of "bosom friends" toward Franco, the Kennedy administration and the new American ambassador in Madrid have shown unmistakable tendencies of adopting a "cool and correct" attitude, such as Professor Whitaker suggests. As yet, it cannot be said whether this is but a temporary deviation from the preceding policy of open support for Franco, or whether the Kennedy administration is planning to bring American policy toward Franco in line with that toward other dictators, who may receive the handshake from the United States, but not the *abrazo*.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

Field Administration in the United Nations System. By WALTER R. SHARP. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—xiv, 570 pp. $12.00.

The deep concern, both in the United States and in the "receiving countries," that our new Peace Corps contribute effectively to social and economic development and to international understanding, together with President Kennedy's efforts to put the financing of foreign economic aid on a sound long-term basis gives unusual timeliness and significance to this study. Professor Sharp covers the experience of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in carrying out their economic and social programs, and more particularly in administering technical assistance during the 1950's. His study describes and evaluates the innumerable problems involved in administering international assistance projects. Among them are the manner in which activities are organized in the field, the relationship between field and headquarters, the extent to which planning and carrying out of policies are delegated to the field, the advantages as well as the shortcomings of country or regional programs, the importance of adequate budgeting, and, above all, the vital importance of proper staffing and training to successful aid programs. Professor Sharp's analysis of the human problems involved in the selection of staff and in attaining an effective working relationship in the field with the "local" personnel who must ultimately be responsible for carrying out projects will prove very instructive to those who have too easily accepted the views expressed in the *Ugly American*.

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Professor Sharp's study should be required reading for all concerned with the administrative aspects of bilateral as well as multilateral foreign economic aid. In it they will find examples of both successful and unsuccessful measures tried out by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, together with what the author calls "guide lines for future action."

One of the central problems of international aid has been the competition between the respective Specialized Agencies, both among themselves and with the United Nations, for the funds available and the right to direct and administer aid programs. Equally harmful has been the competition between governmental departments—foreign offices, health, agriculture, labor, and educational departments and agencies—in the countries receiving aid to have individual programs administered within their jurisdictions. Professor Sharp describes the various methods that have been tried to eliminate, or at least to lessen, the competition between international agencies concerned with such programs and to achieve coördination between programs in the receiving countries. He concludes that there has been steady progress along these lines, although there is still considerable distance to go. He proposes a series of prerequisites for effective program coördination.

The field operations and administrative procedures in effect have been influenced to a large degree by the differing backgrounds and experiences of the individual international agencies. Some, like the International Labor Organization, had small technical aid programs in effect even before World War II. This diversity of pattern, the dispersion of program controls through autonomous international legislative bodies and administrative staffs, the uneven development and quality of field establishments and the difficulties faced by international organizations in checking up on how far their aid programs have been effective constitute substantial limitations on United Nations activities.

Despite these shortcomings and uncertain budgetary arrangements, Professor Sharp concludes "that the United Nations nexus of organizations has demonstrated administrative capacity to plan and carry out world-wide field programs with relatively high standards of performance." The success of the United Nations system, he states, will depend among other things on the assurance of sustained financing over longer periods of time and budgetary appropriations large enough to attract and retain staffs which are personally and technically equipped to deal with "trans-cultural situations."

Rutgers University Carol and Isador Lubin

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The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900–1925. By CHARLES FORCEY. New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.—xxix, 358 pp. $7.00.

This volume presents a critical but foreshortened account of the attempt to substitute a limited national collectivism dominated nationally and in the states by the executive leader for the laissez-faire federal democracy of the "Gilded Age." Ignoring the pre-1901 experimentation with government regulation of the railroads and public utilities and the legislative and propaganda origins of the welfare state, Mr. Forcey confines his study to the delineation of a Theodore Roosevelt-inspired "New Liberalism" ("The New Nationalism") and its rivalry and ultimate fusion with Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom." The heterodox background and ideological orientation of Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter Lippmann, the intellectual triumvirate that championed the new liberalism, are well portrayed. Their rôle as editors of the *New Republic* during neutrality and World War I, their break with Roosevelt and alliance with Wilson, and the final disillusionment are related with critical perception.

An important contribution is made by a careful analysis of the progressive philosophies of Croly, Weyl, and Lippmann. Of these Croly's was the most important. Writing under the influence of Alexander Hamilton and Roosevelt's administration he advocated a national progressivism in which dynamic executive leaders would introduce nationalization of the railroads and the trusts, industrial democracy, and a national foreign policy of organizing the American continents for peace on the basis of mutual guarantees of national independence. This was to be preliminary to the extension of this system of "public law" to Europe and Asia. Upon Croly's system in the *New Republic* were grafted Weyl's demand for a consumer-oriented welfare democracy and Lippmann's emphasis upon the positive leadership of a creative statesmanship "of will" that was indebted to Freud, Sorel, and Wallas.

Mr. Forcey depreciates as coincidental reasoning the asserted influence of Croly's *Promise of American Life* upon the New Nationalism, without perceiving in Roosevelt's letter to Croly that the book had catalyzed existing trends in the ex-President's thought and helped him to cope with the division of the Republican Party in 1910 by providing him with a nationalist philosophy and program. The evidence adduced of the *New Republic's* editors' influence upon Wilson, that is, the League of Nations, "A Peace Without Victory," Lippmann's services on The Inquiry and his authorship of the official interpretation of the Fourteen Points, should have vitiated the author's simile of the

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intellectual moths attracted by the white flames of men of power.

As a critical study of the political journalism of the Progressive movement financed by the Willard Straights, Mr. Forcey's book fills an important gap in scholarly literature. Students of transatlantic cultural relationships are indebted to him for his evidence of European influences in the intellectual orientation of Croly, Weyl, and Lippmann, and for illuminating the contributions made by Norman Angell, Graham Wallas, and Harold Laski to the *New Republic's* editorial policy during the years of neutrality. An even more important contribution is made by exploration of the rôle that pragmatism played in the thought and policy of the Rooseveltian progressives. Equally thought-provoking is the weighing of the constructive potentiality of nationalism for American reform such as Croly had advocated as a means to producing a positive program for progressivism. The relation of the *New Republic* to the "little renaissance" of 1912–1917 is well described, as is the opposition of Randolph Bourne and other cultural nationalists on the staff to editorial support of Wilson's war policy. The relation of Croly's new liberalism to the New Deal is developed incidentally.

CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER

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Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Edited by A. G. GUEST. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.—xviii, 292 pp. $4.00.

The great majority of the essays collected in this volume are of greater interest to the lawyer than to the political scientist. They reflect the present, almost exclusive, preoccupation of contemporary English jurisprudence with the analysis of legal concepts in the light of the meaning of language.

There are, however, two essays of great interest to political scientists as well as lawyers. In the chapter on "The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept," Norman S. Marsh analyzes the essential components of the rule of law in our time, against the background at the successive symposia held on this subject in the last few years at Chicago (Western oriented systems), Warsaw (Communist oriented systems), and New Delhi (International Commission of Jurists). Mr. Marsh's conclusion—not surprisingly—is that it is extremely difficult to give a hard, precise content to the rule of law except by tying it strongly to one, or to a small group, of closely knit legal systems. On the other hand, he shows that the concept of the rule of law is far more than a meaningless phrase. Perhaps the most interesting part of his discussion refers to difficulties of defining the con-

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cept of equality of law. In various attempts to cope with this problem, such documents as the European Convention of Human Rights, or the conclusions of the Committee on the Legislature and the Rule of Law at New Delhi, have tried to differentiate between discriminations on grounds of race, religion and sex which are held to be inadmissible, and other not easily defined differentiations which are clearly necessary in a legal system. The present reviewer has attempted to formulate the distinction as follows: ". . . a democratic ideal of justice demands that inequalities shall be inequalities of function and service but shall not be derived from distinctions based on race, religion or other personal attributes" (*Law in a Changing Society*, 1959, p. 491.)

In his essay on "Sovereignty" Mr. R. F. V. Heuston re-examines the familiar English doctrine made famous in particular by Dicey that there is no legal check whatsoever on the omnipotence of Parliament (this is of course one of the many ways in which the British legal system fundamentally differs from that of the United States). In the light of certain recent decisions and developments, notably in Australia and South Africa, Mr. Heuston points out that modern thinking on the rule of law tends to restrict this doctrine and to impose restrictions on the omnipotence of Parliament—and not only those in federal jurisdictions—in regard to the procedural requirements for the change of the existing constitutional structure.

As for the other essays it must be sufficient to give the briefest survey. Two of them ("Voluntary and Involuntary Acts," by P. J. Fitzgerald, and "Negligence, *Mens Rea* and Criminal Responsibility," by H. L. A. Hart) are concerned with the analysis of criminal law concepts. One ("Means, Motives, and Interests in the Law of Torts," by J. F. Lever) analyzes certain concepts in the law of torts. Two ("The Concept of Possession in English Law," by D. R. Harris, and "Ownership," by A. M. Honoré) analyze basic property concepts. Two ("The *Ratio Decidendi* of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent," by A. W. B. Simpson, and "Logic in the Law," by A. G. Guest) are concerned with the perennial problem of logic and policy, of stability and evolution, of reason and *fiat* in the common law. The last essay in the book ("Justiciability," by Geoffrey Marshall) deals with the elusive problem of finding a criterion by which to distinguish the proper sphere of judicially uncontrollable administrative discretion from that of administrative decisions properly reviewable by judicial re-examination.

All these essays are rich and rewarding for the analytical

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jurist. Yet they suffer, in this reviewer's opinion, from the limitation that contemporary English jurisprudence, especially of the Oxford variety, has chosen to impose upon itself, by excluding from the scope of its analysis (though not entirely and not successfully) the policy aspects of legal analysis. At most, the authors arrive at the point where they acknowledge, somewhat like Kelsen, policy choices as controlling but refuse to regard these as part of their job. Thus Professor Hart convincingly criticizes Dr. Turner's analysis of criminal negligence in terms of a state of mind. His solution is to compare the capacities of the reasonable man with those of the accused, with his particular capacities (including mental abnormality), for the purpose of arriving at a proper yardstick for criminal responsibility for negligence. Because of the self-imposed limitation of arriving at this conclusion by the analysis of meaning, Professor Hart cannot choose the simpler and shorter road of a discussion of the purpose and scope of modern criminal legislation which, notably in the field of negligence, makes reasonable conduct the only possible test of negligence. He might then have proceeded to compare and possibly contrast criminal negligence and civil negligence.

Again, Mr. Lever surveys a number of leading tort cases to show the meaning of means, motives and interests in the law of torts. But to do so for instance in the field of trade and labor conflicts without analyzing the often inarticulate conflicts of policies, outlook and even prejudices which alone make, for example, the difference between *Allen v. Flood, Quinn v. Leathen, Smith v. Lorrell* and the *Crofter Harris Tweed* case comprehensible, is bound to make this kind of analysis highly artificial. As the author himself rightly said, "the law is . . . concerned with the weighing of one interest against another." But his kind of analysis must stop at the threshold.

Again, Professor Honoré gives a subtle and learned classification of the eleven leading incidents of ownership. But he finds himself able only to make a passing reference to the impact of social control on the meaning of ownership, and none at all to the basic problem—not only a sociological but an analytical problem—first posed by Karl Renner at the beginning of the century and more recently taken up by Adolf Berle and others against the background of corporate ownership: that nowadays there may not only be "property without power" but also "power without property."

Finally, the essays devoted to the judicial process point out the limitations of legal logic, and the elasticity of the concept of

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ratio decidendi, but they must leave it to others to analyze the criteria which define the function of the judge in the evolution of law in a changing society.

Wolfgang Friedmann

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The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714. By Christopher Hill. *A History of England, Vol. 5.* Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1961.—xii, 340 pp. 25s.

Students of Stuart history who have read and appreciated *Economic Problems of the Church* (1956) and *Puritanism and Revolution* (1958), will not be disappointed in *The Century of Revolution* by the same author. Though part of a projected new history of England, it, at least, is by no means the conventional textbook. "History," Mr. Hill declares, "is not a narrative of events. The historian's difficult task is to explain what happened" (p. 1). On his judgments then the book must be rated. He writes well, is informed, thoughtful and perceptive. For the most part the explanations offered are sensible, though not all will agree with them. Economic interpretations predominate, but attention is given also to questions of character, religion and political circumstance. The cool appraisal of the faults and virtues of Charles I and witty summation of his much cleverer eldest son deserve high praise. The disappointments of mid-century idealist and reformer are weighed alongside of the achievements of the commercial adventurer and landed proprietor of the Restoration. Puritanism is exonerated from the "dissociation of sensibility," the decline of intimate musicianship and the divorce of literature and art. The conflict between native art and Stuart importation is skilfully portrayed. The emergence of modern society and its search for wealth is noticed and the plight of Bunyan's man with a burden on his back sympathetically depicted. Mr. Hill has managed to keep a fair balance between condemnation of robber baron and appreciation of the sorrows of the poorer part of the population. The strength of his book lies in his lively style and constant awareness of factors often cursorily treated, or entirely divorced from historical narrative.

The Century of Revolution provides a picture, or impression, of Stuart England. The rest of the British Isles and her overseas dependencies are virtually ignored. New England, New York and Virginia, for example, are casually referred to, the Carolinas, Jersies and Pennsylvania, not at all. The scope of the series could not include any narrative of exploration, settlement or exploitation, but in a work so much concerned with England's

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quest for material prosperity it is odd that more attention should not be paid to the preoccupation of the period of the Later Stuarts with imperial matters. Mr. Hill does, however, point out the essential continuities of Cromwellian and later policies.

The arrangement lends itself to some repetition but on the whole serves the purpose of the book well. Narrative is relegated to a few pages at the beginning of each of the four parts of the whole. The remainder is devoted to analysis of economic, political, religious and ideological affairs, presented with originality and some very provocative interpretations. I suspect that Mr. Hill writes quickly and this lends liveliness and brilliance to his pages. But his method, whatever it be, has also resulted in a number of odd slips which should be corrected as soon as a new edition is called for. Dates are confused: a logically connected sequence, the Stop of the Exchequer, the Declaration of Indulgence, and the declaration of the third Dutch war of the century, are carelessly treated (p. 195); the Cavalier Parliament was offensive to the ruling monarch (p. 230), but not in 1676, when it was not in session. Some statements need more support to make them valid: peas and beans should scarcely appear in a list of horticultural innovations without explanation (p. 202). Some commentators and letter writers are used too much (Baxter for one), to the exclusion of many equally useful observers. Parts of an interesting letter on the advantages of trade over land for making money are used only sixty pages apart (pp. 215 and 273). References to the Triennial Act of 1694 (pp. 257, 277) overemphasize it to the omission of others of the post-revolution period of greater importance. Mr. Hill refers his readers to the works of David Ogg, W. K. Jordan, Macaulay, Gardiner and Firth for the factual material of the period. He himself quite obviously enjoys familiarity with a wide range of literature. Nevertheless, if his book is to be useful for the general reader (who will enjoy it), and for the student who needs a bird's eye view (and this provides a good one), it must be thoroughly checked before re-issue. Moreover, a glance at the useful selection of "Books for further Reading" (pp. 322–326) suggests some important lacunae: for example, Jacob Viner's essential *English Theories of Foreign Trade before Adam Smith;* nor is there included any work on the colonial period of American history. These shortcomings should not deter readers on both sides of the Atlantic from *The Century of Revolution.* They will find much profit from this breathless survey of what is perhaps the most interesting era of English history.

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Politics and Religion in Seventeenth Century France. By W. J. STANKIEWICZ. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1960.—xi, 269 pp. $6.00.

The turncoat is never much liked. But French Protestant historians have always reserved an uncommon contempt for those of their fellow Huguenots who were indifferent to the faith and sought social acceptance from the Catholic majority. Attuned to this moral tradition, W. J. Stankiewicz asks why were the Huguenots, after nearly a century of apparent toleration, to suffer persecution anew at the hands of Louis XIV. He looks for the answer in political theory, that contained within the polemical literature which attended the toleration question from the wars of religion to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and its aftermath. He traces the decline of what he calls liberal ideas among both Protestants and Catholics. Liberalism is defined by the author in a nineteenth-century sense as simply the opposite of authority; liberalism is anything which serves to restrict the state's power. The toleration of the *politiques* rested only on expediency; it could not withstand the demands of the growing, all-embracing, and intolerant state. Gallicanism embodied religious and statist currents which, distrusting all variety within society, had in the end to root out the Calvinists. Until too late the too-loyal Huguenots themselves unwittingly helped to prepare their own sad fate by abandoning their sixteenth-century ideas of a limited monarchy which might be resisted and by preaching instead the new monarchist and statist sentiments. For his useful summary and analysis of the contemporary literature on these questions, scholars will be indebted to Stankiewicz. His treatment of Bossuet, Bayle, and Jurieu is especially clear and perceptive.

But, this said, I can but note that the book is often bad history. The author has his villains—Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV, the Catholic clergy. The conscious and consistent plotting that he imputes to all of them is misleading. His approach makes personal what was impersonal; it distracts attention from other forces which generated widespread hostility toward a Reformed Church which Catholics still believed to be antisocial and seditious. In the book, Richelieu was "truly totalitarian in his pursuit of an absolutist way of ruling" (p. 117). Actually hating the Protestants, he decided after taking away their means of armed resistance to fool them, to ensnare them, to soften them for the kill. How? By tolerating them! This was one of those "stealthy and secretive" moves by which the "cunning" Richelieu "with truly Machiavellian ingenuity" dis-

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guised his long-range plan. He succeeded in inducing in the Huguenots a "state of mass hypnosis," with the result that the Calvinists foolishly professed loyalty to the crown, dissociated themselves from the English regicides, and did not participate in the Fronde.

This approach to persons reflects also a deeper misunderstanding of French society, which comes of trying to fit the French into the English pattern. It is surely a mistake to identify the French aristocratic resistance and the Fronde with liberalism in any sense. The centrifugal tendencies of French social forces under the *ancien régime* made the crown the vehicle for change, much of which was liberal; unless, indeed, eighteenth-century enlightened absolutism or perhaps our own New Deal are regarded as illiberal merely because they used political power. In France liberalism had to mean achieving social cohesion, and if the constitutionalist French aristocracy resisted the state, it did not do so for a liberal end. The Huguenots' misfortune was that Catholics thought the Calvinist tradition resembled the antisocial aristocratic one. In general, the author has not succeeded in rooting political ideas properly in society, and this is reflected also in his sources. The names of Mousnier and Kossmann do not appear, and when he wishes to show how "cunningly" the clergy plotted to make of Louis XIV their dupe (p. 187), he cites as evidence a writing by Pierre Jurieu, the *emigré* Huguenot pamphleteer and foe of Bossuet.

Again, with respect to the Huguenots, Stankiewicz finds them wrong for not having resisted and rebelled at mid-century. But when lasting religious toleration was at last achieved during the eighteenth century, it was because Huguenots finally were thought to be good citizens, useful to the state, tame and assimilable, and not because they resisted.

We can applaud the sentiments which led the author to undertake this study. It is a useful book. But it stands also as testimony to the risk in applying the eternal verities of abstract morality and political theory inflexibly to history. Whether a Richelieu or a Louis XIV were hateful or not, they have to be understood as well as condemned; they have to be placed properly in the social and political environments from which they sprung. Understanding and forgiveness are not yet, let us hope, identical.

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France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800–1914. By RONDO E. CAMERON. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—xviii, 586 pp. $10.00.

Professor Cameron's book provides a richer offering than the title might suggest. Its central theme, to be sure, is that of French contributions to the industrialization of Europe in the nineteenth century, but the sidelights and background sketches with which that account is adorned add up to a formidable collection of authoritative contributions to general European economic history. In spite of the lively research by European scholars in recent years there is a dearth—and in English, a virtual absence—of comprehensive modern studies of the Industrial Revolutions outside of Britain. Partly for this reason, and partly for the novelty of some of the material, these judicious and illuminating essays on the *Leitmotif* of European industrialization almost overshadow the narrower question of what Frenchmen and French capital were doing abroad.

That they do not do so entirely is the measure of Cameron's achievement. The pursuit of what was French in the checkered map of European investment and enterprise could easily turn into a collection of spurious statistics and family histories of antiquarian charm but signifying little. Cameron has drawn his story on a far larger canvas than Henderson did for the British entrepreneurs on the Continent, and he demonstrates convincingly that French inspiration and the migration of French capital and skill deserve a far more prominent place in the account of European industrialization than is generally accorded them. To be sure, the magnitude of French capital exports has been well known, but talk of rentier mentality and political manipulation of the Bourse, and the indisputable futility of the more disreputable gilt-edged issues have deflected attention from the productive uses to which French savings were sometimes put. And how could a nation that, as Clapham saw it, hardly experienced an Industrial Revolution at all be expected to lead others along? The fact, however, appears to be that in technology and enterprise as well as in finance France played a part beyond her boundaries that was out of proportion to her domestic achievement, a part which in Europe probably exceeded that of Britain, even if the Napoleonic reforms are not thrown into the balance. The ingenious aspersions that have been levelled at French enterpreneurship lose most of their edge when this record is considered. Instead, it seems to confirm the suspicions that a relative dearth of industrial raw materials and a failure to pursue consistent liberal

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economic policies were the factors that to some extent retarded industrialization in France itself. French contributions in neighboring countries were greatest in industries where France enjoyed the least natural advantage. Although the author touches only lightly on these speculative matters, it is difficult to escape the impression that the *conquête pacifique* of Europe by French technicians and investors was, as it were, the mirror image of the sluggishness of the French economy itself.

It is a pleasure to have at last a comprehensive history in English of the Crédit Mobilier, as well as an account of the rise of investment banking that is worthy of this important subject. The attempt to straighten out the thorny statistics of French capital exports is also welcome. These are topics the author could not have avoided. But the assessment of French scientific and technological education, the histories of the financial press in France and Belgium, the survey of European public debts, the battle between Cavour and Rothschild, new materials on the Ottoman Debt—this and much more we owe to the author's broad conception of his subject and to the remarkable fruitfulness of his persevering archival searches.

It might perhaps be said that his admirable meticulousness eventually threatens to turn the account of Continental railway history into a somewhat overpowering catalog of branch lines—a sort of historical *Bradshaw*—but this painstaking disentangling is nevertheless a *tour de force*. There is more reason to question the relevance of some of the details of the innumerable company histories and of the private and public flotations. The nature of the evidence easily gives rise to financial myopia: an excessive concern with capitalization figures, and with the nominal values of equities.

Although it was in 1855 and not in 1885 that James Rothschild visited Persigny in London (p. 144), there is a remarkable absence of misprints even in the foreign languages so freely used, and the care that marks the presentation of this difficult volume must be commended. The source notes are models of their kind. (It is a relief to learn at last the fate of the 28-volume collection of the *Oeuvres* of the Pereires, projected as a literary monument but strangled by inflation in the page-proof stage.) Above all, however, this is a work of rare scholarship and energy, a major contribution which no student of modern economic history can afford to overlook.

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Mr. Secretary Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel to 1830. By NORMAN GASH. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—xiv, 693 pp. $12.50.

Sir Robert Peel was a puzzle to his contemporaries; he has remained one to historians. A member of the middle classes with the education and prejudices of the aristocracy, the spokesman for the Protestant cause who ultimately proposed Catholic Emancipation, the politican who revived the Conservative Party in the years following 1832 only to split it in 1846, the son of a manufacturer who led the land-owning protectionists, only to reverse positions once again and repeal the Corn Laws—Peel's life seems based on paradox and contradiction. The problem has fascinated historians and much work has been done on separate aspects of Peel's career. But no full scale biography has hitherto been attempted in this century.

Professor Norman Gash has now begun most admirably to fill this gap. The first volume of his biography, *Mr. Secretary Peel,* deals with events to the resignation of Peel and the Wellington ministry under mounting pressure for reform in November, 1830. Based on the Peel papers and other manuscript sources, it traces Peel's career in lavish detail. From his brilliant youthful successes at Harrow and Oxford through the early stages of political life as Under Secretary for War and Colonies and Chief Secretary for Ireland to his appointment in 1822 as Home Secretary, it traces events to the climax of the bill for Catholic Emancipation in 1829 when Peel and his "betrayal" of the Protestant cause dominated British politics, paving the way for a more tolerant political system and postponing the pressure of the Irish problem.

The book is of far broader interest than any outline of Peel's career can indicate. It is not simply the history of a man; it is also that of a family, the Peels of Tamworth, riding on the crest of the first wave of the Industrial Revolution to take its place among the great families of British politics. More than this, it is the record of the attempts of the traditional government of Britain to adjust to the transition forced upon it by the clamoring industrial interest and the clamorous demands of the lower orders. Professor Gash has shown in an earlier work, *Politics in the Age of Peel,* that much of the eighteenth-century system of government by corruption and influence had continued well beyond its textbook terminal date, the Reform Act of 1832; here he shows that the solution attributed to the mid-nineteenth century, the "Victorian compromise," was in fact being hammered out by such men as Peel in the early years of the century. The Reform Act which Peel opposed and the repeal of the

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Corn Laws for which he was responsible were not the beginnings of a new era so much as the end of a chain of compromise and concessions. Peel's struggle to govern the ungovernable Ireland, his organization of the police force and his reforms of the criminal code as Home Secretary in the 1820's, his support of his father's measures for factory legislation, are all part of the efforts of an oligarchic government to adjust to a mass society.

But a biography must ultimately succeed or fail to the extent to which it reveals and explains the man. At times it seems that the contradictions and complexities of Peel's character are concealed in the measured and precise prose with which Professor Gash chronicles his life. The occasional fits of passion and rashness, such as the abortive attempt at a duel with O'Connell in 1815, seem out of place in Peel's careful pursuit of his political career. The two great "betrayals" have sometimes been seen as similar outbursts. Professor Gash convincingly rejects this proposition and provides a moving vindication of Peel's actions. Peel was by nature and conviction a conservative, interested in the pursuit of power through established channels and the preservation of order. Change should never be sought for its own sake and expediency was the rule in politics. From the beginning he opposed Catholic Emancipation on these grounds; the politician must, as he said in a speech in 1817, "weigh the substantial blessings which he knows to have been derived from the government that *is,* against all the speculative advantages which he is promised from the government that is *to be.*" When Peel reversed his position in 1829, he did so on the same grounds and was willing to risk the dangers and antipathy, the charges of "betrayal," as he was to do again in 1846. In this, as Professor Gash shows, there was consistency rather than contradiction; in this lay Peel's greatness.

P. H. Noyes

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Communist Propaganda Methods: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia. By Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, with an introduction by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.—xiv, 287 pp. $6.00.

Dr. Reisky de Dubnic has tried to do too much and ended up doing too little, and that not always well. His book, in part a thorough and useful survey of the structure and operations of the Czechoslovak communist propaganda machinery, correctly stresses the rôle of Soviet guidance and control over the whole Czechoslovak propaganda mechanism. The author takes as one example for mass regime propaganda the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, and gives a thorough and revealing

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account of it. He analyzes regime propaganda toward three élite groups: humanistic intellectuals (writers and artists), scientists, and university faculty and students. He concludes that the regime's dogmatic and unimaginative assault on its four major ideological enemies (bourgeois nationalism, social democratism, Masarykism, and religion), has produced more apathy than enthusiasm, but "inasmuch as propaganda and indoctrination have contributed to the increase of opportunism, on the one hand, and to helplessness and apathy, on the other, the propaganda effort of the CPCS can be called a success" (p. 245).

Unfortunately, Dr. Reisky de Dubnic has not confined himself to this. His efforts to estimate the effectiveness of Czechoslovak communist propaganda and the situation it confronts, in this reviewer's opinion, leave much to be desired. His treatment of Czechoslovakia in relation to the Sino-Soviet bloc is brief and inadequate; the 1952 Slánsky trial, the question of Sino-Soviet differences, and Czechoslovak activities in the underdeveloped areas are not seriously considered. No attempt is made to compare Czechoslovak with Polish or Hungarian developments. The analysis of historical factors is too sketchy and, especially in respect to the intelligentsia, often misleading. Practically no attention is given to Slovak problems. Neither the analysis of the Czechoslovak Communist party nor that of the writers is in terms of groups and factional differences. The rôle of Party apparatchiki in the Central Committee agitprop section (so crucial in Poland and Hungary) is not analyzed. The analysis of the 1955-1956 thaw period is neither consecutive nor complete, particularly as to the reasons for passivity of the workers, and, as to the intellectuals, the crucial problem of difference of generations is not mentioned. (It is, like the literary thaw in general, brilliantly analyzed in Andreas Theiner, "Der Prager Germinal," *Wort und Wahrheit,* XV, 2 (February 1960), pp. 93-110). In general, the manipulative possibilities of regime propaganda are overestimated.

Finally, although the author and publisher are to be congratulated on having put the accents on Czech and Slovak words, there are far too many errors in proof-reading and transliteration. Transliteration from Russian is almost always that used in Czech rather than English (for example, Solochov instead of Sholokhov). German words are often misspelled (for example, "Tschechoslovakei" instead of "Tschechoslowakei"). The author's neglect of Slovakia is symbolized by his spelling the title of the Slovak literary periodical *Kultúrny Zivot* as if it were Czech *Kulturni Zivot* (pp. 264, 275).

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Some 20th-Century Historians: Essays on Eminent Europeans. Edited by S. William Halperin. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1961.—xxi, 298 pp. $5.95.

Of all areas of study in none is intellectual distinction harder to attain than in history. A novel hypothesis either excites a critical barrage or, what is much worse, inspires doting disciples who reduce it to a cliché. Yet there are historians whose lightest essays or most intermediate chapters are challenging, even exciting. Their very words, however directed to a particular problem, illuminate themes far removed, so that a sketch of medieval law or commerce on a sudden becomes a clue to eighteenth-century politics or twentieth-century economics. Some of the men treated here, notably Pirenne and Lefebvre, possessed such distinction, and if this be Francophilism my readers must make the most of it.

The history of historical writing, we know, is a branch of the history of thought. Even at the lowest level of bio-bibliography —and much historiography does not rise above this level—the reader discovers the historian's family, education, career, books, all of which may at once inspire the young and inform the mature Gibbon. Nevertheless, however interesting, this gossip is not enough. What we want to know is where the historian stands in the history of thought, why he studied his particular topic and from what standpoint, how far he reflected contemporary preoccupations, even what he had to say to sociologists or economists or indeed men of no specialty at all.

The present volume, homage to Bernadotte Schmitt, ranges from the lowest to the highest level. For the first the reader will find useful information on a dozen historians (including the honored recipient)—Pirenne, Trevelyan, Lefebvre, Butterfield, Valentin, Renouvin, Webster, Grousset, Eyck, Gooch, and Febvre. For the second—the place of these men in the history of thought—the reader will gain some insights not only on the subjects but also on the writers of the essays: James Cate, Henry Winkler, Gordon McNeil, Harold Parker, Richard Bauer, William Halperin, John Fagg, Donald Lach, William Maehl, Fred Hadsel, Palmer Throop, all at one time or another Schmitt's students. This group, mixed in approach as in quality, achieves a unity and value not always found in such volumes. Because one theme binds the whole a student seeking light on one historian may well venture beyond his especial concern.

His rewards will vary. Although from no essay is he likely to turn unnourished, some will give him scarcely more than crackers from an old barrel. And if we may not describe the content of all as adulation there is throughout an odor of

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hagiolatry that compliments neither the authors nor their subjects. Were I to say, as indeed I must, that on the whole the most rewarding essays, not necessarily in every instance very good ones, deal with the most memorable historians, I am of course thrusting the reviewer into the historiographical scene. If I find Lefebvre (extremely well appraised by the way) memorable and Trevelyan dull, it is because the first says much and the second little to me. Oh yes, I know, that style! Yet what excitement, aesthetic excitement too, springs from ideas, from analysis melding into synthesis. Here Lefebvre—ruthless, austere, rewarding—is superb. His ideas are transposable. Once grasped by a student of revolution they will forever end glib parroting of old catchwords, and, what is equally relevant, deter the coining of new ones.

In conclusion, I cannot forego a footnote, a slightly envious footnote, concerning several historians here considered. How fortunate they were. They had energy, ideas, yes, but they also had opportunities, opportunities to achieve intellectual distinction. Not only were materials to hand and chores absent, they were also writing what they taught, and they were teaching their specialty. Often men with equally good ideas are expending their energies on elementary surveys, deprived of any stimulus to voice their own historical ideas. Yet I must not conclude with an alibi. It had been better for many a well known historian had he been compelled to spell out his phrases to freshmen: he might have spared his readers dreary commonplaces and hollow rhetoric. He might indeed have been as sound a historian as the best of the men examined in this volume.

CHARLES F. MULLETT

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

Presidential Transitions. By LAURIN L. HENRY. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1960.—xviii, 755 pp. $7.50.

This book is an important contribution to the literature on the American presidency in an area hitherto scanted by political scientists. In the time between presidential election and inauguration, policy-formation and decision-making, especially when a party overturn is involved, become increasingly difficult. Mr. Henry delineates the various ways in which the outgoing President prepares to deliver up his office and the President-elect gets ready to resume his new and great responsibilities.

The author examines four presidential transitions in the twentieth century; in each of these periods, the incoming President was of a different party from his predecessor in the

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White House: Taft-Wilson, 1912-1913; Wilson-Harding, 1920-1921; Hoover-Roosevelt, 1932-1933; Truman-Eisenhower, 1952-1953.

The author has followed the conventional historical approach, with parallel reconstructions rather than a truly comparative analysis. The span of forty years, 1912-1952, serves effectively to contrast the tempo and manners of the times. "The Taft-Wilson transition was the first party overturn in the modern era of the Presidency. In the leisurely pace, the old-fashioned manners, the intimate scale of government activity, and some of the accessories like the cow on the White House lawn, there did indeed linger a great deal of nineteenth century simplicity and innocence. Taft and Wilson were the last President and President-elect to ride to the Capitol in a horse-drawn carriage." The events of the Eisenhower inauguration were televised to the whole world for a full twelve hours—including a five-hour parade displaying American military might in the age of nuclear armaments. The arrangements during the Taft-Wilson transition were ad hoc, informal, and personal. The Truman-Eisenhower transition was systematized, coördinated, and institutionalized.

Though the author recognizes the deeper problems of institutional structure and function, he focuses upon personalities. And, "to give the reader a feeling of reality about inherently interesting people," he is inclined to gossip and to point up how great men at the peak of success will still let personal tensions and political rivalries override the national interest. The Hoover-Roosevelt transition, in the midst of domestic crisis, called for extraordinary coöperation between the incumbent and the President-elect. But Hoover exhibited "incredible political ineptitude" in his take-it-or-leave-it approach; and Roosevelt, who felt he was being put on the spot, let Hoover sweat it out. On the other hand, Warren G. Harding is viewed somewhat sympathetically as "a captive of the theory of his time and his party that encouraged the President to take a narrow view of his power"—"a modest man with modest aims" who promised to appoint "the best minds" to his Administration. President Truman appears the most determined to exit as a statesman. "Harry S. Truman was preparing a legacy in the form of a concept of the Presidency and an image of himself in it."

In his Preface, Mr. Henry indicates that he found difficulty in "handling the data necessary to describe a presidential transition as such without becoming lost in the broader political history of the period." As a result, he has written an over-

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size book, nearly 800 pages. To make reading more enjoyable, he tends to play up dramatic episodes—election night, the inaugural ceremonies, picking the Cabinet members, initial meetings of the President-elect with congressional and party leaders. Thus the great issues of the day, from budgets to foreign policy, are developed as stage settings for dramatis personae. The author never reaches down to the departmental level where anonymous public administrators grapple with substantive policies. The responsibility of the bureaucracy for continuity of administration and the orderly response of the civil service to changes in political leadership—these are the complex problems which Mr. Henry perceives but does not really tackle.

This is the crux of *Presidential Transitions:* "a party system that makes it both a minor miracle and a painful experience for the outparty to win a presidential election and then gives the President-elect little assistance in forming a government." Nevertheless, the need for party coherence and corporate responsibility in the transfer of political power in the modern state are blurred into the background, as each pair of principals assume front-stage positions. The author might have achieved greater depth if he had proceeded with his original intention to do a case study of the Truman-Eisenhower transition within a more analytical framework. But the survey of four transitions offers a discerning perspective for the final chapter on "problems and prospects." In this broader context, the author's observations appear more knowledgeable, his suggestions obviously sensible.

MARIAN D. IRISH

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy. By RICHARD N. ADAMS, *et al.* Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, New York, 1960.—xiv, 353 pp. $5.

The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America. By CHARLES O. PORTER and ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961.—215 pp. $4.50.

The first of January, 1959, the day on which Castro deposed Batista and assumed total power in Cuba, may well come to symbolize the date that the United States awakened to the political existence of Latin America. The spectacle of a socialist state oriented toward Moscow has startled all Americans and

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brought the Cold War painfully close to us. And because this has happened and because it was a Latin American nation that brought this about, we have now begun to pay more attention to Latin America.

Perhaps some day the United States will actually be grateful to Castro for having made us see the dangers of our past neglect and follies as well as our present and future responsibilities towards our neighbors to the south.

Today, United States policy towards Latin America is undergoing vast changes. A new theme is making itself heard—outspoken advocacy of social change. It is a theme born of the realization that no longer can we side with the dictators of the Right or the safe and conservative status quo oligarchies in order to keep Latin America on our side. We have awakened to the dangerous appeal international communism and its variations such as *Fidelismo* hold as the alternative to the tyranny, poverty and social injustice that the status quo has provided. We are now aware that our policy must be the development in Latin America of a liberal and progressive society based on the principles of social justice.

Though the two books reviewed here differ in their approaches —Porter and Alexander using the historical-political approach while the Adams study makes use of the tools of sociological and anthropological analyses—both stress the need for social change. And both pay attention to the rôle of the United States in this social-economic-political evolution of Latin America.

The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America provides a generalized and highly readable picture of various aspects of Latin American politics. In this joint effort, Charles O. Porter, one of the all-too-few Congressmen who have shown an understanding of Latin America, and Professor Robert J. Alexander describe the forces favoring and impeding the growth of democracy in Latin America. On the pro-side they list as recent democratic victories the fall of Perón, of Pérez Jiménez and of Batista and the expansion of democratic tendencies in other parts of the continent. As blots on the ledger they list the remaining tyrannies of Castro and others. In their conclusion, after deprecating the previous errors of United States over-support of dictators and under-support of Latin American democratic and economic aspirations, the authors call on the United States to "use all the weight of its prestige and power to advance democracy" in Latin America before it may be too late for us to act effectively. Unfortunately the authors did not include either footnotes or a bibliography, a factor which might prove a hindrance to those wishing to pursue further the issues raised.

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In its analysis in *Social Change in Latin America Today* the Council on Foreign Relations has maintained its usual high standard of scholarship. This excellently edited and thoroughly documented study is a mine of information for policy maker, scholar and *aficionado* alike. Following an introduction by the late Lyman Bryson, John P. Gillin sets the stage by his examination of the social revolution that is currently sweeping Latin America. Noting that "Latin America is experiencing the decay of an old class system and the growing pains of a new one," Gillin is encouraged by the emergence of a middle segment which may play a crucial rôle in helping Latin America come of age in the modern world. Other essays include a case study of Peru as an example of guided social change by Allan R. Holmberg, and analyses of Bolivia's problems by Richard W. Patch, of the Brazilian national scene by Charles Wagley, of Guatemala by Richard N. Adams, and of Mexico by Oscar Lewis. The essays are similar in organization. This facilitates meaningful comparisons and the identification and evaluation of common problems, trends and solutions. Furthermore each essay skilfully translates the raw data that the analyst has uncovered into significant general observations representing policy alternatives for that particular area.

Several key assumptions underlying both books will however be open to questioning. These are: first, that social change is advantageous to Latin America; secondly, that the emergence of a middle segment or middle class automatically guarantees the healthy social, economic and democratic evolution of these nations; and thirdly, that Latin America should be remade, or should remake itself, in the image of the United States. Though one encounters occasional protestations throughout the two books that a "*gringo* utopia" is not being advocated, in chapter after chapter, the United States middle class *ethos* is paraded as the most appropriate model for Latin America.

Historical examples abound to show that the transformation of a feudal society to an industrially based democracy may be filled with turmoil and tension. An overly idealistic outlook on the part of students and policy makers eagerly and optimistically advocating social change may underestimate the risks of social chaos and societal disorganization generated by rapid and radical change. The specter of a rootless, aimless, traditionless society, floating in a sociological limbo between a rejected feudalism and an unattained industrial democracy, can be frightening. The risk of political *anomie* may be small, but have we not un-

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justifiably ignored its possibility? In future studies of underdeveloped lands should we not pay greater attention to this threat?

ROBERTO E. SOCAS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa. By VIRGINIA THOMPSON and RICHARD ADLOFF. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960.—xii, 595 pp. $8.75.

Almost nothing has been written in English about the new states born of former French Equatorial Africa (AEF). Therefore, this book is another "first" for Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, as were their studies of Southeast Asia and French West Africa. Their new book discusses a formidable array of topics, ranging from the colonial background, institutions and administration of the new states to their foreign relations, land tenure, trade, industry, population, education and religion. It is based on extensive research that began while the area was still a federation within the Fourth French Republic and continued after the dissolution of AEF in April, 1959, and the birth of the French Community. Four closing chapters deal with the new states of Gabon, Tchad, Congo Republic (Brazzaville), and the Central African Republic.

The authors worked against considerable odds. First, there is no obvious framework in which to consider raw data on "ex-AEF." After the Second World War lightning changes occurred in constitutional arrangements, parties and foreign relations. Secondly, these states have little internal unity. In pre-European days, except in northern Tchad, the area which became AEF was mostly composed of small scale political units, or of outlying districts of states which had their capitals in the Congo (Leopoldville), in Angola (Bakongo), in Cameroon, northern Nigeria or the Sudan. The frontiers of "ex-AEF" took shape only at the Congress of Berlin where France received the leftovers from the pie divided among Belgium, Germany and Britain. In the first half of this century France invested little money or energy in the states of AEF which were always the poor relations among the French colonies. They cover a huge area—some two and a half million square kilometers—but the average density of population is less than two per square kilometer, giving an estimated total population of less than five million. Of this, Tchad has two and a half million, the Central African Republic a little over one million, the Congo Republic three quarters of a million. The richest of the states, Gabon, has fewer than a half million people. Independence came less

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because of any initiative from within than as a logical sequence to the end of France's empire in North and West Africa. It came to each state separately, rather than to AEF as a whole, as a result of a deliberate French policy of "Balkanisation." Thus, mainly external forces determined the frontiers of these four new states.

Thompson and Adloff have put together scarce and valuable information. It is a pity, however, that the authors have not been able to overcome the difficulties inherent in their choice of area. They have developed no standpoint from which to offer their data, and leave the reader with but a small comprehension of the forces of change. Chronology and chapter headings are not framework enough, particularly in presenting states that have no national economies, little cultural homogeneity, no geographic coherence and are characterized by sharp discontinuities in political history. Having no framework of their own, the authors put too great reliance upon the various frames of reference of those who produced most of the oral and written information they gathered—mostly French officials.

For an understanding of the past it is useful, as the authors have done, to look closely at the relationship between France and "ex-AEF." But for an understanding of the future it might have been well to examine the ideas, the points of cleavage, and the links among Africans living in the four states. The book fails to pose some obviously interesting questions. A mass party emerged only in the Central African Republic—Why not in the other states? Why did messianic cults spread so much more widely in Equatorial Africa than in West Africa? The authors write of the entrance of African priests into AEF politics, but do not go on to ask why. There are some passing remarks about the fascinating *mystique* of De Gaulle, which even expressed itself in a "religio-political cult, Ngol" (p. 44), having its roots in the early response of Equatorial Africa to the Free French call during the Second World War. It is a pity that these ideas are not developed further.

In spite of these limitations, as well as some factual errors, this book is sure to be useful to travellers and to students of African affairs.

RUTH SCHACHTER

BOSTON UNIVERSTY

Community Political Systems. Edited by Morris Janowitz. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1961.—259 pp. $7.50.

Sociologists and political scientists have recently rediscovered the community as a social context for the study of political systems. In most instances their research efforts take the form of

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case studies of one or a few communities in depth. Janowitz, in editing this volume, has provided a brief overview of the field and presented a few of the best and most typical of these studies.

The volume presents three types of studies. The first, perhaps most representative of all, concerns itself with the "power structure" in American communities, attempting to ascertain who prevails in community decision-making. Schultze and Scoble deal with this problem in two medium-sized communities—Bennington, Vermont, and a mid-western town. Both demonstrate that community power structures, at least in America, may be more fluid than the research of Hunter, the Lynds, Mills and their followers, or the speculations and polemics of Marxian and Populist critics of the corporation, would have us believe. Schultze's analysis of the "bifurcation" of the power structure, with both economic dominants and local public officials prevailing in different spheres, and Scoble's picture of the "factionalism" between various crowds and interest groups provide compelling evidence of a pluralistic power structure.

A second type (Hawley on Flint, Michigan, and Greer on St. Louis) points up the structural inadequacies, from the viewpoint of reform-minded social scientists and critics, of many local, township governments in metropolitan fringe areas. A generalized apathy, an ignorance of government and its functions, and a lack of leadership among the citizenry are mentioned as factors contributing to the "political lag" in metropolitan areas. In those areas fringe communities maintain archaic forms of governments that are grossly inadequate for solving new problems of service and welfare, created by the growth of population and industry. Unfortunately, as Greer himself notes, the more essential question of how the existing power structures in such areas prevent an adjustment to changed circumstances, is never studied. It is not enough just to know about public opinion on such matters.

Rossi and Cutright on a middle-sized industrial satellite community and Valen and Katz on four semi-rural communes in Southern Norway provide a third type of research on the ways developed by local party organizations for recruiting leaders and for maintaining electoral support. Rossi and Cutright show how the absence of non-partisan rules in the selection of party officials helps maintain greater solidarity and effectiveness for the party in power. Valen and Katz provide a needed comparative perspective by pointing up the ways in which parties are integrated into communities and maintain electoral support in Norway. Their attempt to place the study in a national and cross-national context is most welcome.

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One of the disappointing features of the volume is its failure to provide any conceptual scheme for a comparative analysis of community political systems. All the authors note the limitations of intensive case studies. Rossi and Schultze are especially aware of the problems of comparative generalization. I would maintain (as do Rossi, Miller and Form in other contexts) that we are now ready for such comparative research. This need not involve an elaboration of formal conceptual schemes. To take the power structure studies, as an example, one strategy would be to classify communities in terms of such factors as size, degree of industrialization, degree of unionization, degree of ethnic, religious and occupational heterogeneity, degree of politicization of various interest groups, extent to which a two-party system or its equivalent exists, degree to which one institutional order (for example, economic, educational, religious) may predominate in the community, and degree of differentiation of the polity from other institutional orders. After classifying communities we might then attempt to make clear the conditions under which different types of power structures prevail, from the most monolithic to the most pluralistic. This could be done by going back over the accumulated case studies and codifying the findings. It could also be done, perhaps at a later time, by designing field studies and selecting communities by criteria of theoretical relevance (archetypal cases) rather than of convenience.

This is not to deny the value and importance of case studies. It is only to say that a keener sensitivity to comparative generalization will make future case studies more meaningful. Perhaps, before too long, another volume on community political systems will be published marking the advances made.

DAVID ROGERS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Industrialization in the Middle East. By KURT GRUNWALD and JOACHIM O. RONALL. New York, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960.—xx, 394 pp. $7.00.

In this book the authors have embarked on an ambitious study of the problems of economic development in the Middle East. They have covered an enormous amount of ground. The book is, in effect, an effort to present the economic history of a dozen or so Middle Eastern countries with special reference to their industrial development. Such a study has its advantages: it is possible to find in one volume important information on the area as a whole as well as a proper economic perspective of the region. On the other hand, the detailed coverage of a given

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subject or of an individual country is limited by the very nature of the undertaking. The studies of individual countries provided in Part II of the book, no doubt, do give the reader a fair background on the subject. However, the reader interested in deeper knowledge would find indispensable the studies undertaken by the United Nations as a part of their work program in the field of economic development.

The most valuable contributions of the book are contained in Part I. The authors have surveyed the resources, both human and natural, of the region. They have dealt with communications in the area and the monetary resources available for the purposes of economic development. In this they have done their task well. The value of the book, however, would have been greater if the authors had formulated conclusions applicable to the policy-making process in the underdeveloped countries. One can find these implicitly stated in a number of places. For example, the authors emphasize the need to support small industries in the process of industrial growth, but these considerations are tucked away in theoretical discussions of matters like the kinds of industrialization—endogeneous and exogeneous—and so on.

The authors have dwelt very little on the subject of politics. It is, however, impossible to avoid the topic completely. It is pointed out, for example, that the Middle Eastern countries after imitating Western civilization with regard to technological development, have not, however, adopted Western values, largely due to the emergence of the "Zealots" (p. 368). It is also stated that the idea of regional development has not caught on because of political and social divergencies. However, coöperation in the field of development such as pest control, transfer of population and so on, is possible, according to the authors, only if the political factor is removed. In the Middle East, the problem is not one of a patient refusing to be cured, as the authors imply, but it is a question, in the opinion of the reviewer, of a doctor providing the right kind of medicine (p. 370).

In the next edition of the book, it is suggested that the authors indicate sources of the statistical tables. A few inaccuracies in the data are noticeable, but this may well be due to the fact that the authors have not been able to take into consideration the revision of certain data by some countries, a fact which haunts all research work.

G. S. Gouri

United Nations

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The Struggle for Survival: Indian Cultures and the Protestant Ethic in British Columbia. By F. E. LA VIOLETTE. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961.—xi, 201 pp. $5.50.

Professor La Violette's book is largely a catalogue of legal disputes, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, between white settlers, missionaries and administrators on the one hand and the native Indian populations of British Columbia on the other. The book concentrates on two main issues: Potlach law and the question of land title. It also deals briefly with the emergence of Indian national consciousness during the period 1946–1951. In providing a summary of hitherto somewhat inaccessible documentary evidence Professor La Violette has performed a service. Unfortunately, his study does not have the narrative appeal that an historian might have given it nor has he succeeded in making a contribution of sociological merit. In fact, he may have done a disservice to the cause of historical sociology through his lack of theoretical sophistication.

The author's thesis is that Indian culture and institutions were attacked by the whites because the Indian way of life offended the "Protestant ethic." He relies upon a quotation from Leonard Reissman's *Class in America* to substantiate the view that North American whites valued industry, perseverance, sobriety and thrift. He makes no attempt to examine this assumption critically or to consider whether the said virtues were exclusively "protestant." A more thorough discussion of the views of Max Weber, R. H. Tawney and H. M. Robertson would have been appropriate as well as some consideration of the alternative hypothesis that it was economic conditions which determined the values held and not vice versa.

Professor La Violette makes certain comparisons between early colonial policies in Canada and in various parts of Africa. He states: "In West Africa, now the state of Ghana (*sic!*), the British refused to permit any European to possess land; it is said today that this principle of land control facilitated the evolution of the tribal people and the emergence of Ghana as an independent state" (p. 7). He goes on to draw attention to the variations in policy and attitudes in Africa and elsewhere and the lack of a consistent social philosophy of colonial rule. However, he does not appear to recognize that the crucial variables in the colonial situations in various countries were (1) the assumed suitability or unsuitability of areas for white settlement and (2) whether or not it was necessary to exploit native labor. In the case of Canada large scale immigration from Europe made it unnecessary to employ Indian labor in the white economy.

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Furthermore, the numerical ratio of whites to Indians after 1850 and the balance of coercive power made it impossible for the Indian population to offer more than a token resistance to the annexation of their land, whether by "treaty" or so-called "peaceful penetration."

Professor La Violette calls his book *Struggle for Survival* and points out that until the 1920's it was widely assumed that the Indian population was doomed to extinction. However, he does not make it clear whether he is endeavoring to analyze the conditions under which the Indian population as a demographic entity succeeded in avoiding extinction or whether he is concerned with the survival of a distinctive culture. From a theoretical point of view these are two different problems which are not always adequately distinguished by sociologists or anthropologists. Frequently, biological survival may involve radical changes in culture and social institutions while the survival of a culture, or of particular elements in a culture, may involve biological sacrifices. It was not until 1923 that Indians were permitted to hold commercial fishing licenses in their own names. It may not be altogether a coincidence that the Indian population of British Columbia ceased to decline from that date onwards.

ANTHONY H. RICHMOND

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad 'Alí in Egypt. By HELEN ANNE B. RIVLIN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—xxii, 393 pp. $8.00.

A detailed study of the economic policy of the founder of modern Egypt is long overdue. Dr. Rivlin describes the beginnings of Muhammad 'Alí, his land reforms, administration, finances and so on, taking into account the changes in policy during his long rule (1805-1849). Appendices, notes, bibliography and a good index enhance the value of the book and facilitate its use. A glossary of technical Arabic and Turkish terms is particularly welcome.

Indispensable as it is, the book suffers from two disabilities. The author draws almost exclusively on Western sources. She worked in archives of Paris, London and Washington; the unpublished Columbia thesis (1952) of Lenoir C. Wright, "The United States and Egypt, 1830-1914," who already used the Department of State records has remained unknown to the author. Thus, like her predecessors, for example, G. Guémard (*Les réformes en Egypte,* 1936), she sees Egypt through the eyes of foreign observers. But only Egyptian archives can help us to see

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life along the banks of the Nile from the point of view of the Egyptians themselves. Some documents translated or summarized in *Cahiers d'histoire égyptienne,* 1948, p. 34, give new details on Muhammad 'Alí's fiscal measures in 1807 and 1809. In possession of sixteen villages, he was at this date an important landholder himself. But he appropriated a half of the land rent under the pretext of punishing his class for the oppression of peasants. Later, he designated the crops to be raised (p. 115), and the local officials were told the quotas required from each village (p. 92). How did the government arrive at its figures? According to the information which the author seems to regard as trustworthy (p. 120), the Pasha between 1805 and 1846 almost decupled his revenues. The figures are hardly realistic. Clot-Bey, a well informed panegyrist of Muhammad 'Alí, believed that the Pasha doubled the revenues of the State (from 35 mill. francs in 1799 to more than 60 mill.). If his economic policy was a failure, as Dr. Rivlin is inclined to believe, how could Muhammad 'Alí accumulate these millions? By oppression of the peasants? But the subsistence level of the peasant was incredibly low during the whole century [*Cf.* Charles Audebau, *L'Egypte contemporaine,* Vol. 10 (1919), p. 135]. In 1835, according to the United States Agent Hodgson (quoted in Wright's dissertation), the Egyption peasant lived on four cents per day.

On the other hand, the author misjudges Muhammed 'Alí and his work. She says that Muhammed 'Alí should have "curbed his private ambition [and] devoted his energies to the improvement of the conditions of the people . . . and to the development of sound institutions." In other words, he should have been a George Washington in turban. Many years ago I emphasized the striking similarity between the economic measures of Muhammad 'Alí and the policy of Ptolemy II (*Renaissance,* 1944-1945, p. 386). But if Dr. Rivlin had just read a couple of good books on Egyptian history, she would have learned that the flight from the land, for instance, was not a result of Muhammad 'Alí's fiscality. The first Arabic rulers of Egypt already branded the fleeing peasants, and the Pharaoh Amenophis III sent the fugitives to a kind of concentration camp. Of course, according to the principles of specialization, if you write about Muhammad 'Alí, you do not need to know anything about the Pharaohs —and vice versa.

E. J. BICKERMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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